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In recent years courts have begun to ponder the first amend­
ment issue of public school library book censorship. 1 These 
fledgling judicial efforts have produced a mostly inadequate analysis 
of the complex legal picture presented by school library book censor­
ship. Courts that desire to intervene in censorship disputes almost 
unthinkingly have relied on first amendment doctrines developed 
outside of the censorship area and assumed their easy application to 
this new problem.2 Courts that take a hands-off attitude toward the 
area rely heavily on the inappropriateness ofjudicial intervention as 
their central theme.3 . Nowhere to be found in these judicial re­
• Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. B.A., State 
University of New York at Stony Brook, 1970; J.D., Boston University, 1973; LL.M., 
New York University, 1975. 
1. E.g., Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980); 
Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); Presidents 
Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 998 (1972); Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 
615 (D. Vt. 1979), aJid, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 
F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read Defense Corom. v. School Corom., 454 F. 
Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978). 
2. E.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); 
Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read Defense 
Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978). 
3. E.g., Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980); 
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sponses is there a comprehensive analysis of the difficult issues raised 
by these cases. 
Recently, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
a case of school library censorship.4 That case may establish the first 
amendment boundaries of such disputes, or it may mark only the 
first of several Supreme Court probings of this complex problem. In 
advance of any Supreme Court resolution, this article will explore 
the school library censorship area with attention to the subtleties that 
beset any easy resolution of the problem. Its attempt is to highlight 
the often overlooked first amendment difficulties in the area even 
more than to provide clear solutions to the problems raised. This 
article will strive to point out where the cases fail and what issues 
require further probing before an adequate intellectual framework 
for dealing with the area can be created. 
School library book censorship can occur in three related fact 
patterns: (1) A challenge to a school board decision to remove a 
Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972). 
4. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 404 (2d 
Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981). The Pico litigation began in the New 
York Supreme Court, Nassau County in an effort to overturn a decision of the Island 
Trees Board of Education removing nine books from elementary and secondary school 
libraries and from use in the curriculum. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union 
Free School Dist., No. 22724 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., tiled December 20, 1976). Defendants later 
removed the case to federal court and Judge Pratt of the Eastern District of New York 
granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. 474 F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). 
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the 
case for trial. 638 F.2d 404. The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit was by a divided panel, Judges Sifton and Newman voting to remand for 
trial based on the allegations contained in plaintiffs' class action complaint, and Judge 
Mansfield dissenting. Judge Sifton of the Eastern District of New York, sitting by 
designation, reasoned that the procedural irregularities in the record, including the in­
volvement of persons in the decisionmaking process not usually concerned with library 
operations and the ambigious quality of the justifications offered for the removal, made 
out a prima facie case justifying federal court intervention. Id at 414-15. Judge New­
man, writing separately but concurring in the result, was of the view that a first amend­
ment violation would be made out by a removal based on the political content of the 
books. By contrast, removal because the books contained vulgar language and sexually 
explicit passages would be justifiable. Since Judge Newman found the record, in the 
absence of a trial, inadequate as a basis for determining the nature of the school board's 
motivation, he voted to remand for trial. Id at 432. Judge Mansfield, in dissent, argued 
that the majority's action was an unwarranted interference in matters of educational pol­
icy. Id at 419. After the Second Circuit's ruling, defendants tiled a petition for a rehear­
ing en banco The court, by a five-to-five vote, denied the request for a rehearing. 646 
F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1981). Defendants then tiled a petition for a writ of certiorari and the 
United States Supreme Court granted the petition on October 13, 1981. 102 S. Ct. 385 
(1981). 
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book from the school library;5 (2) a suit to force the removal of a 
book from the schoollibrary;6 and (3) a suit to force the purchase of 
a book for the schoollibrary.7 In distinguishing among these three 
situations, courts have disagreed on the proper result in the first fact 
pattern8 and uniformly have rejected claims in the second and third 
5. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 404 (2d 
Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981) (the following nine books were ordered 
removed from elementary and secondary school libraries and were no longer permitted 
to be used in the curriculum: (1) Slaughter House Five by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.; (2) The 
Naked Ape by Desmond Morris; (3) Down These Mean Streets by Piri Thomas; (4) Best 
Short Stories by Negro Writers edited by Langston Hughes; (5) Go Ask Alice by Anony­
mous; (6) A Hero Ain't Nothing But a Sandwich by Alice Childress; (7) Soul on Ice by 
Eldridge Cleaver; (8) A Reader for Writers edited by Jerome Archer; and (9) The Fixer 
by Bernard Malamud; a tenth book, Black Boy by Richard Wright, was available to 
students only upon parental approval); Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 
F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980) (plaintiffs challenged defendant's decisions prohibiting the use 
of Values Clar!fication, Growing up Female in America, Go Ask Alice, The Bell Jar, The 
Stepford Wives and portions ofStudent Critic in the high school English curriculum, and 
permanently removing Go Ask Alice from the school library); Minarcini v. Strongsville 
City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976) (challenge to the removal of the novels 
Catch 22 by Joseph Heller and Cot's Cradle by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. from the library of 
the high school in Strongsville, Ohio as well as a complaint against the refusal to approve 
Catch 22 and God Bless You, MT. Rosewater by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. for use as textbooks); 
Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972) (challenge to the removal of all copies of Down These 
Mean Streets, an autobiographical novel about growing up in New York City's Spanish 
Barrio, from junior high school libraries in the District); Bicknell v. Vergennes Union 
High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615 (D. Vt. 1979), affd, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 
1980) (challenge to the removal of two books, The Wanderers, by Richard Price and Dog 
Day Afternoon by Patrick Mann, from the high school library and also the adoption of 
restrictive library acquisition policies); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 
(D.N.H. 1979) (challenge to the removal of issues of Ms. from the library of Nashua 
Senior High School); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 
(D. Mass. 1978) (suit to require the reshelving of an anthology of writings by adolescents 
entitled Male and Female Under 18 which had been removed from the Chelsea High 
School Library because of a poem included in the anthology, "The City to a Young 
Girl," containing "street language"). 
6. Evans v. Selma Union High School Dist., 193 Cal. 54,222 P. 801 (1924) (action 
to enjoin purchase of 12 copies of the King James version of the Bible for the high school 
library); Rosenberg v. Board of Educ., 196 Misc. 542, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 1944) 
(suit to halt the use of Oliver Twist by Charles Dickens and The Merchant of Venice by 
William Shakespeare for classroom reading and to require the removal of the books from 
school libraries). 
7. In re Appeal of Daniel Kornblum, 70 N.Y.S. Educ. Dep't Rep. 19 (1949). 
Daniel Kornblum, a taxpayer and the publisher of The Nation, sought to have The Ha-
I tion included in the list of periodicals approved for high school libraries. Since the mag­
azine previously had been on the approved list and was removed from that list for the 
1948-49 school year, the case bordered between being a challenge to a decision to remove 
a book and a suit to force the purchase of a book. 
8. For cases ruling against a school board's decision to remove a book from the 
school library, see note 2 supra. For cases upholding the school board's decision, see 
note 3 supra. 
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categories.9 These distinctions are made ofibandedly without any 
real attention paid to whether a coherent approach to the area is 
being developed. 
The first step in revealing the layers of complexity that lie hid­
den below the analytically smooth surface of ~he school library cases 
is to identify the reasoning relied on by the case law. From there the 
task will be to explore the accuracy of this reasoning. Finally, an 
additional perspective will be sought by comparing and contrasting 
the three factual situations in which the school library censorship 
issue arises. The aim of this part of the inquiry will be to develop 
some sense of the appropriateness of distinctions made by the courts 
among these three settings. 
II. CHALLENGES TO BOOK REMOVALS 
The censorship scenario that has received the greatest amount 
of judicial attention is that of a school board decision to remove a 
shelved book from the school library.lO Typically, in response to 
such action a group, variously composed of students,11 parents, 12 
9. In both Evans v. Selma Union High School Dist. 193 Cal. 54, 222 P. 801 (1924) 
and Rosenberg v. Board of Educ. 196 Misc. 542, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 1944), the 
courts rejected the claims of parties seeking to remove books from the school library. 
The Commissioner, however, upheld the Board of Education's decision to remove The 
Nation from its list of approved periodicals in In re Appeal of Daniel Kornblum, 70 
N.Y.S. Educ. Dep't Rep. 19 (1949). 
10. See cases cited note 5 supra. 
II. Students were among plaintiffs in all of the library book removal cases. In 
some instances, due to their minority, students sued through their parents as next friends. 
See, e.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976). This 
article, for the most part, will view the school library book removal cases from the per­
spective of the rights of student plaintiffs. While other persons may have first amend­
ment rights in this situation, the major impact is on the students themselves. Moreover, 
the purpose of the article, to demonstrate the unrealized complexities of the case law, can 
be achieved by viewing the problem from the perspective of the students. The author 
will leave it to others to detail the interests of other parties in the book censorship situa­
tion. For an examination of the parental interest in the related area of classroom book 
censorship, see Comment, Challenging Ideological Exclusion of Curriculum Material: 
Rights ofStudents and Parents, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 485 (1979). 
12. Parents of students attending schools in which an incident of library book re­
moval occurred sued on their own behalf in Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community 
School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972); Bicknell v. 
Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615 (D. Vt. 1979), affd, 638 
F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980); and Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. 
Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978). In Presidents Council and Bicknell, the parents were allowed 
to remain as parties to the suit and no mention was made of the basis for the parents' 
claim. In Right to Read, the parents of a student plaintiff were dismissed from the action 
for lack of standing. No explanation for this dismissal was given by the court. 454 F. 
Supp. at 705 n.2. The difficulty of separating the first amendment interests of minor 
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teachers,13 librarians,14 and public interest organizations,15 files suit 
children in the educational setting from the interests of their parents and guardians has 
been recognized. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241-46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dis­
senting in part); Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 321 (1979). 
13. Teachers were among plaintiffs in Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community 
School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972); Salvail v.. .
Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979); and Right to Read Defense 
Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978). In Presidents Council, the 
only special mention of the interests of the teacher-plaintiffs was a statement by the court 
to the effect that the interests of the teachers had not been impaired: "[T]he teacher is 
still free to discuss the Barrio and its problems in the classroom. The action of the Board 
does not even preclude the teacher from discussing Down These Mean Streets in class or 
from assigning it for outside reading." 467 F.2d at 292. In Salvail, the separate interests 
of teachers were refiected only in testimony that Ms. had been assigned as a research tool 
by several teachers at the senior high school and by the court's conclusion that the maga­
zine had value "as a means of researching current feminist attitudes on matters of social 
interest. 469 F. Supp. at 1272-73. In Right to Read, while plaintiffs included an English 
teacher, no discussion of the scope of teacher rights is found in the opinion. The rights of 
teachers were more central in Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 
(6th Cir. 1976). While students were the only plaintiffs in that case, the challenged school 
board action included a refusal to approve the use of Catch 22 by Joseph Heller and God 
Bless You, Mr. Rosewater by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. as textbooks. The Sixth Circuit summa­
rily dismissed the claim that teachers have a right to select textbooks that is greater than 
the rights of the school board in such matters. Id. at 579-80. After dismissing this claim, 
the court examined an allegation that the academic freedom of teachers had been vio­
lated by the school board's refusal to allow classroom discussion of the disapproved 
books. The court rejected this argument, finding no clear evidence in the record to sup­
port the claim that classroom discussion had been forbidden. Id. at 583-84. 
The issue of teacher rights in the textbook selection process arose recently in Cary v. 
Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979). In Cary, the Tenth Circuit rejected the 
claim raised by five high school teachers that they had a constitutionally protected right 
to academic freedom that included the right to free choice of books to assign for reading 
in their high school English courses. As in Minarcini, the case did not involve a ban on 
classroom discussion of books not included on the school board's approved reading list. " 
See Note, Cary v. Board of Education: Academic Freedom at the High School Level, 57 
DEN. L.J. 197 (1980). 
The separate but related issue of the school board's right to dismiss a teacher for 
using teaching methods or materials disapproved by the school board has arisen with a 
fair degree of frequency. See, e.g., Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir.), 
tifid on rehearing en bane, 502 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 
(1975); Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 
(1st Cir. 1969); Sterzing v. Fort Bend Independent School Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. 
Tex. 1972), vacatedandremanded, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974); Webb v. Lake Mills Com­
munity School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791 (N.D. Iowa 1972); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. 
Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970); Parker v. Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md.), tifid, 
348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966); Harris v. Mechanicville 
Cent. School Dist., 86 Misc. 2d 144,382 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup. Ct. 1976). On the scope of 
teacher first amendment rights, see Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right ofPublic 
School Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1976); Miller," 
Teachers' Freedom ofExpression Within the Classroom: A Search/or Standards, 8 GA. L. 
REv. 837 (1974); Nahmod, Controversy in the Classroom: The High School Teacher and 
Freedom ofExpression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1032 (1971); VanAlstyne, The Constitu­
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complaining that the board's action is a violation of the first amend­
ment to the United States Constitution. 
The judicial response to such lawsuits falls into one of two cate­
gories: (1) A noninterventionist model in which the court takes the 
position that it generally will not intrude into Platters of educational 
policy; 16 or (2) a judicial review model in which the court finds such 
controversies subject to first amendment limitations and then exam­
ines the nature of the right interfered with and the weight of the 
justification offered for the invasion of that right.J7 
Courts offer a variety of explanations in defense of the noninter­
ventionist model. One point consistently made by such courts is that 
no one's first amendment rights have been violated by such a deci­
sion. Students have no constitutionally protected right of access to 
certain books in the school library; neither do the publishers of those 
tional Rights ofTeachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841; Developments in the Law-­
Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1045 (1968). 
14. In Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972), Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. 
of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615 (D. Vt. 1979), qffd, 638 F.2d 438 92d Cir. 1980), and Right to 
Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978), schoolli­
brarians were among the plaintiffs. In Presidents Council and Right 10 Read, the courts 
failed to consider the arguably separate interests of the librarians. In Bicknell, the district 
court rejected a claim of first amendment protection for librarians: 
Nor do we believe that school librarians have an independent first amendment 
right to control the collection of the school library under the rubric of academic 
freedom. The selection of works for the library is a curricular rather than a 
methodological matter, and "public secondary school boards have considerable 
discretion as to the substantive content" of the curriculum. 
475 F. Supp. at 622 (citation omitted). In Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union 
Free School Dist., 474 F. Supp. 387, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 638 
F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981), student plaintiffs attempted 
to assert the rights of librarians to academic freedom. The court found no reason to 
grant the students permission to raise the rights of the absent librarians and therefore 
dismissed this claim. For an argument that librarians have constitutionally protected 
rights of expression that limit the extent to which books can be removed from a library 
over the objection of the librarian, see O'Neil, Libraries, Liberties and The First Amend­
ment, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 209 (1973). 
15. In Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615 (D. 
Vt. 1979), qffd, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980), plaintiffs included the Right to Read De­
fense Committee of Vergennes. The committee was organized for the purpose of chal­
lenging attempts to restrict school library collections. Similarly, in Right to Read 
Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978), the Right to Read 
Defense Committee of Chelsea was among the complaintants. On the issue of the stand­
ing of public interest organizations to sue, see, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 
(1972); Zacharias, Standing ofPublic Interest Litigating Groups 10 Sue on BehalfofTheir 
Members, 39 U. PIrf. L. REV. 453 (1978). 
16. See cases cited note 3 supra. 
17. See cases cited note 2 supra. 
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books have the right to have their publications kept on the library 
shelves. IS Moreover, students still can have access to the books 
through means other than the school library. 19 
In addition to the rejection of any first amendment right of stu­
dents in this setting, the impropriety of judicial interference in the 
internal affairs of the school is a frequently sounded note in the 
cases.20 Courts cite language from Epperson v. Arkansas21 to support 
this position.22 They rely on the broad discretionary powers granted 
to school officials in curricular matters as an explanation for their 
approach.23 . 
By contrast, courts that are willing to intervene in school library 
book removal cases justify their actions by a differing view of the 
proper school/court relationship. Because the school is viewed as an 
important adjunct to first amendment values, courts occasionally 
must intervene in matters of school policy in order to secure those 
18. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 404, 
429 (2d Cir. 1980) (Mansfield, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981); Bicknell 
v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615,621 (D. Vt. 1979), affd, 
638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980). 
19. Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1306 (7th Cir. 
1980); Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615, 621 (D. 
Vt. 1979), affd, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980). 
20. Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1306 (7th Cir. 
1980) ("[N)othing in the Constitution permits the courts to interfere with local educa­
tional discretion until local authorities begin to substitute rigid and exclusive indoctrina­
tion for the mere exercise of their prerogative to make pedagogic choices regarding 
matters of legitimate dispute."); Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. 
No. 25, 457 F.2d 289, 292 (2d Cir.), cerl. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972) ("Academic freedom 
is scarcely fostered by the intrusion of three or even nine federal jurists making curricu­
lum or library choices for the community of scholars."). 
21. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
22. Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305 (7th Cir. 
1980); Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289, 291 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972); Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. 
of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615, 619 (D. Vt. 1979), affd, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980). The 
frequently repeated quotation from Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), stated: 
"By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and 
local authorities. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which 
arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply 
implicate basic constitutional values." Id at 104 (footnote omitted). The use of this 
reference is ironic because the Court in Epperson found that an Arkansas law forbidding 
the teaching of Darwinian theory in the public schools did "sharply implicate constitu­
tional values." The Court struck down the law as a violation of the first amendment 
establishment clause. For further discussion of Epperson, see text accompanying notes 
136-39 infra. 
23. Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 638 F.2d 438, 441 (2d 
Cir. 1980); Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305 (7th Cir. 
1980). 
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values.24 Cases such as Shelton v. Tucker25 and Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District ,26 in which the Supreme 
Court approved an interventionist stance toward educational policy, 
are pointed to by these courts as support for the conclusions they 
reach. 
In addition to the basic question of philosophy, interventionist 
courts see the school library as a public forum.27 While the state, so 
the argument goes, has no obligation to create such a forum in the 
first instance, nor to stock it with any particular books, having done 
so the state is not free to make content-based decisions to remove 
books unless those decisions are supported by sufficiently important 
state interests.28 While removal may be justified on content neutral 
grounds such as a limitation on shelf space or the obsolescence of a 
book, decisions based on inadequately justified hostility to the ideas 
contained in the book are forbidden.29 
According to this view, students have the right to complain 
about content-based removals because such removals violate the first 
amendment rights of the students. While the students are not being 
denied the right to speak, they are being denied the right to receive 
information.30 The "right to know" has a firm grounding in the first 
amendment, and the ability of the students to obtain a book from a 
source other than the school library does not minimize the gravity of 
the constitutional violation.31 
While efforts are made by interventionist courts to reconcile 
24. Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 710 (D. 
Mass. 1978). 
25. 364 U.S. 479 (1960). In Shellon, the Court struck down an Arkansas statute 
that required all teachers at state-run sehools to file an annual list of every organization 
with which they had been connected during the previous five-year period. The statute 
was held to violate the right of teachers to free association because it indiscriminately 
requested associational information not all of which was necessary to protect the state's 
interest in having fit and competent teachers. Id at 490. 
26. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). For a discussion of Tinker, see text accompanying notes 
62-67 infra. 
27. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582-83 (6th Cir. 
1976); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 (D.N.H. 1979). 
28. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976); 
Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (D.N.H. 1979). 
29. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 1976); 
Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F.Supp. 1269, 1275 (D. N.H. 1979). 
30. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1976). 
31. Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 (D.N.H. 1979); Right 
to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 714-15 (D. Mass. 1978). 
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their decisions with those of noninterventionist judges,32 it is clear 
that the two lines of decision reflect ~ fundamental disagreement 
about the proper role of the judiciary in matters of educational pol­
icy. Additionally, the two lines of cases differ on the applicability of 
two major first amendment doctrines to the book removal cases: the 
public forum principle and the first amendment right to know. 
A. The Public Forum Question 
As a beginning point in this analysis of the book removal cases, 
it will be useful to discover if the school library qualifies as a public 
forum in the way interventionist courts assume. In the first amend­
ment lexicon, a public forum is a government owned place available 
for the exercise of first amendment rights.33 Government ownership 
alone, however, is not enough to establish a right of access by the 
public for first amendment purposes. Some places, like streets and 
parks, traditionally have been considered available as forums for 
speech.34 Other places, while not considered to be traditional public 
32. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 1976); 
Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 711 (D. Mass. 1978). 
33. The term "public forum" gained prominence in Kalven, The Concept of the 
Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1. Since Professor Kalven's classic 
exposition of the public forum concept, a vast literature has been required to chronicle 
the concept's continued development. See, e.g. , Cass, First Amendment Access to Govern­
ment Facilities, 65 VA. L. REv. 1287 (1979); Horning, The FiFst Amendment Right to a 
Public Forum, 1969 DUKE L.J. 931; Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 
SUP. CT. REv. 233; Note, The Public Fo""n: Minimum Access, Equal Access, and The 
FiFst Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REv. 117 (1975). 
34. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.). A statement 
from Justice Roberts' opinion has come to be considered the quintessential articulation 
of this concept: 
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been 
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for 
purposes ofassembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing 
public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient 
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. 
The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for 
communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest 
of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to 
the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good 
order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied. 
Id. at SIS. In addition to the streets and parks, several other traditional public forums 
have been identified. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 
(1980) (courtroom); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (statehouse 
grounds). 
In addition to encapsulating the. idea of the traditional public forum, the above 
quoted language from Mr. Justice Roberts' opinion also began what has become an 
ongoing debate in the public forum area. His opinion raised the still unresolved question 
of whether the first amendment guarantees minimum access to certain public places or, 
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forums, have been added to the list of places available for the exer­
cise of first amendment rights.3S 
In examining the cases, two kinds of public forums can be dis­
cemed.36 One kind, a primary forum, is a place established by the 
government specifically for the expression of ideas. For example, in 
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd v. Conratf37 a municipal theater was 
identified as ~ public forum because its essential function was to 
serve as a place for a certain kind of expression. If the government 
creates a place primarily as a forum, exclusions from that place must 
be based on sufficiently important reasons and must follow constitu­
tionally adequate procedures. 38 
The other kind of forum, a secondary forum, is a government 
owned place created for some other primary purpose but which is 
incidentally compatible with speech use. An airport is an example of 
this kind of government facility.39 In this second kind of forum, ex-
instead, whether equal access is all that is promised. Under the guaranteed access view, 
complete closure of the streets and parks to all expressive activity would be prevented. 
Under the equal access view, closure would be permissible if it was affected in an even­
handed manner and not selectively. See Cass, supra note 33, at 1298-1303; Note, supra 
note 33. This unanswered public forum question will not be dealt with in the context of 
the school library. It is unlikely that even a clear victory for minimum access advocates 
would extend to ensure access to the library bookshelves. 
35. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 
U.S. 503 (1969) (school); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (library); Chicago 
Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 
992 (1975) (airport); Albany Welfare Rights Organization v. Wyman, 493 F.2d 1319 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974) (welfare office); Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 268 
F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), mod!fied, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 
(1968) (bus terminal). 
36. See Cass, supra note 33, at 1297. 
37. 420 U.S. 546 (1975). 
38. Among the constitutionally adequate reasons for exclusion is that the speech at 
issue is not protected by the first amendment. Thus, if the production of the musical 
"Hair" at issue in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), had 
been found to be obscene as judged by constitutionally appropriate standards, exclusion 
of the production would have been justified. Further, in the case of a primary forum 
opened up for a certain kind of speech, if a speaker wishes to use the forum for a manner 
of expression outside the scope of the enterprise established by the government, exclusion 
also might be justified. Thus, if the government created a state operated public theater to 
be used solely for the production of plays and a speaker wanted to use the theater to give 
a speech, this noncompatible use could be foreclosed. Constitutionally adequate proce­
dures for determining if access is to be allowed also must be established. In Southeastern 
Promotions, the Court's holding was based on the constitutional inadequacies of the pro­
cedures established for judging the appropriateness of allowing "Hair" to be presented. 
See note 80 infra for elaboration of these procedural infirmities. 
39. See, e.g., Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); Kuszynski v. City ofOakiand, 479 F.2d 1130 (9th 
Cir. 1973); Fernandes v. Limmer, 465 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Tex. 1979). 
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elusions can be based on disruption of the primary activity for which 
the forum was created or for other sufficiently important reasons.40 
Despite the existence of two kinds of forums, no clear-cut 
method for identifying a place as either kind of forum has been es­
tablished.41 Further, whether the two categories are as distinctly 
etched as the above discussion suggests is far from certain.42 Finally, 
what purposes, if any, are served by distinguishing between the two 
categories has not yet been resolved.43 Without attempting to settle 
these issues, an effort will be made to determine if the school library 
fits into either or both of these categories. 
In first turning to the library book removal cases for guidance 
on these questions, the explanation for considering the school library 
to be a public forum is succinctly stated: "A library is a mighty re-
The character of the airport and the pattern of usual activity make the airport 
an appropriate place for communication of views.... True, the principal pur­
pose of the airport is to move people from one place to another via airplane; but 
the court must look beyond "principal" purposes to determine whether or not 
an area is a "public" forum. 
Id at 504 n.4. 
40. For instance, in Chicago Area Military.Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921 
(7th Cir.), cerl. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975), the court found the public areas of the termi­
nal buildings at O'Hare Airport to be a public forum available to a group seeking to 
distribute literature. The court, however, excluded the areas leading to the arrival and 
departure gates from use for leafteting. The primary use to which those areas of the 
airport were put would be disrupted if they were made available for use by leafteteers. 
The court left open the question of -whether leafteting at check-in counters similarly 
could be prohibited. The court, however, pointed out that such a ban would be upheld if 
it appeared "that such activities substantially interfered with rapid and efficient airport 
operations." Id at 926. 
In deciding whether a particular regulation of the time, place, and manner of forum 
use is reasonable, the court will consider "[t)he nature of a place, the pattern of its normal 
activities...." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). Thus, in Hef­
fron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981), the 
Supreme Court upheld a rule that restricted those who wished to sell or distribute written 
materials or solicit funds at the Minnesota State Fair to doing so from a rented booth. 
The Court focused on "the need to maintain the orderly movement of the crowd given 
the large number of exhibitors and persons attending the Fair." Id at 2565. 
41. A number of criteria have been suggested as factors to be used in determining 
whether a public forum exists. One recommendation is to consider the customary usage 
of a place, whether it is available for general public access, any history of openness, and 
consistency between use as a forum and the other public uses of a place. Homing, supra 
note 33, at 945. Another suggestion is to look to the property's value for nonexpressive 
purposes, to consider the value of the property for expression, and to evaluate the extent 
to which speech and nonspeech uses are in condict. Cass, supra note 33, at 1317-20. 
42. Professor Tribe divides public forums into three groupings: (I) Traditional 
public forums; (2) "[p)ublic facilities or institutions created for the primary purpose of 
public communication;" and, (3) "semi-public forums." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI­
TUTIONAL LAW 688-91 (1978). 
43. See Cass, supra note 33, at 1297-98. 
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source in the free marketplace of ideas. It is specially dedicated to 
broad dissemination of ideas. It is a forum for silent speech."44 The 
major authorities cited as support for this conclusion are the 
Supreme Court cases of Brown v. Louisiana4S and Tinker v. .Des 
Moines Independent Community School.District.46 
In Brown, five black men entered the Aud.ubon Regional Li­
brary in the town of Clinton, Louisiana in order to protest the segre­
gation of the library. One of the men, petitioner Brown, requested a 
book. The branch assistant determined that the library did not have 
the book and informed Mr. Brown of this along with the information 
that the book could be obtained from the state library and made 
available to him by mail or at a bookmobile.47 After speaking with 
the librarian, Brown sat down in the reading area and his four com­
panions stood near him. The regional librarian was called from an­
other room and she asked the men to leave. They nevertheless 
remained in the room making no noise. Ten to fifteen minutes later 
the sheriff arrived and, after unsuccessfully asking them to leave, ar­
rested the men, charging them with a breach of the peace. The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of 
their convictions. 
Justice Fortas, writing for the Court in an opinion joined only 
by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, reversed the convic­
tions. His opinion found a lack of evidence of any "intent to pro­
voke a breach of the peace," or of "circumstances such that a breach 
of the peace may be occasioned."48 Petitioners were present in the 
library in order to express their opposition to the segregation of the 
library and they did so in an orderly and nonprovocative manner. 
Justice Fortas also found that even if the statutory definition of a 
breach of the peace was satisfied, the Court would have to find its 
application to petitioners' behavior to be a violation of their first and 
fourteenth amendment rights.49 These rights were found to "include 
the right in a peaceable and orderly manner to protest by silent and 
reproachful presence, in a place where the protestant has every right 
44. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 571, 582-83 (6th Cir. 
1976) (citations omitted). 
45. 383 U.S. 13l (1966). 
46. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
47. 383 U.S. at 136. The Audubon Regional Library had two bookmobiles. The 
red bookmobile serviced only whites. The blue bookmobile was for the use of black 
library patrons. Blacks were not permitted to use the three branch libraries. 
48. Id at 139. 
49. Id at 142. 
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to be, the unconstitutional segregation of public facilities."50 Be­
cause the use of the library by others was not interfered with by peti­
tioners, the Court did not need to consider whether disruptive 
conduct also would have been constitutionally protected.51 
While Justice Brennan concurred in the reversal of the convic­
tions, he would have struck down the statute as facially overbroad, 
thereby eliminating the need to reach the question of whether peti­
tioners' conduct was constitutionally protected and therefore could 
not be punished even by a narrowly drawn statute.52 Justice White, 
also concurring in the result, reversed solely on equal protection 
grounds.53 
Justice Black, writing for the four members of the dissent, at­
tacked the new constitutional doctrine established by the majority: 
Though the First Amendment guarantees the right of assembly 
and the right of petition along with the rights of speech, press, and 
religion, it does not guarantee to any person the right to use some­
one else's property, even that owned by government and dedicated 
to other purposes, as a stage to express dissident ideas. 54 
Justice Black then insisted that the doctrine created by the plurality 
opinion had no stopping off place. n necessarily would allow protest 
groups to invade the peace and tranquility of the library and inter­
fere with normal library use by the patrons of the library. 
Brown raised more questions than it resolved. Why was the 
protest activity allowed in the library? Was it because the govern­
ment owned the facility? Was it important that the protestors' 
message was directed at the segregation of the very facility they used 
as the site of their protest? What would have been the result if dis­
ruption of the facility had occurred? What other forms of expression 
would be permitted on the library premises? Unfortunately, the 
questions raised by Brown were not quickly resolved. When the 
public forum doctrine next came before the Court, the Justices who 
had been in the majority in Brown found themselves outvoted. The 
50. Id 
51. Id 
52. Id at 149-50. 
53. Id at 151. Justice White argued that petitioners' behavior in the library 
amounted to normal library use. He was convinced that no arrests would have occurred 
if the behavior had been engaged in by whites. Therefore, petitioners' arrests violated 
their rights under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. This equal pro­
tection aspect of the case was not ignored in Justice Fortas' opinion for the Court. He, 
too, commented on the state's obligation to regulate its facilities in a nondiscriminatory 
manner. Id at 143. 
54. Id at 166. 
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Brown dissenters joined by Justice White, thereby composing a ma­
jority of the Court, proceeded to put a roadblock in the path of the 
incipient public forum doctrine. 
That development came in Adderley v. Florida. 55 In Adderley, 
200 demonstrators partially blocked the driveway of the county jail 
in a protest against the arrest of other demonstrators and also against 
policies of segregation in effect at the jail and elsewhere. After they 
refused to leave, thirty-two demonstrators were arrested and con­
victed under the Florida general trespass statute. The Supreme 
Court upheld the convictions. Important to this result was that the 
demonstration had taken place on a part of the jail grounds not gen­
erally open to the public. The Court rejected petitioners' claims of a 
right of access to the part of the jail grounds reserved for transporta­
tion of prisoners: 
The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to 
preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is 
lawfully dedicated. For this reason there is no merit to the peti­
tioners' argument that they had a constitutional right to stay on 
the property, over the jail custodian's objections, because this 
"area chosen for the peaceful civil rights demonstration was not 
only 'reasonable' but also particularly appropriate. . . ." Such an 
argument has as its major unarticulated premise the assumption 
that people who want to propagandize protests or views have a 
constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever 
they please. . . . The United States Constitution does not forbid 
a State to control the use of its own property for its own lawful 
nondiscriminatory purpose. 56 
The Court in Adderley, however, was careful to point out that the 
sheriff had not sought to disperse the protestors because he objected 
to the substance of their protest. 57 Moreover, there was no evidence 
that any other group had been permitted access to the same part of 
the jail grounds for any reason. 58 
The dissenting Justices in Adderley took a contrary view of the 
public forum issue. They considered the jail to be a forum akin to 
the statehouse, courthouse, or executive mansion and "an obvious 
center for protest."59 While the dissent agreed that some public 
places serve functions incompatible with their use as places for pro­
55. 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
56. Id at 47-48. 
57. Id at 47. 
58. Id 
59. Id at 49. 
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test and that some forms of protest may be inconsistent with the 
places in which they are sought to be held, the dissenting Justices 
were not willing to leave the decision as to whether a place is a fo­
rum to the discretion of public officials.60 
A dder/ey, like Brown, dealt with government property primarily 
dedicated to uses other than expression, but sometimes available for 
first amendment purposes. While reaching contrary results on 
whether the demonstrators were entitled to access to government 
property, the two decisions share a common concern. In both cases 
the attention of the Court was focused on whether the demonstrators 
disrupted the normal functioning of the government facility they 
used as the site of their protest.61 
This same concern was central to the Court's analysis in Tinker 
v. lJes Moines Independent Community School lJistrict,62 the second 
public forum case relied on by the courts examining the book re­
moval question. In Tinker, the locus of the protest activity was the 
public high school. Petitioners, high school students, wore black 
armbands to school to symbolize their opposition to the Vietnam 
War. The students were suspended from school for their actions 
and, thereafter, filed a complaint challenging the constitutionality of 
the actions of school officials in suspending them. 
In finding for petitioners, the Court first focused on the primary 
activity that takes place in the public school. The learning process 
was seen as a multifaceted experience encompassing both classroom 
and nonclassroom hours. The Court gave this enthusiastic descrip­
tion of the classroom learning experience: ''The classroom is pecu­
liarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon 
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of 
ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] 
60. Id at 54. 
61. Focusing on the similarity between Brown and Adderley is not intended to sug­
gest that the two cases do not reftect a substantial difference of opinion. While it is 
possible to find sufficient numbers of factual distinctions between the two cases to view 
the results reached as consistent (that is, that the library reading area was generally open 
to the public while the jail driveway was not and that no disruption of library activities 
occurred in Brown whereas the jail driveway used for the transport of prisoners was 
blocked by the demonstrators in Adderley), the view that the cases reflect a substantial 
disagreement about the scope of first amendment protection for public access to govern­
ment properties is very persuasive. See Cass, supra note 33, at 1294 (arguing that the 
Brown majority supported a broad based right of access to government owned places 
whereas the Adderley majority would require equal access only when the government 
opens up a forum). 
62. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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than through any kind of authoritative selection.' "63 Education in 
the schoolhouse, however, was not viewed as limited to the 
classroom: 
The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accom­
modate students during prescribed hours for the purpose of cer­
tain types of activities. Among those activities is personal 
intercommunication among the students. This is not only an inev­
itable part of the process of attending school; it is also an impor­
tant part of the educational process. A student's rights, therefore, 
do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the 
cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the au­
thorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial 
subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, ifhe does so without "materi­
ally and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appro­
priate discipline in the operation of the school" and without 
.colliding with the rights of others.64 
With this ringing endorsement, the schoolhouse joined the list of 
public places available as public forums. To the extent possible 
without interfering with the normal functioning of the public school, 
students are permitted to exercise their first amendment rights.6s 
The Court's decision in Tinker does not stand as firm support 
for viewing the book removal cases as involving a public forum. 
One important point to be stressed is that the forum in Tinker was 
available for the expression of student views whenever that could· 
occur without interfering with good order and discipline. In discuss­
ing the impact of petitioners' activities in Tinker the Court was care­
ful to note: "They neither interrupted school activities nor sought to 
intrude in the school affairs or the lives of others. They caused dis­
cussion outside of the classrooms, but no interference with work and 
no disorder."66 This statement emphasizes the idea that the rights 
granted to students are rights to express their views through the mak­
ing of personal statements. They may speak out so long as their 
speech can coexist peacefully with the day-to-day functioning of the 
school. 
63. Id at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967». 
64. Id at 512-13 (footnote and citation omitted). 
65. In addition to students, teachers are entitled to the first amendment rights es­
tablished by Tinker: "First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteris­
tics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be 
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Id at 506. On the issue of teacher rights 
of expression, see Miller, supra note 13; Nahmod, supra note 13. 
66. 393 U.S. at 514. 
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The point to be made is that as forums, public places like the 
school or the library first serve their governmentally administered 
functions. As a secondary matter, they also may be available for 
compatible expressive use by members of the public.67 Therefore, as 
a forum on the order ofBrown and Tinker, the school library would 
seem to be available as a place for silent protest by students. Mary 
Beth Tinker would be permitted to wear her armband into the school 
library. Groups of students would be able to stand silently as "mon­
uments of protest"68 to school policies. Mary Beth even would be 
able to bring her own copy of a book removed from the school li­
brary and read it sitting at a table in the library as a way of pro­
testing the library's book selection policies. These actions and others 
like them seem to describe the kind of rights made available by 
Brown and Tinker. Neither of these cases allow the protestors to 
have a say in the administration of the government facility itself. If 
petitioner Brown had wanted to step behind the librarian's desk and 
check out books for library patrons, the case would have had an en­
tirely different result. Similarly, if petitioner Tinker had interrupted 
a class and demanded the right to class time to make a speech 
against the Vietnam War, the Court would not have granted her a 
forum so readily. . 
Tinker, however, is not the final word on the public forum issue 
and it may be that subsequent cases shed additional light on the 
book removal situation. After Tinker, the Supreme Court decided 
several other cases that contributed to the further development of the 
public forum doctrine. The first of these was Police Department of 
Chicago v. Mosley.69 In Mosley, the Court gave express recognition 
67. One additional point must be made about the school as a public forum. Con­
trary to the situation in Adderley, the forum in Tinker was not necessarily open to the 
members of the public. Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 273 n.5 (1981) ("[T]he 
campus of a public university, at leastfor its students, possesses many of the characteris­
tics of a public forum.") (emphasis added). The Court in Tinker included students and 
teachers in the group entitled to use the school as a place for expression. The Court 
never addressed the question ofwhether the schoolhouse was also available for the use of 
nonstudent members of the public. This limited holding in Tinker suggests that the pub­
lic forum doctrine is flexible enough to view some places as limited forums, places in 
which rights of expression are guaranteed only to the special population taking part in 
the primary, nonexpressive activity engaged in at the government facility. On the ques­
tion of whether nonstudent, nonteacher members of the public are entitled to access to 
the school as a forum, see Comment, The University and the Public: The Right ofAccess 
by Nonstudents to University Property, 54 CAL. L. REv. 132 (1966). 
68. This phrase was used in the opinion of Justice Fortas in Brown v. Louisiana, 
383 U.S. 131, 139 (1966), to describe petitioner Brown and his four companions as they 
sat and stood in the reading area of the Audubon Regional Library. 
69. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
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to the equal protection component of public forum theory: 
There is an "equality of status in the field of ideas," and govern­
ment must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be 
heard. Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by 
some groups, government may not prohibit others from assem­
bling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. Selec­
tive exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content 
alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone.70 
In adding this equality principle to public forum theory, the Court 
made clear what it had insinuated in Drown andAdderfey: Once the 
government opens up a forum for the expression of some ideas, that 
forum must be available for all ideas.71 
After Mosley, the Court decided two cases which raised a differ­
ent aspect of public forum analysis. Unlike the secondary forums in 
Drown and Tinker,72 the Court next encountered two cases in which 
70. Id. at 96 (footnote omitted). 
71. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), was decided on the same 
day as Mosley. While adding no new dimensions to the public forum doctrine, Grayned 
. did serve to accentuate the need for compatibility between the primary use of the forum 
and the manner in which first amendment rights are exercised: 
The nature of a place, "the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds 
of regulations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable." Although a 
silent vigil may not unduly interfere with a public library, making a speech in 
the reading room almost certainly would. That same speech should be perfectly 
appropriate in a park. The crucial question is whether the manner of expres­
sion is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a 
particular time. 
Id. at 116 (footnote and citation omitted). Grayned involved a challenge to two ordi­
nances: An antipicketing ordinance and an antinoise ordinance, both regulating first 
amendment activity within close proximity to a school building in which school was in 
session. The antipicketing ordinance was identical to the ordinance struck down by the 
court in Mosley. The ordinance fell under the weight of the equality principle. The 
antinoise ordinance was upheld as carefully tailored to the municipality'S "compelling 
interest in having an undisrupted school session conducive to the students' learn­
ing...." Id. at 119. 
72. While it is possible to describe the forum in Tinker as a secondary forum (see 
L. TRIBE, supra note 42, at 690, describing schools as "semi-public forums" where a 
greater variety of regulations designed to preserve the good order and discipline of the 
school will be permissible than would be true of ordinances regulating access to streets 
and parks), this characterization is subject to question. One interesting qualification of 
this assumption derives from the Court's division of the educational process into several 
primary parts. In. one respect the school can be classified as a conventional secondary 
forum. Like the library in Brown it serves a government purpose independent of service 
as a forum for student expression. These parts of the education package include the 
classroom transmission of knowledge in a variety of required subjects and other extracur­
ricular activities like team sports and drama club. In another respect, however, educa­
tion includes a component that falls within the primary forum definition. The Court 
defines an important part of the educational process as ''personal intercommunication 
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the potential forum was a place created by the government primarily 
for the expression of ideas. In both Lehman v. City of Shaker 
Heights73 and Southeastern Promotions, Ltd v. Conrad,74 petitioners 
argued for the existence of a "primary forum." In Lehman, the po­
tential forum was the advertising card space in the cars of a public 
transit system. That space was made available for commercial ad­
vertising but not for political ads. A candidate for political office 
argued that the city had created a forum by its policy of renting out 
such space. A four-Justice plurality rejected this contention, finding 
the advertising space to be part of the city's commercial venture and 
not the creation of a forum.7s The four dissenting Justices, in an 
opinion by Justice Brennan, argued that the case did not call upon 
the Court to decide if public transit cars must be considered a forum 
but instead involved the voluntary creation of a forum by the city. 
Having voluntarily created such a forum for expression, the city was 
not free to base exclusions from that forum solely on the content of 
the potential advertisement.76 
After dissenting in Lehman, Justice Brennan was a member of 
among the students." 393 U.S. at 512. With respect to this function the school is a pri­
mary forum for the expression of ideas by students. The Court's job is to accommodate 
both of these school functions. It does this by limiting student rights of communication 
to those that are compatible with the other educational functions served by the school. 
On the general subject of the school as a public forum, see Nahmod, Beyond Tinker: The 
High School as an Educational Public Forum, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 278 (1970); 
Comment, The Public School as Public Forum, 54 TEX. L. REv. 90 (1975). Note also the 
Supreme Court's recent statement in Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981), on the 
closely related question of the public forum status of public universities: "A university 
differs in significant respects from public forums such as streets or parks or even munici­
pal theaters. A university's mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never 
denied its authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon 
the use of its campus and facilities." Id. at 273 n.5. 
73. 418 U.S. 298 (1974). 
74. 420 U.S. 546 (1975). 
75. 418 U.S. at 303. The deciding vote in Lehman was cast by Justice Douglas, 
concurring in the result. Justice Douglas based his opinion on the constitutional rights of 
commuters: "In my view the right of the commuters to be free from forced intrusions on 
their privacy precludes the city from transforming its vehicles of public transportation 
into forums for the dissemination of ideas upon this captive audience." Id. at 307. Jus­
tice Douglas' view of the matter made the opening of the advertising spaCes to commer­
cial messages irrelevant. The clear implication of his opinion was that a later challenge 
brought against the intrusion of commercial ads also would result in his finding that 
those ads violated the privacy rights of the passengers. 
The plurality opinion in Lehman has been criticized frequently for its misuse of 
public forum principles. See, e.g., Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First 
Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20, 34-35 (1975); Stone, supra note 33, at 256-61,275-80. 
76. 418 U.S. at 313-14. 
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the majority in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd Y. Conrad.77 The pub­
lic forum in Southeastern Promotions consisted of a municipal thea­
ter. A production of the musical "Hair" was rejected by the directors 
of the Chattanooga Memorial Auditorium on the ground that it was 
not "in the best interest of the community."78. In analyzing the case, 
the Court rejected any claim that petitioner was seeking entry to a 
place principally serving nonspeech purposes. In this respect the fo­
rum could be contrasted to traditional forums, such as the streets and 
parks. Unlike those places, the theater, in Justice Blackmun's opin­
ion for the Court, was identified as a public forum "designed for and 
dedicated to expressive activities."79 Exclusions from such a primary 
forum had to follow adequate procedural safeguards80 and be based 
on constitutionally sufficient justifications.8} Since Southeastern Pro­
motions, the Court has announced no new conceptual developments 
in the ongoing formulation of public forum theory.82 
77. 420 U.s. 546 (1975). 
78. Id at 548. 
79. Id at 555. 
80. The Court found the procedures utilized by the directors of the municipal thea­
ter to be constitutionally defective in several respects. Contrary to the teachings of 
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), there was no provision for prompt judicial 
review of the board's decision. 420 U.S. at 561. Additionally, the burden of instituting 
judicial review and proving the play was protected expression was placed on the play's 
producers and not on the board. Id at 562. Finally, the restraint on the play imposed 
during the pendency ofjudicial proceedings was unduly long and altered the status quo. 
Id These requirements of appropriate procedural safeguards are an aspect of first 
amendment due process. See Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process", 83 HARV. L. 
REV. 518 (1970). 
81. After Southeastern Promotions was denied access to the municipal theater, it 
sought a permanent injunction allowing it to use the facility. Following that request for 
relief, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas held hearings on 
the issue of obscenity vel non. 341 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Tex. 1972). The jury returned a 
verdict finding "Hair" to be obscene within the meaning of city ordinances and state 
statutes. Id at 472. Petitioner than appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir­
cuit and that court affirmed by a divided vote. 486 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1973). Petitioner 
argued in the Supreme Court that the courts below had applied an erroneous standard 
for determining the issue of obscenity vel non and that "Hair" was not obscene. In light 
of its finding that constitutionally inadequate procedures had been applied, the Supreme 
Court found it unnecessary to decide these questions. 420 U.S. at 552. 
82. While the Supreme Court has relied on public forum principles in several cases 
decided since Southeastern Promotions, none of these more recent decisions contribute 
any new insight into the future direction of the public forum doctrine. See, e.g., United 
States Postal Servo v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 101 S. Ct. 2676, 2684 (1981) 
("[tlhere is neither historical nor constitutional support for the characterization of a letter 
box as a public forum"); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 578 
(1980) (a trial courtroom, like streets, sidewalks, and parks, is a public place that tradi­
tionally has been open to the members of the public who have a first amendment right to 
be present there); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 134 
(1977) (a prison is not a public forum); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 834-38 (1976) (a 
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In light of the public forum cases, several potential arguments 
for applying the public forum rationale to the book removal cases 
deserve exploration. First, however, the Brown-Tinker analogy 
finally should be put to rest. In bestowing public forum status on the 
library and the school, the Supreme Court stressed the compatibility 
between government facilities principally serving nonexpressive 
functions and the use of those places for nondisruptive forms of ex­
pression. The library is principally designed for reading, reflection, 
and research. Ifdemonstrators can quietly speak in the public space 
of the library reading room without disturbing library patrons, they 
may do SO.83 The classroom is principally for the communication of 
ideas through the transfer of those ideas to the students, but a silent 
symbol can be worn into class so long as no disruption occurs. Still 
in the school, but outside the classroom, other more vocal forms of 
expression may be permissible. In the lunchroom, for example, stu';' 
dents may be permitted to distribute literature or solicit members for 
political organizations or support for candidates.84 The common de­
nominator among all these activities is that they all can peacefully 
coexist with the primary function of the forum. None of them, how­
ever, suggests a right to participate in those primary activities. The 
forum consists of the open space within the government facility. By 
the use of this space, a message may be communicated in a place 
where an effective audience exists. In none of these cases does the 
protestor gain the right to move into the government's own space 
and supplant or join the government in the mooiog of the forum. 
Speech and nonspeech uses exist side by side, but each in its separate 
sphere. What this means in the library is that, as a secondary forum, 
the public forum consists of the open public spaces of the library. 
The government spaces, such as the library shelves and the reference 
desk, are reserved for the government's own use. 
To reach the library shelves, arguments other than those relying 
military base is not a public forum to which civilians have a right of access because the 
use of the base as a place to train soldiers and the paramount interest of the military in 
maintaining itself as a politically neutral establishment are incompatible with the charac­
terization of the base as a public forum for civilian expressive activities); accord, Brown 
v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (military base). 
83. But see Bullock v. Mumford, 509 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (sit down strike in 
main reading room of the Library of Congress termed "disruptive" of study and 
meditation). 
84. q: Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972) (suspension of . 
students for distributing copies of underground newspaper in school corridors before and 
after classes and during lunch hour overturned since school rule plaintiffs were charged 
with violating was an unconstitutional prior restraint on expression). 
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directly on Brown and Tinker must be advanced. Three possibilities 
merit discussion. First, there is the argument that the library collec­
tion is itself a primary forum. The reasoning here is that the books 
on the shelves are a forum for the expression of ideas like the munic­
ipal theater in Southeastern Promotions. If t~s argument is success­
ful, the Mosley equality principle takes over as a basis for a 
challenge to book removal. If the books themselves are a forum, 
selective exclusions from the collection become suspect. 
While this reasoning results in the very variation on the public 
forum theme that is needed in the book removal cases, one major 
difficulty stands in the way of its success. That difficulty is that, un­
like the municipal theater, the library collection was not created as a 
place for students to express their ideas and contribute books of their 
choice.8s The school library's collection was created as a forum for 
the government's own ideas and not the ideas of members of the 
school community. While the expression of those ideas is through 
the vehicle of books written by a variety of authors and not by gov­
ernment authorship, the main point is that outside persons were not 
invited to participate in the selection of books for the collection. To 
illustrate this point further, if the library were to create a shelf in the 
library for student donated books, such a shelf might well be consid­
ered a forum. The library, having voluntarily created such a shelf, 
could not exclude some books because of disagreement with their 
content. But the entire library collection is not the equivalent of a 
student gift shelf. The existence of the library is not necessarily the 
equivalent of a government offering of a place where all ideas are 
welcome. In the absence of such a voluntary government offering, 
the equal access principle of Mosley does not come into play. 
While the only participant in the process of filling the library 
shelves is intended to be the government itself, this restriction is not 
necessarily fatal to public forum theory. A second analysis of the 
library book collection is possible in which this facet of the govern­
ment's intent is unimportant. In this view of the matter, a forum 
may exist where the government intends to be the only voice heard 
in the forum. In such a situation, the government will have the in­
tent to use its voice to speak for all who wish to contribute to the 
85. A similar distinction between a municipal auditorium and a publicly funded 
broadcast station was relied on to deny the station public forum status in Muir v. Ala­
bama Educ. Television Comm'n, 656 F.2d 1012, 1021 (5th Cir. 1981) ("There is an essen­
tial difference between a public broadcaster engaged in the private broadcaster function 
of selecting and presenting its own programs, and a municipal auditorium made avail­
able for presentations by others."). 
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forum. If the library can be seen as a place where the government 
has promised to represent all points of view, a voluntary forum will 
be found to have been created. 
To further highlight this forum possibility, a look at a case in 
which just such a forum was created will be helpful. In Alaska Gay 
Coalition v. Sullivan,86 the municipality of Anchorage published a 
guide to services and organizations in the greater Anchorage area. 
The Anchorage Blue Book rejected an entry submitted by the Alaska 
Gay Coalition because of hostility to the beliefs of the group's mem­
bers. The Alaska Supreme Court identified the publication as a pub­
lic forum and found that exclusions from that forum could not be 
based on objections to the ideas represented by the Coalition. Since 
other political groups were included in the publication, no content 
neutral reason could be discerned for the exclusion. The Anchorage 
Blue Book was considered to be a public forum because it was ex­
pressly created in order ''to provide Anchorage residents with a sin­
gle source of information regarding public services, local 
government, recreational opportunities and crisis assistance."87 In 
light of the municipality's intent to disseminate a complete informa­
tion guide, the municipality thereafter could not exclude a group 
from being listed in the guidebook based on objection to the ideas 
represented by the organization. 
In Alaska Gay Coalition, the government was the sole author of 
the guidebook. A private group could not participate in the guide by 
requesting a page in the book on which it could describe its organi­
zation. The government's express intent in founding the guide, how­
ever, was to include information on all organizations in the 
community. Having voluntarily established this intent, a forum was 
viewed as having been created. The school library shelves differ 
from the Anchorage Blue Book in one critical respect. The public 
school has not created its library with the express credo that it shall 
contain books representing all ideas, both popular and unpopular. 
To the contrary, the government's clear intent is to selectively fill the 
shelves of the school library with only those books it determines are 
appropriate to the school's educational mission.88 Lacking this kind 
86. 578 P.2d 951 (Alaska 1978). 
87. Id at 953. The court acknowledged that in most cases a forum has been identi­
fied as a physical location. It had no trouble extending the public forum doctrine to 
include a publication, however, especially since the booklet's very purpose was commu­
nication. The booklet, therefore, satisfied the definition of a primary forum since it had 
been created voluntarily by the government for the purpose of expression. Id at 956-57. 
88. As an example of the possible criteria used in book selection, the court in Presi­
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of volitional intent to give voice to all ideas, the school library can­
not be considered to be a public forum on the order of the Anchorage 
Blue Book. 
Despite the inadequacy of these two public forum theories for 
the case at hand, there remains one further argument with a chance 
for success in the library book removal cases. That argument does 
not depend on the voluntary nature of the government's actions in 
creating a forum. The essence of this argument is that by the very 
act of establishing a school library, the library shelves become an 
involuntary forum in which the government is obligated to represent 
all ideas. 
Having articulated a public forum argument that seems a plau­
sible means of fastening public forum status on the library book­
shelves, the next step is to evaluate whether this argument can be 
supported by case law as well as logic. As a means of approaching 
this inquiry, it will be useful to see how this idea of an involuntary 
forum fared when applied to other areas in the schoolhouse. Not 
surprisingly, the public forum issue arose in the educational setting 
in a number of ways. The aspects of the school environment that 
received attention in the cases included the hallways, the lunchroom, 
the classroom, the school auditorium, the school newspaper,' and the 
school notice distribution system. In the classroom, the hallway, and 
the lunchruom, questions of use for the exercise of speech rights re­
lied directly on Tinker. 89 Since students sought access to places serv­
ing other primary functions, Tinker's material disruption standard 
was applied.90 Cases involving the use of the school auditorium 
were resolved with the use of the Mosley principle. If the auditorium 
generally was made available to some groups it must be made avail-
dents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cerl. 
denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972), cited the following regulation of the New York State Com­
missioner of Education as governing selections for secondary school libraries: 
The book collection in the secondary schools shall consist of books approved as 
satisfactory for: (I) Supplementing the curriculum, (2) reference and general 
information, (3) appreciation and (4) pleasure reading. The course of study 
and the interest of boys and girls of given ages and grades are factors which 
should playa large part in the selection of books for a school library. Books of 
established quality and authority in sufficient quantity to meet all school needs 
are recognized as necessary tools and materials of instruction. 8 N. Y. Code, 
Rules & Regs. (Educ.) § 91.1(b) (1966). 
Id at 291 n.4. 
89. E.g., Butts v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 436 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971); 
Aguirre v. Tahoka Independent School Dist., 311 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Tex. 1970). 
90. Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972). 
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able to others on the same terms.91 The voluntary creation of a fo­
rum idea was central in these cases. The school newspaper cases 
were somewhat more complicated. Here as well, however, by the 
creation of a school newspaper relying on student writers and edi­
tors, the school was viewed as having voluntarily created a forum for 
student expression.92 School sponsorship and funding do not place 
the school in the position of a private publisher.93 While the school 
may have been permitted to exercise control where it was necessary 
for the protection of the student body,94 generally a forum was 
viewed as having been created by the establishment of a student run 
paper.95 Having established a forum, student editors thereby were 
protected against attempts by school officials to censor articles slated 
for publication in the school paper.96 
In addition to the issue of whether school publications are fo­
rums with respect to student editors and writers, the public forum 
status of school publications has been raised in one other context. In 
this additional context the concern is whether outside contributors 
have rights of access to school publications because those publica­
tions are public forums.97 An interesting example of this problem is 
91. National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 
1973); Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946). 
The equality principle also is used to analyze claims of unconstitutional exclusion from 
other school facilities. See, e.g., Gay Students Organization v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st 
Cir. 1974) (successful challenge by a student organization to the refusal to allow the 
organization to hold social functions on campus); if. Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 296 F. 
Supp. 188 (M.D. Ala.), aJid., 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969) (pre-Mosley challenge to the 
refusal to permit the Reverend William Sloan Coffin to speak on campus). 
92. Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970); Zucker v. Panitz, 
299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). For a discussion of the public forum status of school 
newspapers, see Note, Tinker's Legacy: Freedom ofthe Press in Public High Schools, 28 
DE PAUL L. REv. 387 (1979); Note, Public Forum Theory in the Educational Selling: The 
First Amendment and The Student Press, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 879. 
93. Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570, 573-74 (5th Cir.), modified en bane, 489 F.2d 
225 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974). 
94. Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200, 1205 (5th Cir. 1980) (''The First Amend­
ment rights of the students must yield to the superior interest of the school in seeing that 
materials that encourage actions which endanger the health or safety of students are not 
distributed on school property."). 
95. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 810 (2d Cir. 1971). 
96. Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Va.), aJid, 564 
F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977). But if. Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cerl. 
denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978) (court upheld a denial of permission to schoolnewspaper to 
distribute a questionnaire concerning sexual attitudes of students). For a thorough dis­
cussion of Trachtman, see Comment, Behind the Schoolhouse Gate: Sex and the Student 
Pol/ster, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 161 (1979). 
97. These cases involved several aspects of the school as public forum not dis­
cussed in Tinker. In addition to the obvious issue of the school newspaper as a public 
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found in Avins v. Rutgers, State University.98 In Avins, a law review 
article was rejected by the Rutgers Law Review, a publication of the 
state-supported Law School of Rutgers University. The author of 
the article claimed that it had been improperly rejected based on its 
conservative jurisprudential outlook. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the exercise of editorial discre­
tion by the Law Review's Editorial Board. The Rutgers Law Review 
was found to be part of the law school's educational program and 
not a forum available to all who wish to express their ideas on its 
pages. The court rejected Avins' claim, concluding that "the accept­
ance or rejection of articles submitted for publication in a law school 
law review necessarily involves the exercise of editorial judgment 
and this is in no wise lessened by the fact that the law review is 
supported, at least in part, by the State."99 At least with respect to 
outside contributors, the law review was not considered to be a vol­
untary public forum and the court apparently was unwilling to con­
sider it as an involuntary forum. 100 
Two additional cases in the educational setting also concerned 
public righ~s of access to potential public forums within the school 
environment. In both of these cases, access claims were made to 
school notice distribution mechanisms. In the first, Buckel v. Pren­
tice,101 an even more clear-cut rejection of the involuntary forum 
forum, there is also the question of the rights of nonstudents when the public forum 
involved is a part of the school's educational program. See note 67 supra. At least one 
case suggested that the rights of students in an educational public forum are greater than 
the rights of nonstudents. Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 975 (N.D. Miss. 1969), 
tiff'd,446 F.2d 1366 (5th Cir. 1972). See generally Comment, supra note 72, at 120-24. 
98. 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cerl. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968). 
99. Id at 153-54. 
100. Outside of the schoolhouse" context, at least one case can be found in 
which the court reached a contrary result." In Radical Lawyers Caucus v. Pool, 324 F. 
Supp. 268 (W.O. Tex. 1970), the court found a right to place a political advertisement in 
a state-supported publication despite a publication policy barring such ads. In Pool, 
plaintiffs sought to place an ad in the Texas Bar Journal publicizing a caucus they were 
sponsoring during the annual meeting of the State Bar of Texas. The Texas Bar Journal 
had a policy against accepting political advertisements. Despite this policy, the court 
held for plaintiffs. The court ruled that the Texas Bar Journal had no policy against 
accepting advertising since it accepted commercial ads. Moreover, it found the defend­
ant's explanation that it wished to remain neutral in controversial matters to be insuffi­
cient in light of other political materials published by the Journal. Id at 270. While 
Pool seemed to create an involuntary forum in the face of a government intention not to 
open up the Journal to political ads, the case is of minimum assistance in finding support 
for such an argument. The court in Pool failed to discuss the public forum issue. It 
appeared to assume, suh sUenlio, ~t a forum existed, and went on to conclude that the 
government lacked a compelling reason for excluding plaintiffs from that forum. Id 
101. 410 F. Supp. 1243 (S.D. Ohio 1976), tiff'd, 572 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1978). 
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concept occurred. In Buckel, plaintiffs based their claim on the 
equal access doctrine arguing that the Kingswood Elementary 
School in Columbus, Ohio had created a public forum by its practice 
of sending circulars home to parents through inschool distribution to 
their school-aged children. Defendant school system in Buckel had 
no written policy governing the distribution of noncommercial 
materials. The record in Buckel indicated that informational 
"materials about home fire safety, musical instrument rental plans, 
school lunch menus, summer recreation facilities and programs, and 
musical concerts and recitals" had been sent home in the past. 102 
Additionally, the schools had disseminated pamphlets "promoting 
tax levies and a state income tax."I03 The record was further compli­
cated because plaintiffs previously had been granted permission to 
distribute a document urging decentralization of the public 
schools. I04 Plaintiffs' lawsuit sought the right to distribute additional 
materials on this same subject. 
The court in Buckel recognized that the system was stepping 
dangerously close to the edge of creating a public forum by having 
no structured policy about distribution. At some point, the practice 
of allowing individual school printipals to decide what material 
could be sent home with students might give rise to the creation of a 
forum. The court, however, felt that while such a potential existed, 
the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the Columbus 
public schools had developed a practice of permitting parents to use 
student distribution to express opinions or disseminate information 
to other parents. lOS Therefore, no forum had been created on the 
facts before the court. 
Having rejected plaintiffs' attempts to show that the school had· 
voluntarily created a forum by developing a practice of allowing the 
message distribution system to be used by parents, the court also 
considered the possibility that an involuntary forum existed. The 
idea was that the school's own use of the distribution system for the 
dissemination of information gave rise to a right of parental usage of 
102. Id at 1246. 
103. Id 
104. Id In addition to the plaintiffs previous distribution, one other incident of 
private use of the school distribution system appeared in the record. A group called 
"Interested and concerned Kingswood Parents" distributed a circular urging parents to 
attend a discussion on the topic of school decentralization, to be held at the Kingswood 
Elementary School. Id 
lOS. Id at 1247. 
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that same system. The court, however, rejected this possibility as 
well: 
[T]he distribution via students of information concerning coming 
theatrical events, home safety measures, and the like, is not indic­
ative of the establishment of a forum for First Amendment pur­
poses. Dissemination of such material is a logical and a proper 
extension of the educational function of schools in our society, 
and such dissemination does not of itself give rise to any right of 
access to student distribution by parents or other concerned 
citizens. 106 
Applying the same logic to the school library setting would result in 
a rejection of any access to the library shelves. The process of book 
selection is part of the educational function of the school. Engaging 
in this process of itself would not be viewed as giving rise to the 
creation of an involuntary foruin. 
The final case involving a notice distribution system is Bonner­
Lyons Y. School Committee. 107 In Bonner-Lyons, members of The 
Ad Hoc Parents' Committee for Quality Education challenged the 
distribution of notices about a planned antibusing rally through the 
use of the internal distribution procedure of the Boston public school 
system. Use of this procedure allowed the notice to reach the ap­
proximately 97,000 students attending the Boston public schools. 
The distribution of the notice was authorized by a resolution 
adopted by the Boston School Committee. The notice informed par­
ents of schoolchildren that the Boston School Committee supported 
the "Parents' March on the Statehouse." Plaintiffs sought to enjoin 
future use of the distribution mechanism for notices voicing opposi­
tion to busing or, in the alternative, for access to the same system for 
the purpose of publicizing probusing rallies. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in analyzing the case, as­
sumed that the distribution procedure had been opened up to use by 
a private group for the dissemination of antibusing views. l08 Based 
106. Id 
107. 480 F.2d 442 (1st Cir. 1973). 
108. Id at 443. The decision is ambiguous as to the source of the antibusing no­
tice. The facts indicate that on March 29, 1973 the Committee authorized the distribu­
tion of the following notice: 
Dear Parents: 
At a meeting on March 29,1973, a resolution of the School Committee to 
support the Parents' March on the State House on Tuesday, April 3, 1973, at 
10:00 A.M. was passed unanimously. 
The purpose of the meeting is to inform the Governor and members of the 
Legislature that parents and the Boston School Committee stand united in op­
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on this assumption, the court applied the Mosley equal access princi­
ple and held that the system had been opened up to antibusing 
views, it had to be equally available for probusing opinions or, alter­
natively, to advocates of neither position. 109 Here again, a voluntary 
opening of the distribution system accounted for the result reached 
by the court. No issue of the involuntary creation of a forum by the 
school's attempt to create a forum solely for its own use had to be 
resolved. 
These authorities make clear that when the public forum issue is 
raised in the school environment, the case law has relied on the vol­
untary creation of a forum and the equal access principle to find a 
solution. Only two of these cases spoke directly to the question of 
whether an involuntary forum is part of first amendment theory in 
circumstances in which the government sets up a forum only for gov­
ernment speech. In both of these cases such an argument was re­
jected. The Third Circuit in Avins concluded that the state may 
create a place for the expression of ideas that is not a public fo­
rum. 110 This same result was adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Buck­
el.1ll Like the law review in Avins, the school's use of an 
information distribution system was found to be part of the school's 
educational function and did not give rise to the creation of a forum. 
A vins and Buckel both adopted what has been described as an 
all or nothing approach to the· public forum doctrine. 112 A place is 
or is not a forum with respect to all requests for access to that place. 
This approach, however, is not the only one available for analysis of 
public forum questions. One alternative is to consider the Law Re­
view to be a public forum, but find justifiable many of the editorial 
position to forced busing and redistricting now being considered by the State 
Board of Education. 
All parents are encouraged to write the Governor, the Senators and the 
Representatives in support of House Bill 3439 which opposes busing without 
the written consent of the parents. 
Id While the content of the notice suggests that its source is the School Committee itself 
and not a private party, the court rejected such an interpretation. The court found sup­
port for its position in that on April 30, 1973, the School Committee apparently author­
ized a second set of antibusing notices to be distributed. According to defendants these 
notices were prepared by the "Home and School Association," a private association. Id 
at 443 n.2. What the result would have been if the court had treated the notice as having 
. been sent by the School Committee itself was not discussed in the case. 
109. Id at 444. 
110. 385 F.2d at 153-54. 
III. 410 F. Supp. at 1247. 
112. Karst, Public Enterprire and tlte Public Forum: A Comment on Southeastern 
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 247, 248-52 (1976). 
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board's actions that result in the exclusion of certain articles from 
publication in the forum.1I3 For example, the rejection of Professor 
Avins' law review article because of dissatisfaction with its perspec­
tive on a question of constitutional analysis would seem to fall well 
within the permissible bounds of the editorial board's decisionmak­
ing authority. Suppose the board, however, rejected an article for a 
reason unrelated to its content. Instead, the board felt a personal 
animus toward the author of the article or objected to the author's 
political opinions, opinions not reflected in the work itself. This de­
cision should be considered an unjustified exclusion of the article 
from the pages of the Law Review. Nothing in the concept of edito­
rial discretion requires a decision based on such grounds. Under this 
analysis, therefore, the Law Review would be considered a public 
forum, but not all exclusions from it would be unconstitutional. 
While this reasoning might be preferred to the analysis of the 
courts in Avins and Buckel, it does not yet have. support in the case 
law.l l4 Therefore, an attempt to consider the library book collection 
to be an involuntary forum first would depend on an ability to con­
vince a court to adopt a more flexible response to public forum 
questions. 
One final approach to the problem of viewing the library book­
shelves as an involuntary forum remains. Unlike the kind of invol­
untary forum that would have been created in Buckel, this forum 
would not involve granting access to outside persons. The govern­
ment's own voice would continue to be the only voice heard in the 
forum. The government, however, would take on an obligation to 
express a variety of views. The argument here is for a kind of consti­
tutionally mandated fairness doctrine. I IS Whenever government 
puts its machinery behind the selling of certain ideas by the creation 
of a forum for the expression of those ideas, as it does in the educa­
tional process, the first amendment would impose an obligation that 
the government make a "balanced presentation" by expressing a di­
versity of viewpoints. I 16 
Several lines of decision have some relevance to the question of 
113. See notes 292-304 infra and accompanying text. 
114. Cass, supra note 33, at 1303. 
115. The fairness doctrine is a requirement imposed on private broadcasters by the 
Federal Communications Commission that the broadcasters fairly present opposing 
views in their coverage of controversial public issues. Applicability of the Fairness Doc­
trine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10,416 
(1964). 
116. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 714-16 (1970). 
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whether the first amendment permits the government to monopolize 
the school library as a forupl for the expression of its own ideas. 
One point of inquiry focuses on Supreme Court statements about the 
role of public education and whether the schools are limited in the 
extent to which they may teach a favored ideology. A useful starting 
place in this discussion is Tinker. 
In Tinker, the role of public education and limitations on the 
state's ability to formulate an educational program were discussed. 
The Court in that case set out limitations on the school's relationship 
with its pupils. The Court stated: "In our system, state-operated 
schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do 
not possess absolute authority over their students."1'17 Later the 
Court reiterated this point: "[S]tudents may not be regarded as 
closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to com­
municate. They may not be confined to the expression of those sen­
timents that are officially approved."1l8 These statements by the 
Court are open to two differing interpretations. One interpretation 
considers the Court's words in light of the facts of Tinker itself. The 
limitations on the power of school authorities to dictate certain 
messages to their students are supplied by the students having first 
amendment rights of freedom of expression in the schools. The state 
may preach its message, but the students have the right to rejoin with 
contrary messages of their own. A second interpretation of Tinker 
sees the case as imposing a much more direct restraint on school 
authorities. That interpretation views Tinker as requiring the school 
to disseminate a variety of messages. The school's obligation would 
be to expose students to a marketplace of ideas and would allow the 
students to choose those ideas that appeal to them most. This re­
quired democratization of the schoolhouse would limit the discretion 
of school authorities in matters of curriculum content. Even if no 
student desired to express contrary views to the school's favored ide­
ology, the school itself would bear this responsibility. In the school 
library this would mean the school would be limited in its ability to 
screen out certain books because of disagreement with the ideas ex­
pressed in those books. This view of the school as an involuntary 
forum, however, is far from established. 
To explore the question of whether such an argument can find 
further support in the case law, several additional cases deserve at­
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tention. In West Virginia State BoardofEducation v. Barnette, 119 the 
West Virginia State Board of Education's adoption of a resolution 
requiring compulsory flag salute in the schools was challenged. 
Challengers, Jehovah's Witnesses, claimed the flag salute law vio­
lated their rights to freedom of speech and religion. The Court in­
validated the West Virginia statute, relying on free speech principles. 
While the West Virginia statute did not interfere with the challeng­
ers' right to speak, it did interfere with their right to remain silent, a 
right also protected by the first amendment's free speech guarantee. 
In declaring the West Virginia law to be unconstitutional, the Court 
had no quarrel with the state's ability to foster national unity. In­
stead, it objected to the state's choice of coercive means. That the 
end was legitimate and only the means unconstitutional was reaf­
firmed by this language in the Court's opinion: ''To believe that pa­
triotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and 
spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflatter­
ing estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds."120 Thus 
Barnette cannot be viewed as a case in which the state's ability to 
foster patriotism was called into question. 
A similar reasoning and result also appeared more recently in 
Wooley v. Maynard. 121 In that case, George and Maxine Maynard 
challenged the authority of the State of New Hampshire to require 
that the Maynards display the New Hampshire state motto, "Live 
Free or Die," on their automobile license plate. The Maynards, Je­
hovah's Witnesses, claimed the motto ''to be repugnant -to their 
moral, religious, and political beliefs."122 The Supreme Court relied 
heavily on Barnette in finding for the Maynards: 
Here, as in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure which 
forces an individual, as part of his daily life-indeed constantly 
while his automobile is in public view-to be an instrument for 
fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds 
unacceptable. In doing so, the State "invades the sphere of intel­
lect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to 
our Constitution to reserve from all official contro1."123 
In addition to reaffirming the notion of a first amendment right to 
119. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruling Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 
586 (1940». 
120. 319 U.S. at 641. 
121. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
122. Id. at 707. 
123. Id. at 715 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
642 (1943». 
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remain silent, the Court also reaffirmed the legitimacy of govern­
ment attempts to "disseminate an ideology": 
The State is seeking to communicate to others an official view as 
to proper appreciation of history, state pride, and individualism. 
Of course, the State may legitimately pursue such interests in any 
number of ways. However, where the State's interest is to dissemi­
nate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest 
cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to avoid 
becoming the courier for such message. 124 
Once again, the Court had no objection to state attempts to instill 
favored values, only with its attempt to coerce allegiance to those 
values. 
One final case provided direct support for the acceptability of 
state attempts to disseminate a favored ideology in the schools. In 
Ambach v. Norwick,12S the Court upheld a ban on the employment 
of aliens as public school teachers. In doing so, the Court com­
mented: "Public education. . . 'fulfills a most fundamental <;>bliga­
tion of government to its constituency.' The importance of public 
schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, 
and in the preservation of the values on which our society rests, long 
has been recognized by our decisions."126 After describing public 
education as " 'a principal instrument in awakening the child to cul­
tural values,' "127 the Court also recognized the role of public educa­
tion in the indoctrination of fundamental values: 
Other authorities have perceived public schools as an "assimila­
tive force" by which diverse and conflicting elements in our soci­
ety are brought together on a broad but common ground. These 
perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental val­
ues necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system 
have been confirmed by the observations of social scientists. 128 
The Court went on to hold that the state's effort to further its educa­
tional goals justified imposing a citizenship requirement on public 
school teachers.129 
In upholding the legitimacy of state efforts "to promote particu­
124. 430 U.S. at 717 (footnote omitted). 
125. 441 U.S. 68 (1979). 
126. Id. at 76 (citation omitted). 
127. Id. at 77 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954». 
128. 441 U.S. at 77 (citations omitted). 
129. Id. at 80-81. 
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lar values and attitudes toward government"130 the Court, by impli­
cation, reinforced a narrower reading of Tinker. The Court's 
holding in Ambach suggests that the restraint on state authority im­
posed by Tinker was directed at the state's ability to silence student 
ideas and not at the state's right to choose to t~ach only certain ideas 
and values. 
The impact of these cases in the school library setting cuts away 
from the idea of the school library as an involuntary forum in which 
a broad spectrum of ideas and values must be represented. As there 
appears to be no element of coercion in the library setting, the limi­
tation established in cases like Barnette is inapplicable. The school 
library serves as a place for doing research on classroom assign­
ments, borrowing books for voluntary spare time reading, spending 
study hour time reading books of a student's own choice, and similar 
activities. Students are not compelled to read any particular 
books131 and certainly are not compelled to affirm belief in ideas 
represented in books read or to serve as walking advertisements for 
ideas expressed in those books. 
In searching for support among Supreme Court decisions for 
the argument that the school's ability to create a value laden library 
collection is subject to constitutional limitations, only two cases look 
promising. Upon closer examination, however, the support offered 
by these decisions is slight. 
In Meyer v. Nebraska, 132 the Supreme Court struck down a stat­
ute which forbad the teaching of any modem language, other than 
English, to any child who had not completed the eighth grade. The 
Court concluded that the statute interfered with the constitutionally 
protected liberty to acquire knowledge and with the right of parents 
130. Id at 79 n.lO. 
131. Unlike the school library situation, the element of coercion plays a role in the 
classroom setting. Since the students are required to participate in the classroom learn­
ing process and since the content of that process is controlled by the school, the class­
room environment is distinctly more coercive than that in the library. This makes more 
persuasive the argument for first amendment limits on classroom curriculum content. 
See, e.g., Comment, supra note II, at 497-503 (arguing that the vulnerability of children 
in the classroom setting to indoctrination gives rise to a constitutional right to challenge 
curriculum exclusions that result in a curriculum that imposes ideological homogeneity). 
But if. Hirscholf, Parents and the Public School Curriciulum: Is There a Right to Have 
One's Child Excused from Objectionable Instruction?, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 871, 905-09 
(1977) (arguing that practical obstacles stand in the way of relying on a balanced presen­
tation obligation for classroom teachers and that these obstacles point toward the alterna­
tive of allowing parents who disagree with the values taught in certain public school 
classes to have their children excused from such instruction). 
132. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
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to control the upbringing of their children. 133 
While Meyer appears to be an example of a constitutionallimi­
tation on curriculum content, its importance should not be exagger­
ated. In the first place, just as in the later cases of Barnette and 
Ambach, the Court recognized the legitimacy of "[t]he desire of the 
legislature to foster a homogeneous people with American ideals 
prepared readily to understand current discussions of civic mat­
ters."134 The Court's quarrel was with the state's choice of means, 
not with its ends. 
One further limitation on the importance of Meyer results from 
the Court restricting its decision to the facts before it. While the 
Nebraska statute was applicable to both public and private school 
instruction in foreign languages, plaintiff in Meyer was a teacher at a 
parochial school run by the Zion Evangelical Lutheran Congrega­
tion. The Court therefore dealt with the statute only as applied to 
the private school setting raised by plaintiff. The Court specifically 
eliminated from its consideration the question of the validity of the 
same curriculum control as applied to state run schools. 13s This lim­
itation on the Court's decision is critical. Its impact was to reduce 
the value of Meyer in invalidating public school curriculum restric­
tions. Thus, the case has no direct application to curtailing what the 
state may teach in a forum of its own creation. 
One Supreme Court case that involved the issue of a constitu­
tional limitation on what mayor may not be taught in the public 
schools is Epperson v. Arkansas. 136 In Epperson, an Arkansas law 
made illegal the teaching of the Darwinian theory of evolution in the 
public schools. In striking down this law, the Court retlected gener­
ally on past judicial involvement in educational controversies impli­
cating constitutional values. While discussing Meyer and its reliance 
on the interference with the due process rights of students and teach­
ers, the Court Clearly disavowed any reliance on Meyer as a basis for 
Epperson. The controversy in Epperson was resolveable solely on 
establishment of religion grounds without any need to consider the 
broader problem of the general right to freedom of expression. 137 
The Constitution requires the government to take a position of neu­
133. Id at 401. On the same day as Meyer, the Court struck down three very 
similar statutes in effect in Iowa, Ohio, and Nebraska. Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 
(1923) (cases consolidated). 
134. 262 U.S. at 402. 
135. Id 
136. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
137. Id at 105-06. 
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trality in religious matters, thus government advocacy of "a religious 
doctrine or the prohibition of theory which is deemed antagonistic to 
a particular dogma"138 is forbidden. The Arkansas law was found to 
have been motivated by a desire to outlaw all discussion of evolution 
that contradicted the Biblical account of the <;lrigin of the species. 139 
The law, therefore, was a violation of the establishment clause of the 
first amendment. 
Meyer and Epperson provided only a feeble endorsement for the 
notion of a constitutional requirement that the government give 
something akin to equal time to the teaching of opposing ideas in the 
public schools. Instead, the message of Tinker, Barnette, Wooley, 
and Ambach is that the government is free to place its weight behind 
a particular idea so long as it does not coerce others to pledge alle­
giance to that belief. 
The public school's ability to monitor its library collection so as 
to have it represent appropriate values is one aspect of the larger 
question of the constitutional treatment of government advocacy. 
This question has received scant attention until now. l40 The most 
direct treatment of the question came in a series of cases that chal­
lenged government advocacy in the electoral context. 141 
138. Id at 106-07. 
139. Id at 107. 
140. While this issue thus far has provoked infrequent scholarly comment, e.g., Z. 
CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MAss COMMUNICATIONS 732-34 (1947); T. EMERSON, supra 
note 116, at 697-716; Van Alstyne, The First Amendment and the Suppression ofWarmon­
gering Propaganda in the United States: Comments and Footnotes, 31 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROB. 530, 531-36 (1966), there are indications this situation is changing. For two excel­
lent recent treatments of the topic of government expression, see Kamenshine, The First 
Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1104 (1979) (argu­
ing that the first amendment contains an implied prohibition against political establish­
ment similar in its operation to the religious establishment clause and limiting the right 
of government to advocate political viewpoints); and Yudof, When Governments Speak: 
Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 
863 (1979) (suggesting that excessive government expression should be curbed by courts 
becoming aware of the dangers of such speech and strengthening individual speech rights 
to combat those dangers, and by strengthening legislative limits on government speech 
through the use of the ultra vires technique). A third approach to the problem ofgovem­
ment speech is advocated in Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 V.C.L.A. L. REv. 565 
(1980) (arguing that the legitimacy of government speech ought to be evaluated by an 
eclectic approach, in each case balancing the interests which weigh against allowing such 
speech against the interests in favor of government speech). 
141. For an analysis of the problems presented by such cases, see Ziegler, Govern­
ment Speech andthe Constitution: The Limits ofOffiCial Partisanship, 21 B.C. L. REv. 578 
(1980); Note, The Constitutionality ofMunicipal Advocacy in Statewide Referendum Cam­
paigns, 93 HARv. L. REv. 535 (1980). 
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In Anderson v. City ofBoston 142 the city sought to expend funds 
"for the purposes of providing educational materials and disseminat­
ing information urging the adoption by the people of a proposed 
amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution relating to the classifi­
cation of property for purposes of taxation." 143 In pursuit of his ef­
forts to encourage passage of the classification amendment, the 
mayor created the Office of Public Information on Classification. As 
a result of the city's efforts, eleven taxpayers sued to prevent the city 
from engaging in activities to bring about the passage of the classifi­
cation referendum. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
ruled in favor of plaintiff taxpayers on the ground that the city lack­
ed statutory authority to appropriate funds for the purpose of influ­
encing election results.l44 
Despite the lack of statutory authorization, the city argued that 
the first amendment protected its right to speak even in the absence 
of enabling legislation. The city was entitled to such constitutional 
protection, it therefore could expend funds in order to advocate pas­
sage of the proposed amendment. 145 In commenting on the constitu­
tional claim raised by the city, the court suggested that the city's 
right to speak, while it might be constitutionally protected, also was 
subject to some degree of constitutional restraint: 
There are, no doubt, constitutional restrictions on governmental 
speech even where the subject under discussion is one at the heart 
of the First Amendment's protection. On the other hand, there 
are a variety of instances in which government funds are used 
lawfully to express views and conclusions on matters of impor­
tance where various taxpayers may disagree with those views and 
conclusions. The Constitution of the United States, thus, does not 
forbid all government communications and publications which 
are not neutral and purely informative. l46 
142. 376 Mass. 178, 380 N.E.2d 628, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 1060 (1979) (dis­
missed for want of substantial federal question). 
143. Id at 180,380 N.E.2d at 631 (footnote omitted). 
144. Id at 182, 380 N.E.2d at 182. 
145. Id at 188-89, 380 N.E.2d at 635. 
146. Id at 191-92,380 N.E.2d at 637 (footnote omitted). The court specified some 
of the restrictions on government speech in a footnote to this statement: 
Surely, the Constitution of the United States does not authorize the expen­
diture of public funds to promote the reelection of the President, Congressmen, 
and State and local officials (to the exclusion of their opponents), even though 
the open discussion of political candidates and elections is basic First Amend­
ment materiaL Government domination of the expression of ideas is repugnant 
to our system of constitutional government. 
Id at 191 n.14, 380 N.E.2d at 637 n.14. 
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The remainder of the court's analysis assumed for purposes of argu­
ment that the government speech at issue in Anderson was of the 
constitutionally protected variety. The court, however, even assum­
ing such a protected status, found that the state has a sufficiently 
compelling interest in "assuring the fairness of elections and the ap­
pearance of fairness in the electoral process"147 to justify curbing 
such advocacy. 
The government's right to engage in political advocacy also was 
raised in Citizens to Protect Public Funds v. Board ofEducation of 
Parsippany-Troy Hills l48 and Stem v. Kramarsky.149 The facts of 
Citizens to Protect Public Funds were similar to those of Anderson. 
The case involved a referendum on a proposal to issue bonds to 
finance a school building program. Prior to the referendum vote, the 
Board of Education printed and distributed an eighteen-page book­
let entitled "Read the Facts Behind the Parsippany-Troy Hills School 
BUilding Program." The booklet contained facts about current 
school facilities and detailed plans of the proposed school expansion 
program. On the cover of the booklet and on several inside pages 
the reader was urged to "Vote Yes" on the referendum. The booklet 
also set out the untoward consequences of a negative vote. Plaintiffs 
challenged the legality of the Board of Education's use of public 
funds for the distribution of the booklet. The Supreme Court of 
New Jersey found no express or implied statutory authority for the 
expenditure of public funds for publication of the booklet. While 
not deciding the case on constitutional grounds, some of the court's 
reasoning seemed to bear on that question as well. The court found 
it appropriate for the school board to expend funds to fairly present 
all the consequences, both good and bad, of the proposed building 
program. For example, the Board of Education could sponsor a 
public forum for the airing of all views on the proposal or could 
broadcast a radio debate between proponents and opponents of the 
referendum. ISO The Board's authority, however, did not include the 
"use of public funds. to advocate one side only of the controversial 
question without affording the dissenters the opportunity by means 
of that financed medium to present their side."lsl The court's real 
objection was to ''the expenditure of public funds in support of one 
side only in a manner which gives the dissenters no opportunity to 
147. Id. at 193,380 N.E.2d at 638. 
148. 13 N.J. 172, 98 A.2d 673 (1953). 
149. 84 Misc. 2d 447, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1975). 
150. 13 N.J. at 182,98 A.2d at 677-78. 
151. Id. at 180-81,98 A.2d at 677. 
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present their side."152 
A similar opinion was expressed by the court in Stern v. Kra­
marsky.153 In Stern, a taxpayer sued to enjoin the Commissioner of 
the Division of Human Rights of the State of New York from engag­
ing in activities to bring about the adoption of the proposed equal 
rights amendment to the Constitution of the State of New York. 
While the court upheld the propriety of activities designed to edu­
cate and inform the public concerning the proposed equal rights 
amendment, it spoke out strongly against government departures 
from a position of neutrality on issues or candidates: "It would be 
establishing a dangerous and untenable precedent to permit the gov­
ernment or any agency thereof, .to use public funds to disseminate 
propaganda in favor of or against any issue or candidate."154 
While Anderson , Citizens to Protect Public Funds, and Stern sug­
gested some limitation on the right of government advocacy, several 
caveats to the application of these cases to the school library book 
removal problem must be raised. First, there is the nonconstitution­
al ratio decidendi of these decisions. Second, there is the lack of any 
cited authority for the restrictions on government speech expressed 
in the opinions. Third, there are obvious distinctions between gov­
ernment support for a candidate or election issue and government 
support for certain positions in an educational setting. One possible 
distinction is based on the concept of a government function. Ac­
cording to Professor Emerson, the government's right of expression 
should "not extend to any sphere that is outside the governmental 
function."155 While "direct support of a particular candidate for of­
fice"156 is not a government function, education clearly is an impor­
tant government concern. 157 Inherent in the administration of a 
public school system is the need to make choices of some ideas over 
152. Id at 182, 98 A.2d at 678. 
153. 84 Misc. 2d 447, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1975). 
154. Id at 452, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 239. 

ISS. T. EMERSON, supra note 116, at 699. 

156. Id 
157. As the Supreme Court recognized in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954): 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function I)f state and local 
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures 
for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education 
to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic 
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very founda­
tion of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the 
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in 
helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful 
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others. Ideological neutrality is not part of the history of public edu­
cation in the United States. ISS One other distinction is that the selec­
tion ofcertain books for the school library is not as direct an instance 
of government advocacy as occurs when government supports a can­
didate for office. The act of placing books in a library for students to 
read at their option does not put the active voice of government be­
hind those ideas, campaigning for their adoption. While the govern­
ment may intend a student to hear a particular message, its manner 
of presenting that message is a great deal more subtle. ls9 
While the political advocacy cases ofAnderson, Citizens to Pro­
tect Public Funds, and Stem, and the government forum cases of 
Avins and Buckel, all raised the issue of the government's right to 
create a forum for the dissemination of its own speech, the two lines 
of cases came at the issue from different directions. The government 
forum cases contemplated limiting the government's right to reserve 
a forum exclusively for its own use, while the political advocacy 
cases allowed the government to monopolize a forum but restrain 
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the 
opportunity of an education. 
Id at 493. 
158. It is common for state statutes to require the teaching of patriotism and demo­
cratic values in the public schools. E.g., ALA. CODE § 16-40-3(c) (1975) which states: 
The direction of study shall be one of orientation in contrasting the government 
of the United States of America with the Soviet government. . . . It shall lay 
particular emphasis upon the dangers ofcommunism, the ways to fight commu­
nism, the evils of communism, the fallacies of communism and the false doc­
trines of communism. 
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1613 (1980) (''The instilling into the hearts of the various pupils of 
an understanding of the United States and of a love of country and of a devotion to the 
principles of American Government, shall be the primary object of such instruc­
tion...."); NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-213(5)(b) (1976) which states 
In at least two grades of every high school, at least three periods per week shall 
be devoted to the teaching of civics, during which courses specific attention 
shall be given to. . . [t)he benefits and advantages of our form of government 
and the dangers and fallacies of Nazism, Communism, and similar 
ideologies. . . . 
159. Some might argue that despite their subtlety, government efforts at indoctri­
nation in the educational process are more effective than any direct advocacy engaged in 
during the electoral'process. See Hirschoff, supra note 131, at 905-07. While this gener­
ally may be true with respect to classroom instruction, it is a much more difficult argu­
ment to make convincingly with regard to the school library. Attempts to tailor the 
school library collection to indoctrinate certain ideas must contend with the absence· of 
required reading assignments and of the infiuential presence of the classroom teacher. 
Further, the subtlety of these efforts makes much more difficult the creation of an effec­
tive and appropriate remedy for excessive government expression. See Yudof, supra 
note 140, at 910-12. 
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what the government may say in its exclusive forum. Both of these 
principles, however, have application in the school library setting. 
If the school is not free to create a library exclusively for its own 
use, the consequences would seem to involve either allowing others 
to donate books to the school library for placement on the library 
shelves, giving library patrons the right to suggest additional titles 
for inclusion in the library collection and have those suggestions 
judged by constitutionally adequate standards, or at the very least, 
allowing students to protest the removal of books from the school's 
collection. In this way the school would have the right to attempt to 
foster favored ideas in its selections for the library, but students 
would have a right to check these efforts by being given a constitu­
tionally guaranteed voice in what the library places on its shelves. In 
this instance,' the burden for speaking up is on the students them­
selves and does not fall directly on school administrators. 
The application of the theory of a restricted right ofgovernment 
expression would have an even greater impact in the school library 
setting than the inability to create an exclusive forum. If the govern­
ment may create a forum for its own use, but is constrained in the 
extent to which it may engage in advocacy in that forum, this would 
suggest that the school may not design the library collection with an 
eye toward indoctrination of several favored ideas. Outright expul­
sions of books because they represent a disfavored position would 
come up against this barrier. If the state were to include prolife 
abortion literature in the library, but refuse to keep shelved any 
prochoice literature arguing in favor of the right to choose an abor­
tion, this barrier would be crossed. 
The acceptance of either of these positions would lead to some 
amount of constitutional restraint on school board decisions to re­
move books from the school library. It, however, is clear that these 
two arguments are found far afield from the public forum doctrine 
routinely cited by courts willing to intervene in book removal cases. 
While these courts relied on Brown v. Louisiana 160 and Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District,161 the issue of 
whether the school library qualifies as a public forum clearly cannot 
be resolved on the basis of these authorities alone. A complete anal­
•ysis of the public forum status of the school library book collection 
requires a court to grapple with the idea of an involuntary forum 
and restrictions on the right of government advocacy. Neither of 
160. 383 U.S. 131 (1966). 
161. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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these inquiries appear in the book removal cases, thus revealing the 
inadequacy of the analysis engaged in by the book removal courts. 
B. The Right to Know 
It is evident from the discussion of the public forum doctrine 
that one difficulty found in applying traditional first amendment 
principles to the school library book removal cases is that the plain­
tiffs in these cases are not asking to speak. Unlike the students in 
Tinker, these student plaintiffs seek access to books removed from 
the school library and the right to the information contained in those 
missing volumes. 
This significant difference between the right to engage in speech 
and the right to receive information did not escape the attention of 
courts faced with deciding book removal cases. All of the school 
library censorship cases considered the nature of the first amend­
ment right interfered with by the school board's action. The results 
of this consideration, however, varied depending on whether the 
court in question adhered to the noninterventionist model or the ju­
dicial review model of resolving book removal disputes. 
The beginning premise for both kinds of courts is that the first 
amendment protects both the speaker and the listener. While agree­
ing on this initial assumption, the two lines of cases thereafter go 
their separate ways. The noninterventionist courts assert that the 
rights of the listener are no greater than those of the speaker. 162 As 
the speakers in these cases, the publishers of the removed books, 
have no right to have their books retained on the library shelves, it 
therefore follows that the readers of the books have no such right. 163 
Moreover, the courts go on to assert a second line of defense to the 
claim that a constitutionally protected right has been invaded. These 
courts point out that because the students have alternative means of 
access to the removed books, they have not been deprived of any 
right to receive the information contained in the books.l64 
162. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 404, 
429 (2d Cir. 1980) (Mansfield, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981); Bicknell 
v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615,620 (D. Vt. 1979), offd, 
638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980). 
163. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 404, 
429 (2d Cir. 1980) (Mansfield, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981); Bicknell 
v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615, 621 (D. Vt. 1979), offd, 
638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980). 
164. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 404, 
428 (2d Cir. 1980) (Mansfield, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981); Zykan 
v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1306 (7th Cir. 1980); Presidents 
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A different analysis is offered by courts willing to review book 
removal controversies. These courts also rely on the right to know as 
established by such Supreme Court cases as Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. :165 "Freedom 
of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists, 
as is the case here, the protection afforded is to the communication, 
to its source and to its recipients both."166 The willing speaker is 
identified as the book itself and the recipient as the student-reader. 167 
No examination of the protected interest, if any, of the speaker is 
undertaken by these courts. Further, the existence of alternative av­
enues of access to the books is regarded as irrelevant. 168 
Only one of the cases invalidating such school board action re­
lied on a more expansive view of the nature of the student rights 
involved. In Right to Read Defense Committee v. School Committee 
ofChelsea, 169 the rights of the students were not viewed as reciprocal 
rights to those of the speaker. An independent right of access to in­
formation was identified: "It is the right of the public to receive suit­
able access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and 
experiences which is crucial here."17o 
The right to "receive information and ideas" relied on in the 
book removal cases is firmly established as part of the first amend­
ment territory.l7l Whether this right, however, extends so far as to 
protect the student-readers is far from clear. The Supreme Court 
first definitively recognized the "right to know" as an independent 
Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289, 292 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972); Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 
F. Supp. 615, 621 (D. Vt. 1979), affd, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980). 
165. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
166. Id at 756 (footnote omitted). This language was quoted by the courts in 
Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577,583 (6th Cir. 1976) and Salvail 
v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (D.N.H. 1979). 
167. Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (D.N.H. 1979). 
168. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976); 
Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 715 n.19 (D. Mass. 
1978). 
169. 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978). 
170. Id at 714 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 
(1969». 
171. For a sampling of articles documenting this right, see, e.g., Emerson, Legal 
Foundations ofthe Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. I; Henkin, The Right to Know and 
tlte Duty to Withltold' The Case ofthe Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 271 (1971); 
Note, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 109 (1977); Note, The Right 
to Know in First Amendment Analysis, 57 TEX. L. REV. 505 (1979); Note, The First 
Amendment Right to Gother State-Held Information, 89 YALE L.J. 923 (1980). 
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first amendment right in Lamont v. Postmaster Genera/.l72 In La­
mont, the constitutionality of section 305(a) of the Postal Service and 
Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962 was challenged. Section 
305(a) required that the addressee of a piece of mail identified by the 
Post Office as "communist political propaganda" be mailed a notice 
that the mail was being held by postal authorities. If the addressee 
desired the delivery of the piece of mail, a reply card requesting such 
delivery had to be returned within twenty days. Failure to return the 
card would result in the destruction of the mail. In Lamont, several 
addressees of mail identified as "communist political propaganda" 
argued that the statute violated their first amendment rights. The 
Court agreed with the challengers and struck down the statute be­
cause the requirement that the addressee request a piece of mail be 
delivered in order to receive it was found to abridge the first amend­
ment rights of the addressees.173 
The issue of whether the rights of the recipients were in any way 
dependent on the rights of the senders of the mail was raised in La­
mont as well. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion took the posi­
tion that the "addressees assert First Amendment claims in their own 
right."174 While "the First Amendment contains no specific guaran­
tee of access to publications,"175 Justice Brennan had no difficulty 
identifying such a right as part of the first amendment's protection: 
"I think the right to receive publications is such a fundamental right. 
The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing ifotherwise will':' 
ing addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It would be 
a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buy­
ers."176 After Lamont, the right to receive information continued to 
be recognized as an independent constitutional right with those as­
serting the right being granted standing on their own and not in or­
der to assert the rights of absent speakers. The cases, however, as in 
Lamont, involved government interference with communication be­
tween a willing speaker and a willing listener. 
172. 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
173. Id at 307. 
174. Id at 308. Justice Brennan noted that the case would present a more trouble­
some problem if the addressees were relegated to raising claims dependent on the rights 
of the senders. The reason for this was that the addressees then would need to demon­
strate a justification for allowing them standing to raise the rights of absent third parties. 
Further they would need to establish "First Amendment protection for political propa­
ganda prepared and printed abroad by or on behalf of a foreign government." Id 
175. Id 
176. Id 
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In Kleindienst v. Mandel,177 Ernest Mandel, a Belgian citizen 
and self-described "revolutionary Marxist," was invited to partici­
pate in a series of conferences, lectures, and panel discussions 
throughout the United States. To enter the United States, Mandel 
applied for but was denied a nonimmigrant visa. The legitimacy of 
the government's refusal to issue a visa to Mandel was challenged by 
Mandel and a group of eight university professors. The professors 
were "persons who invited Mandel to speak at universities and other 
forums in the United States or who expected to participate in collo­
quia with him so that, as the complaint alleged, 'they may hear his 
views and engage him in a free and open academic exchange.' "178 
That the interests of those who sought the right to hear Mandel were 
independent of Mandel's own constitutional rights was obvious to 
the Court. Because Mandel, "as an unadmitted and nonresident 
alien, had no constitutional right of entry to this country,"179 appel­
lee scholars could not depend on Mandel's rights as the basis for 
their claim. Instead, they relied on the right to receive information 
and ideas. The Supreme Court, while it ultimately held for the gov­
ernment,180 recognized the legitimacy of this claim.l8l The govern­
ment's action in this case, as in Lamont, interfered with willing 
communication between a speaker and his audience, as Mandel 
sought entry to the United States and desired to participate in the 
scheduled conferences. 
Kleindienst also raised, but did not resolve, another right to 
know issue disputed in the library book removal cases. The govern­
ment argued in that case that no first amendment infringement had 
occurred because appellees had alternative avenues for access to 
Mandel's ideas ''through his books and speeches, and because 'tech­
nological developments: such as tapes or telephone hook-ups, read­
ily supplant his physical presence."182 In responding to this 
argument, the Court first pointed out that these alternatives might 
177. 40S u.s. 753 (1972). 

17S. Id at 759-60. 

179. Id at 762. 
ISO. Id at 770. In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on the plenary congres­
sional power to exclude aliens. Under § 212(a)(2S) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 27, Congress had delegated this authority to the Executive. 
The Court, in reviewing the Executive exercise of this authority, found it to be based on a 
facially legitimate and bona fide reason. Id at 769. Under those circumstances, the 
Court refused to balance the government justification for its decision to exclude Mandel 
against the first amendment rights of those who wished to meet and speak with Mandel. 
Id at 770. 
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not compensate completely for the benefits of face-to-face communi­
cation. 183 As for a final resolution of the relevance of alternatives, 
the Court found it unnecessary to resolve the question: 
While alternative means of access to Mandel's ideas might be a 
relevant factor were we called upon to balance First Amendment 
rights against governmental regulatory interests-a balance we 
find unnecessary here in light of the discussion that follows in Part 
V-we are loath to hold on this record that existence of other al­
ternatives extinguishes altogether any constitutional interest on 
the part of the appellees in this particular form of access. 184 
This statement on the relevance of alternatives left the issue very 
much up in the air. While the Court was unwilling to rule out the 
relevance of alternatives, it also was unwilling to include them and 
express any opinion on how much weight alternatives are to be 
given. 
The theme of willing speakers and listeners showed up again in 
the more recent right to know cases of Procunier v. Martinez l85 and 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc. 186 Procunier involved a challenge, on first amendment 
grounds, to the censoring of prisoner mail. The Court, in deciding 
the case in favor of the inmates, found it unnecessary to address the 
scope of prisoner· first amendment rights. Whatever the scope of 
those rights, it was clear to the Court that the first amendment rights 
of noninmate correspondents also were being infringed. As in La­
mont, the intended recipient of a letter had a constitutionally pro­
tected interest. 187 Also as in Lamont, willingness characterized both 
sides of the communication in Procunier. 
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con­
sumer Council, Inc., 188 a ban that prohibited pharmacists from ad­
vertising the prices of prescription drugs was attacked. The 
challenge to the statute was raised not by a pharmacist but by a per­
son required to take prescription drugs on a daily basis and by two 
nonprofit organizations. Plaintiffs claimed "that the First Amend­
ment entitles the user of prescription drugs to receive information 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. 416 U.S. 396 (1974). 
186. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
187. 416 U.S. at 408-09. The Court in Procunier not only protected noninmates 
when they were the intended recipients of letters. Noninmates also received protection 
from the censoring of their correspondence when they authored letters to prisoners. Id. 
188. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
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that pharmacists wish to communicate to them through advertising 
and other promotional means, concerning the prices of such 
drugS."189 The Court agreed that plaintiffs, as willing recipients of 
the price information, were entitled to first amendment protection. 190 
Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in Virginia Pharmacy 
Board also responded to an argument raised by the dissenting opin­
ion of Justice Rehnquist. That argument concerned the relevance of 
alternative methods of obtaining drug price information. Despite its 
somewhat diffident handling of this issue in Kleindienst v. Mandel,191 
the Court in Virginia Pharmacy Board unequivocally declared alter­
native methods for obtaining the information to be irrelevant: 
The dissent contends that there is no such right to receive the in­
formation that another seeks to disseminate, at least not when the 
person objecting could obtain the information in another way, and 
could himself disseminate it. Our prior decisions, cited above, are 
said to have been limited to situations in which the information 
sought to be received ''would not be otherwise reasonably avail­
able...." We are aware of no general principle that freedom of 
speech may be abridged when the speaker's listeners could come 
by his message by some other means, such as seeking him out and 
asking him what it is. Nor have we recognized any such limitation 
on the independent right of the listener to receive the information 
sought to be communicated. Certainly, the recipients of the polit­
ical publications in Lamont could have gone abroad and thereaf­
ter disseminated them themselves. Those in Kleindienst who 
organized the lecture tour by a foreign Marxist could have done 
the same. And the addressees of the inmate correspondence in 
Procunier could have visited the prison themselves. 192 
Justice Rehnquist remained far from satisfied with the majority's re­
sponse to his argument. He rejected its contention that alternatives 
were equally available in Procunier, Kleindienst, and Lamont: "In 
Procunier this would have entailed traveling to a state prison; in 
Kleindienst and Lamont, traveling abroad. Obviously such measures 
would limit access to information in a way that the requirement of a 
phone call or a trip to the comer drugstore would not."193 
If the majority's position in Virginia Pharmacy Board is ac­
cepted as the last word on the issue of alternatives, nonintervention­
189. Id at 754. 
190. Id at 756-57. 
191. 408 U.S. at 765; see text accompanying notes 182-84 supra. 
192. 425 U.S. at 757-58 n.15. 
193. Id at 783. 
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ist courts which point out that students will be able to obtain 
removed books through purchase or at other libraries are in error in 
their analysis. 194 If the distinction urged by Justice Rehnquist is ac­
cepted as viable, however, the position taken by these courts is more 
credible. Unlike the situation in Procunier, K(eindienst, and Lamont, 
the alternative means of access in the book removal cases are not so 
obviously inferior. In these cases there is no loss of face-to-face con­
tact with the speaker by being forced to accept an alternative method 
of communication. In all cases the means of communication will be 
the same: the reading of the book by the student. 
Despite the surface appeal of these alternatives, however, they 
still may make access to the books involved more difficult for the 
student. Purchase of the book as an alternative will involve a 
financial outlay not encompassed in the borrowing of the book from 
the library. 195 Borrowing the book from a municipal library may not 
be all that easily accomplished. The city library may not have a 
copy of the book, or it may be shelved in the adult section of the 
library. This latter possibility would mean student access would be­
come dependent upon the willingness of the student's parents to bor­
row the book and give it to the student to read. None of these 
alternatives provide as ready access to the book as would be avail­
able in the school library. 196 The school library is established for the 
194. E.g., Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615, 
621 	(D. Vt. 1979), affd, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980). 
Finally, we note that there has been neither evidence nor argument in this case 
that the Board's actions have in fact abridged the student plaintiffs' constitu­
tional rights of free expression. Students remain free to purchase the books in 
question from private bookstores, to read them in other libraries, to carry them 
to school and to discuss them freely during the school day. 
Id 
195. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 774 (1978) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
196. The need to carefully analyze available alternatives to make sure they are 
equally effective exists both when the listener is seeking access to information and when 
the speaker desires to convey a message. For an example of such scrutiny when a 
speaker's preferred communication medium has been banned, see Linmark Associates, 
Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977). In that case, an ordinance prohibit­
ing the use of real estate "For Sale" signs was found to violate the first amendment. In 
finding that the ordinance did not leave the sellers of property with ample alternative 
methods for communication, the Court remarked: 
Although in theory sellers remain free to employ a number of different alterna­
tives, in practice realty is not marketed through leafiets, sound trucks, demon­
strations, or the like. The options to which sellers realistically are relegated­
primarily newspaper advertising and listing with real estate agents-involve 
more cost and less autonomy than "For Sale" signs; are less likely to reach 
persons not deliberately seeking sales information; and may be less effective 
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benefit of the students and exists as a readily available source of 
books. Thus, even if equally available alternatives were to be con­
sidered a relevant factor in the court's analysis, reasonable minds 
could differ on the issue of whether such alternatives exist in the 
book removal cases. Under either the view of the majority or the 
dissent in Virginia Pharmacy Board, the possibility of alternative 
methods of obtaining removed books need not affect the outcome of 
the right to know issue. 
The elimination of the barrier posed by the existence of alterna­
tive methods of access to removed books, however, does not resolve 
all problems raised by the application of the right to know doctrine. 
There is still the requirement that the relationship between speaker 
and listener be a voluntary one. The question arises whether the 
term "voluntary" accurately describes the speaker/listener relation­
ship in the context of the book removal cases. 
The first step in answering this question is to determine the 
identity of the speaker. The identity of the listener is not in doubt. 
The student-readers desire access to the library books and the benefit 
of the information contained in the books, thereby qualifying them 
as willing listeners. Three possible speakers, however, must be con­
sidered: The publisher, the author, and the school board. 
Addressing the first two possibilities, it is difficult to see how the 
interests of the publisher and the author differ in any significant way. 
As the disseminator of the book, the publisher stands in the shoes of 
a speaker. 191 Similarly, the author of the book, having penned the 
words contained in the book, is speaking through its pages. To this 
extent one can argue that the government in the form of the school 
board is interfering with the relationship between a willing speaker 
(the publisher or author) and a willing listener (the student-reader). 
The speaker/listener relationship, however, is not a direct one. The 
publisher or author has not attempted to sell or mail the book to the 
student and had that activity interrupted. Here the speaker and lis­
tener were able to communicate because of government purchase of 
the book. This is a much more active government role in the trans-
media for communicating the message that is conveyed by a "For Sale" sign in 
front of the house to be sold. 
Id at 93 (citations omitted). 
197. Cf. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64 n.6 (1963) (while the 
Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth purported to regulate only. 
. 	the distribution of books, the publisher of books found "objectionable" by the Commis­
sion could assert an independent constitutional claim based on the first amendment's free 
press guarantee). 
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action than is found in any of the other right to know cases. In at 
least one of those cases, the transaction was purely private. 198 In 
Virginia Pharmacy Board, the pharmacist purchased advertising 
space in an appropriate place and the consumer was able to see or 
hear that advertising. The first amendmen~ simply prevented the 
government from interfering in that private transmission of informa­
tion. No affirmative obligation was imposed on the government, 
such as providing the pharmacist with a place in which to advertise. 
In Lamont and Procunier, the government's role was a slightly more 
active one. The speech was transmitted by the use of the postal serv­
ice. As the Court, however, remarked in Lamont: 
Whatever may have been the voluntary nature of the postal 
system in the period of its establishment, it is now the main artery 
through which the business, social, and personal affairs of the peo­
ple are conducted and upon which depends in a greater degree 
than upon any other activity of government the promotion of the 
general welfare. 199 
The government's role in the transaction was the passive one of not 
denying the use of the postal system to two willing private communi­
cators. The system generally was available to all on the same terms 
and the government simply was prevented from interfering with its 
use. This negative prohibition on government action again was not 
the imposition of an affirmative duty to aid the communication be­
tween the speaker and the listener.2OO 
198. The speaker/listener relationship was purely private in Stanley v. Georgia, 
394 U.S. 557 (1969), although the setting made irrelevant any inquiry into the exact na­
ture of the means by which information was transmitted. In Stanley, appellant was con­
victed of "knowingly hav[ingJ possession of ... obscene matter." Id. at 558. The 
Supreme Court ruled that punishment for the mere private possession of obscene materi­
als was not permitted under the first amendment. Id at 568. The rights asserted by 
appellant in the case were described by the Court as follows: "He is asserting the right to 
read or observe what he pleases-the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs 
in the privacy ofhis own home. He is asserting the right to be free from state inquiry into 
the contents of his library." Id at 565. Because of the unprotected nature of the speech 
in Stanley, the only protection afforded was to the possessor of such material in the pri­
vacy of his home. The seller of the material had no reciprocal right to disseminate the 
material. Therefore, under the unusual circumstances of Stanley, the government was 
prevented from interfering with private possession of obscene material, but could punish 
the commercial distribution of this material. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 
(1971). 
199. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 305 n.3 (1965) (quoting Pike v. 
Walker, 121 F.2d 37, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1941». 
200. The distinction made here is further supported by the Supreme Court's opin­
ion in United States Postal Servo v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 101 S. Ct. 2676 
(1981). In that case, the Court found that appellees had no first amendment right to use 
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It is at this point that the right to know doctrine and the public 
forum doctrine meet in the book removal cases. If the government 
activity required in order to bring about contact between speaker 
and listener is constitutionally mandated, the right to know doctrine 
is easy to apply. Such a constitutional mandate will exist whenever 
the speaker/listener relationship is to be consummated in a place 
that has been identified as a public forum. This result will follow 
whether the government has voluntarily created a forum or had a 
forum forced upon it by the operation of the involuntary forum doc­
trine. In either case the existence of a public forum gives rise to con­
stitutionally protected interests on the part of both speakers and 
listeners.201 Alternatively, if no forum exists the government is not 
free to interfere with a private meeting of speaker and listener, but 
takes on no special obligation to bring about their meeting. For ex­
ample, if a speaker wishes to rent out a municipal auditorium in 
order to reach an audience, a member of the prospective audience 
also can sue on the basis of the right to know, claiming the munici­
pality's refusal to rent the hall is unconstitutional.202 Because the 
city has created a forum available for speech, it must make it avail­
able to all on a nondiscriminatory basis. The city, by its establish­
ment of the auditorium, has taken upon itself the obligation of 
providing a forum in which the speaker and listener can find each 
other. On the other hand, suppose a speaker wishes to rent a public 
school auditorium but that auditorium is not made available to 
outside groups and the court is unwilling to find it to be an involun­
tary forum. In this setting, while the listener may have a constitu­
tionally recognized right to know, that right standing alone will not 
be enough to force the school to provide the speaker with a place to 
speak.203 
Applying this same reasoning to the publisher or author in the 
letter boxes for the deposit of unstamped civic notices. While the Postal Service could 
not restrict appellees' right to use the mails to circulate their notices based on the content 
of the notices, id at 2684, the Postal Service had no affirmative obligation to make letter 
boxes available for the deposit of letters that bore no postage. 
201. This explanation dovetails with the situation in Lamont v. Postmaster Gen­
eral, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). The characteristics of the postal system described in that case 
make it easy to characterize the system as a voluntary public forum. Since the govern­
ment has voluntarily created a forum by which to transmit communication between the 
sender and the recipient of a piece of mail, it follows that the recipient has a right to 
challenge wrongful exclusions from the use of that system. 
202. See Smith v. University of Tenn., 300 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Tenn. 1969); Brooks 
v. Auburn Univ., 296 F. Supp. 188 (M.D. Ala.), affd, 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969). 
203. Lawrence Univ. Bicentennial Comm'n v. City of Appleton, 409 F. Supp. 
1319,1324 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (''The state is under no duty to make school buildings avail­
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role of the speaker and the student-reader cast as the listener, the 
right to know fails to provide a self-sufficient basis for first amend­
ment protection. While the right to know in this guise provides the 
student with standing to complain about the book removal, a suc­
cessful result from the plaintiffs point of view will depend on the 
plaintiffs ability to argue that a public forum has been created in the 
form of the school library collection. While the rights of the listener 
are independent of the rights of the speaker, the right to know doc­
trine, while a necessary part of the plaintiff's case, is not a sufficient 
argument to sustain that case. 
Still relying on right to know principles, the task now is to deter­
mine ifany theory exists whereby the right to know can be viewed as 
a self-sufficient basis for judicial review in library book removal dis­
putes. This attempt will involve an alternative analysis in which the 
government in the form of the school board steps into the speaker's 
shoes. In this analysis the focus is on the government's role in creat­
ing the library and stocking it with books. For purposes of the right 
to know, it is possible to say that the government is speaking through 
the books it places on the library shelves. Unfortunately, from this 
perspective, the government as speaker in a book removal situation 
is far from willing. Since the school has removed the book from the 
library shelves, the government has indicated its unwillingness to 
continue to speak. 
The question raised by this alternative analysis is whether the 
right to know extends to situations in which the relationship is be­
tween an unwilling speaker and a willing listener. Two cases are 
relevant to this point. In both Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC204 
and Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,20S the problem of the un­
willing speaker received attent~on. In Red Lion, the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of Federal Communication Commission 
. (FCC) rules adopted to implement the fairness doctrine. The fair­
ness doctrine requires that broadcasters devote time to the discussion 
of public issues and that fair coverage be given to each side of an 
issue. To aid in the enforcement of the fairness doctrine, in 1967 the 
FCC promulgated rules to govern personal attacks made in the 
course of discussing controversial public issues and to regulate the 
tight to reply to political editorials. These new rules were challenged 
able for public meetings.") (quoting Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 
2d 536, 545, 171 P.2d 885, 891 (1946». 
204. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
205. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
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on both constitutional and statutory grounds. The constitutional 
claim made by the broadcasters was that the first amendment pro­
tected their right to broadcast what they chose.206 The Supreme 
Court responded to this argument by relying on the unique character 
of the electronic broadcast media, especially the scarcity of spectrum 
frequencies: 
Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the government is 
permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose 
views should be expressed on this unique medium. But the people 
as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their 
collective right to have the medium function consistently with the 
ends and purposes of the First Amendment.207 
Contrary to the broadcasters' claim, the Court found a first amend­
ment interest to adhere, not to the broadcasters, but to the audience 
of viewers and listeners: 
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhib­
ited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, 
rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, 
whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee. . . . 
It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, 
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is 
crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged ei­
ther by Congress or by the FCC.20S 
The Court in Red Lion found a right to view and listen and 
allowed that right to be implemented even at the expense of an un­
willing broadcaster. RedLion, however, is only of limited preceden­
tial value in the school library context. First, the obligation on the 
unwilling broadcaster is imposed by statute. There is no suggestion 
that such an obligation would flow directly from the first amendment 
in the absence of a statute.209 Second, there is the unique nature of 
206. 395 U.S. at 386. 
207. Id at 390. 
208. Id 
209. The Court in Red Lion avoided the need to decide if the first amendment 
would dictate a version of the fairness doctrine, even in the absence of any FCC require­
ment, by the simple expedient of assuming the broadcast companies are private broad­
casters. In the absence of a finding of sufficient government activity on the pan of the 
broadcasters to bring into play the first amendment, the Court was free to ignore the 
issue of whether the first amendment guarantees certain access rights to governmentally 
sponsored broadcast stations. On this question see, Comment, Access to Stale-Owned 
Communications Media-The Public Forum Doctrines, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1410 (1979). 
In a later case, Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 
U.S. 94 (1973), the Court for the first time addressed both the question of whether the 
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the broadcast industry to consider.210 These factors make it difficult 
to draw out of Red Lion a constitutional obligation for the govern­
ment to speak, even if unwilling. 
A more recent case, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,211 
may provide firmer support for such a proposition. In Richmond 
Newspapers the Court addressed the question of ''whether the right 
of the public and press to attend criminal trials is guaranteed under 
the United States Constitution."212 To find an answer to this ques­
activities of the electronic broadcast media are sufficiently governmental to require the 
application of first amendment principles and whether, assuming they are, the first 
amendment would guarantee members of the public access to broadcast time to air their 
views. Unfortunately, while the Court addressed both these questions, no clear consen­
sus developed on the government action question. The case raised these issues in the 
context of a .challenge to a broadcaster's refusal to sell air time for editorial advertise­
ments. While the Court held for the broadcaster, a majority was formed by a combina­
tion offour Justices (Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Douglas) 
who believed the first amendment did not apply to the broadcaster, and three Justices 
(Justices White, Blackmun, and Powell) who reasoned that, even assuming the first 
amendment did apply, the fairness doctrine and its policy of allowing broadcasters lee­
way in deciding how to comply with its requirements was consistent with the first amend­
ment. The remaining two Justices (Justices Brennan and Marshall) dissented on the 
ground that there was sufficient government involvement to require the application of 
first amendment principles and that those principles required "that citizens be permitted 
at least some opportunity to speak directly for themselves as genuine advocates on issues 
that concern them." Id. at 189-90 (emphasis in original). While no majority of Justices 
was found on either side of the government action question, there was a majority in 
agreement that, if applicable, the first amendment would not require the selling of time 
for editorial advertisements. Five Justices shared this view although the conclusion was 
dictum for three of the five because they had previously found the first amendment inap­
plicable to the case. Four Justices, however, suggested that the first amendment would 
impose an obligation to allow access to the broadcast station to members of the public 
since, under those circumstances, the station would have to be viewed as a public forum. 
210. The Court has continued to adhere to the distinction between the broadcast 
industry and other communications media that it relied on in Red Lion. In Miami Her­
ald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), the Court struck down a statute that 
gave a candidate for political office a right to reply to newspaper criticism. Despite the 
similarity between the Florida right to reply law and the FCC regulations upheld in Red 
Lion, the Florida statute was held to be a violation of the first amendment's guarantee of 
freedom of the press. The Court, in reaching its conclusion, refused to adopt an analogy 
between the scarcity of broadcast frequencies and the increasing concentration of press 
ownership in the hands of large media conglomerates. Id. at 256-57. The unique charac­
ter of the broadcast industry was also a factor justifying regulation in FCC v. National 
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (upholding FCC regulations bar­
ring common ownership of a radio or television station and a daily newspaper located in 
the same community). 
211. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
212. Id. at 558. The Court specifically limited its decision to criminal trials. The 
question of a right of access to civil trials was left unresolved. The Court, however, did 
note that the tradition of openness it identified as an aspect of the criminal trial also 
applied to the civil trial. Id. at 580 n.17. 
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tion, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, in an opinion 
joined by Justices White and Stevens, first traced the uncontradicted 
history of openness in the court system at both English common law 
and in the American colonies. The Chief Justice then found a con­
stitutional recognition of this important common-law tradition in­
herent in the first amendment guarantees: "In guaranteeing 
freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment 
can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as 
to give meaning to those explicit guarantees."213 
As Richmond Newspapers arose out of a request by defendant to 
have the press and the public excluded from his criminal trial, the 
government was not interfering with willing communication by 
granting his request. The government, however, by finding merit in 
defendant's motion, implicitly became the custodian of speech it was 
unwilling to let go public. The media representatives, as surrogates 
for the public, sought to enforce a right of access to the information 
the government refused to release. The Court, in responding to this 
claim of a right to know what went on in the courtroom, once again 
recognized the constitutional protection afforded listener status: 
Free speech carries with it some freedom to listen. "In a variety of 
contexts this Court has referred to a First Amendment right to 
'receive information and ideas.''' What this means in the context 
of trials is that the First Amendment guarantees of speech and 
press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily clos­
ing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at 
the time that amendment was adopted.214 
In order to protect the listeners' rights, the Court made it clear that 
the government is not free, without compelling reasons, to oust the 
public from the courtroom.2lS 
The question arises whether this imposition on an unwilling 
speaker necessarily is based on an extension of right to know princi­
ples. The answer appears to be that it is not. By the Court's own 
statements in Richmond Newspapers, the explanation for why the 
government is not entitled to summarily close the courtroom is 
found in the history of openness that surrounds the criminal trial: 
"[A] trial courtroom also is a public place where the people gener­
ally-and representatives of the media-have· a right to be present, 
213. Id at 575. 
214. Id at 576 (citation omitted). 
215. The Court left open the question of what circumstances would be sufficient to 
justify the closure of all or part of a criminal trial. Id at 581-S2 n.1S. 
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and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance 
the integrity and quality of what takes place."216 By comparing the 
trial courtroom to other "places traditionally open to the public,"217 
such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, Chief Justice Burger placed the 
courtroom alongside other traditional public forums. Thus, under 
the analysis of the right to know doctrine developed previously,2lS 
Richmond Newspapers can be seen as a case in which the right to 
know alone is not a constitutionally sufficient basis for the result. 
That the courtroom is considered to be a traditional public forum is 
critical. Because such a forum exists, the government is not free to 
close it to listeners.219 
While it may be possible to draw out of Richmond Newspapers 
the beginnings of a right to information from an unwilling govern­
ment, the Court really had no need to reach that question in the case. 
The issue of what other institutions of government have this same 
history of openness such that access to them cannot be restricted eas­
ily was not addressed by the Court.220 Further, the broader question 
of whether a right of access will be guaranteed even in the absence of 
such a history was not even hinted at by the Court. Only the concur­
ring opinion of Justice Stevens reflected on the possible future reper­
cussions of the case: 
This is a watershed case. Until today the Court has accorded 
virtually absolute protection to the dissemination of information 
or ideas, but never before has it squarely held that the acquisition 
216. Id. at 578. 
217. Id. at 577. 
218. See text accompanying notes 201-03 supra. 
219. As a forum, separate from its role as a tribunal in our criminal justice system, 
the courtroom is peculiarly a forum for listeners. Use for most speech purposes would 
disrupt the primary activity taking place in the courtroom: the trial of criminal cases. 
There are exceptions, of course. For example, the wearing of a black armband by a 
spectator in a courtroom is no more disruptive than it was in the schoolroom in Tinker. 
220. The only reference by the Court to this larger issue came in the form of a 
finding that prisons, like military bases, do not enjoy a history of openness and "are not 
'open' or public places." 448 U.S. at 576 n.ll. The Court, therefore, was able to distin­
guish the prior cases of Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). and Saxbe v. Washington 
Post Co.• 417 U.S. 843 (1974). in which the Court rejected press claims of a right of access 
to penal institutions for the purpose offace-ta-face interviews with inmates designated by 
the press representatives. In both Pell and Saxbe. however. the Court was careful to 
point out that the press had not been denied the same rights of access that were available 
to the general public. The Court in Richmond Newspapers was not faced with the ques­
tion of whether the media have greater access rights than the general public and thus the 
cases are distinguishable on that ground as well. 448 U.S. at 584 n.2 (Brennan. I., 
concurring). 
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of newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitutional protection 
whatsoever. . . . 
. . . Today, however, for the first time, the Court unequivo­
cally holds that an arbitrary interference with access to important 
information is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and of the 
press protected by the First Amendment.221 
Justice Stevens extended his remarks further and also commented 
that he found the Court's willingness to find a right of access to crim­
inal trials "somewhat ironic" in light of its prior refusals to recognize 
a similar right of access to penal institutions.222 Even Justice Stevens 
chose not to speculate on the possible future scope of the right to 
information about the operation of government suggested by Rich­
mond Newspapers. 
The possibility of a more generalized first amendment right to 
information from an unwilling government, while having little basis 
in case law, has been urged by a variety of commentators.223 In a 
221. 448 u.s. at 582-83. 
222. Id at 583. Justice Stevens' comment is directed at the Court's earlier decision 
in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. I (1978). Ip that case, KQED news personnel were 
denied access to the Greystone portion of the Alameda County Jail other than as mem­
bers of monthly public tours scheduled at the facility. KQED complained that: I) The 
tours did not provide adequate media access because the scheduled tours were limited to 
25 persons; 2) once this number was signed up media representatives were denied access; 
3) the tours did not include parts of the jail involved in allegations of brutality and 
substandard conditions; 4) no cameras or tape recorders were permitted; and 5) inmates 
generally were kept from the view of tour members and could not be interviewed during 
the tour. Id at 5. In rejecting a claim by KQED of a first amendment right of access to 
the jail, Chief Justice Burger stated: "Neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth 
Amendment mandates a right of access to governmental information or sources of infor­
mation within the government's control." Id at 15. Only Justices White and Rehnquist 
joined Chief Justice Burger's opinion. Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment. While 
agreeing with the Chief Justice that the press was entitled only to receive treatment equal 
to that of the general public in questions of access to government-held information, Jus­
tice Stewart argued for a more flexible definition of equal access. He recognized that 
there might be times when the terms of access applied to the general public would ''be 
unreasonable as applied to journalists who are there to convey to the general public what 
the visitors see." Id at 17. This four member majority was sufficient to outvote the 
dissent of Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Powell since Justices Marshall and Blackmun 
took no part in the consideration of the case. Therefore, despite a decision denying the 
journalists' claim of a first amendment right of access, no majority of the Court sup­
ported such a result. 
223. E.g., Klein, Towards an Extension ofthe First Amendment: A Right ofAcquisi­
tion, 20 U. MIAMI L. REv. 114 (1965); Parks, TIle Open Government Principle: Applying 
the Right to Know Under the Constitution, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REv. I (1957); Steel, Free­
dom to Hear: A Political Justtfication of the First Amendment, 46 WASH. L. REv. 311 
(1971); Note, TIle Rights ofthe Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. 
REv. 1505 (1974); Note, Access to O.fficiallnformalion: A Neglected Constitutional Right, 
27 IND. L.l. 209 (1952); Note, Access to Govemmentlnformalion and the Classification 
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seminal article written in 1976, Professor Emerson argued for the 
existence of "a constitutional right in the public to obtain informa­
tion from government sources necessary or proper for the citizen to 
perform his function as ultimate sovereign."224 According to Profes­
sor Emerson, "this right would extend, as a starting point, to all in­
formation in the possession of government."225 Whether an 
extension of the right to know along these lines would incorporate a 
right of access to books removed from the public school library is 
open to doubt. One question that must be asked is whether such 
information is relevant to the process of self-government. It could be 
argued that as prospective self-governors, all information is relevant 
to the future effective functioning of young citizens. Education fur­
thers the goal of training young people to assume their roles as par­
ticipants in our political system, thus the better their education, and 
the more ideas they are exposed to, the more effectively they will 
fu1fi11 this future role. But this argument leads us into the realm of 
the house that Jack built. Certainly, knowledge of the contents of a 
removed book is not as directly related to self-government as knowl­
edge of the workings of one of our government institutions, such as 
the courts. Second, the information being sought is not especially 
governmental in nature: It is not a document prepared by govern­
ment officials relevant to some official action, nor is it access to a 
government institution to examine its workings, such as a prison. In­
itially, the book in question is placed in the private domain and 
made available through the commercial marketplace to all who wish 
to purchase it. The government has made it available through the 
alternative mechanism of a loan from a government run library, but 
query whether this transforms the book into the equivalent of gov­
ernment information. Thus, even this scholarly expansion of the 
right to know does not easily incorporate access to removed school 
library books. 
One further extension of the right to know may be somewhat 
more helpful in this regard. Professor Emerson also has suggested 
one additional aspect of the right to know doctrine: 
A third use of the right to know as protection against govern­
ment interference with the system of freedom of expression arises 
Process-Is There a Riglttto Know?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 814 (1971); Note, supra note 171,89 
YALE L.J. 923 (1980). But see O'Brien, The First Amendment and tlte Public's "Riglttto 
Know," 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 579 (1980). 
224. Emerson, supra note 171, at 16. 
225. Id. 
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in certain situations when the government itself engages in expres­
sion. The government of course is entitled to participate in the 
system of freedom ofexpression and, while its contribution may at 
times tend to drown out others, no constitutional objection can 
normally be entered. Under some circumstances, however, the 
government may possess a monopoly, or a near monopoly, of the 
means of communication. Here restrictions on the government 
are necessary to prevent a serious distortion of the system. For 
this difficult task, a limiting principle may be found in the right to 
know. 
For example, in the field of public education, where the gov­
ernment has a virtual monopoly, certain kinds of curriculum re­
strictions seem to run afoul of the right to know. Thus in Epperson 
v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court considered an Arkansas statute 
which prohibited teaching the doctrine of evolution in the public 
schools. A majority of the Court found that the law violated the 
establishment clause of the first amendment, but the Court might 
better have placed its decision upon a violation of the right to 
know. Similarly in the area of public broadcasting, the right to 
know would seem to compel the public broadcaster to present a 
reasonably balanced view on issues of public interest. The 
Supreme Court has not thu,s far employed right to know doctrines 
in this way, but the concepts are applicable and should be 
utilized.226 
This argument, striking many of the same chords as the concept of 
an involuntary public forum discussed earlier,227 is not as clearly rel­
evant in the school library as in the classroom setting described by 
Professor Emerson. Students in the classroom are a captive audience 
for the receipt of government ideas.228 In this way the government 
monopolizes their education. Students in the school library are not 
equally captives for particular ideas. Books are available on a vol­
untary basis. While students may be required to spend some time in 
the school library, they usually will not be required to read certain 
books during that time. The concept of required reading is associ­
ated with course materials for classroom use.229 Further, the school 
226. Id at 7-8 (footnote omitted). 
227. See discussion of involuntary forum in text accompanying notes 89-161 supra. 
228. Comment, supra note II, at 497-99. 
229. Challenges to material selected for required classroom reading occasionally 
have been brought by students and their parents. All of these suits have been unsuccess­
ful. E.g., Williams v. Board of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. W. Va. 1975); Todd v. 
Rochester Community Schools, 41 Mich. App. 320, 200 N.W.2d 90 (Ct. App. 1972); Car­
roll v. Lucas, 39 Ohio Misc. 5, 313 N.E.2d 864 (C.P. 1974); In re Mitchell, 13 N.Y.S. 
Educ. Dept. Rep. 228 (1974). 
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library may be monopolized by the government because it has total 
control over the book selection process, but the government message 
is much more muted in the many volumes on the library shelves than 
it is when it speaks through the person ofthe classroom teacher. The 
teacher's labeling of some ideas as true and others as false may be 
given almost conclusive weight by impressionable school age chil­
dren.23o A book read in the school library does not so obviously 
come with a government seal of approval. Unlike the teacher in the 
classroom, no government voice has preached the ideas contained in 
its pages and identified them as true. The assumption that if a book 
is in the library it must be true is an improbable one. Students are 
unlikely to equate library shelf space with school approval. There­
fore, even under this extension of the right to know doctrine, the 
doctrine would have difficulty reaching the library shelves. 
Thus, just as with the public forum doctrine, the right to know 
doctrine does not easily extend to cover the problem of library book 
removal. The majority of the case law deals with government inter­
ruption of communication between a willing private speaker and lis­
tener. In the book removal cases, the student as listener and the 
publisher or author as speaker certainly are willing. No enforceable 
right to know, however, protects their relationship without the addi­
tional finding that the school library serves as a public forum. Alter­
natively, if the government assumes the speaker's position, the 
speaker ceases to be a willing one. While this speaker/listener rela­
tionship exists independent of reliance on public forum priIiciples, it 
requires the extension of right to know theory to cover the listener's 
right to obtain information from an unwilling government speaker. 
Such a result, while arguably suggested in case law and scholarship, 
will not necessarily extend to the library book removal situation. 
These complexities are virtually ignored in the decided censorship 
cases. The library book removal courts, in this aspect of their analy­
sis as in their public forum discussions, have failed in their task of 
adequately applying first amendment principles to the facts 
presented to them. 
230. Cj Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1979). 
[A] teacher serves as a role model for his students, exerting a subtle but impor­
tant influence over their perceptions and values. Thus, through both the pres­
entation of course materials and the example he sets, a teacher has an 
opportunity to in1luence the attitudes of students toward government, the polit­
ical process, and a citizen's social responsibilities. 
Id (footnote omitted). 
61 1981) PUBLIC SCHOOL LIBRARY CENSORSHIP 
C. The Selection ofa Standard ofReview 
If a court were to overcome the many first amendment hurdles 
placed in the path of judicial review of book removal disputes, the 
question of the scope of review would need to be addressed. With 
the threshold question of the existence of a constitutionally protected 
right out of the way, the merits of the dispute would next invite judi­
cial scrutiny. This aspect of the decisionmaking process itself in­
volves a host of difficult first amendment questions. 
In initially turning to the decisions of book removal courts, one 
major difficulty in the selection of a standard of review becomes ap­
parent. The first sign of this difficulty is found in the decisions of 
noninterventionist courts. One reason pointed to for their decision 
not to review is the difficulty of identifying any adequate standard 
for review. The point is made that the process of stocking a library 
collection is inevitably and continuously content-based.231 Since 
shelf space and funding are finite resources, decisions constantly 
must be made about the comparative worth of books. One kind of 
decision will involve whether books on a particular topic should be 
included in the collection. Reasons such as lack ofstudent interest in 
an area or the exclusion of an area from the school's curriculum 
might cause a particular subject- not to be included in the school's 
collection. Another kind of decision arises once a topic is slated for 
inclusion in the collection. The various books on that topic must be 
examined to determine which should be included in the collection.232 
231. Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1308 (7th Cir. 
1980). 
232. This examination usually will not involve a first hand appraisal of available 
books by the school librarian. Since such an examination often would be an impossible 
task, the librarian will rely on secondary sources such as book review journals and other 
publications, the reputation of the publisher of a book, and the reputation of the author 
ofa book in order to select books for the library collection. A description of the decision­
making process that went into a school librarian's decision to shelve a particular book is 
contained in one of the cases raising a successful challenge to a book removal: 
Coleman [the librarian) read the book's introduction and scanned its contents, 
but did not read City, the poem which is the subject of this litigation. 
Coleman felt that Male & FemoJe would be useful for students taking ado­
lescent literature and creative writing courses, particularly because it would 
give them an opportunity to see the variety of ways in which other students 
expressed themselves. She recognized the anthology's two editors as highly re­
garded professionals, and the publisher, Avon books, as having a good reputa­
tion in the area of young adult literature. These considerations, plus her own 
review, caused Coleman to place the anthology in the High School Library dur­
ing March of 1976. 
Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 706 (D. Mass. 1978) 
(footnote omitted). For a list of the book review journals commonly relied on by librari­
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This decision will be a function of a variety of factors such as how 
many books in the area are suitable for the overall balance of the 
collection and which are the "best" of the available books on that 
topic. After the collection is initially compiled, a constant process of 
updating is necessary. For instance, new topics may be added and 
new books may be purchased and old ones discarded. These deci­
sions are inescapably content-based. 
Noninterventionist courts respond to this fact of life in the book 
selection process by resolving to leave such unavoidable questions of 
book suitability to the discretion of the elected school board mem­
bers. Such courts consider a sch~ol board's proper function to be the 
implementation of an educational system that transmits the ba:;ic 
shared values of the community to its youth.233 The federal courts 
especially. in attempting to keep the proper state/federal balance, 
should rarely intrude in this process of value transmission. 
Courts that feel free to intervene in book removal cases are not 
so willing to concede that all selection decisions are unavoidably 
content-based, at least, to be more accurate, book retention deci­
sions. These courts see a distinction between the initial selection 
process, a process they see as raising fewer constitutional problems, 
and decisions to remove already shelved books.234 For these courts, 
removal decisions are divided into three categories: (1) Content 
neutral decisions; (2) constitutionally valid content-based decisions; 
and (3) constitutionally invalid content-based decisions. Despite 
identifying three categories, all of the decided cases in which a re­
view of the merits occurred conclude that the situation presented to 
the court falls into the third category.23S It therefore is difficult to 
ans, see Comment, Censoring tlte Scltool Library: Do Students Have tlte Riglttto Read?, 
10 CONN. L. REv. 747, 755 n.46 (1978). 
233. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 404, 
426 (2d Cir. 1980) (Mansfield, I., dissenting), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981); Zykan 
v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir. 1980). 
234. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 404, 
436 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, I., concurring), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981); 
Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976); Salvail v. 
Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read Defense 
Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 712 (D. Mass. 1978). For a discussion of the 
related problem of challenges to the book selection process, see text accompanying notes 
333-56 infra. 
235. In Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976), 
the removed books were described as "completely sick" and "GARBAGE." Id at 58!. 
The court held that the school board was not free to remove a book because it found its 
content to be distasteful. In Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 
1979), the court held the removal of Ms. to be constitutionally improper because it was 
based on objections to the political content of the magazine. Id at 1274. Finally, in 
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discern much in the way of hard and fast rules on the specifics of this 
tripartite classification scheme. Some rationales for removal are 
identified as content neutral. These include the obsolescence of a 
book, a lack of shelf space, and the wearing out of a copy of a 
book.236 Among the potential constitutionally valid content-based 
justifications for book removal are that the book can be character­
ized as containing unprotected speech such as obscenity,237 and that 
a substantial government interest, such as education, is furthered by 
the removal.238 Constitutionally invalid content-based removals in­
clude a dislike for the political content of a publication239 and a dis­
taste for the offensive language contained in a work.240 
These courts, like their noninterventionist counterparts, recog­
nize the need to leave school policymaking in the hands of school 
officials. When basic constitutional values are at stake, however, in­
tervention is deemed appropriate. The very importance of education 
to our system of government is viewed as requiring that courts be 
especially protective of first amendment rights in the schools.241 
While striking a proper balance between leaving the control of the 
schools to school authorities and keeping an ever vigilant eye on first 
amendment rights may be a difficult task, it is a task that the consti­
tution irrevocably assigns to the courts. 
The differences between interventionist and noninterventionist 
courts on this point .underscore a question of general concern in first 
amendment analysis. That question is whether and to what extent 
the government is permitted to make distinctions about speech pro­
tected by the first amendment based on its content.242 This issue of 
Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978), the 
district court found that the removal of a poem, ''The City to a Young Girl," was imper­
missibly motivated by the school committee's objection to the poem's use of vulgar lan­
guage. Id at 713. 
236. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 404, 
434 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J., concurring), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981); 
Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 1976); Right to 
Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 711 (D. Mass. 1978). 
237. Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1273 (D.N.H. 1979). 
238. Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703,713 (D. 
Mass. 1978). 
239. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 404, 
434 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J., concurring), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981); Salvail 
v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (D. N.H. 1979). 
240. Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 713-14 
(D. Mass. 1978). 
241. Id at 710. 
242. On this question, see generally Farber, Content Regulation and The First 
Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727 (1980); Stone, Restrictions ofSpeech 
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differential treatment of speech by government depending on its con­
tent was placed in sharp focus in Police Department of Chicago v. 
Mosley.243 Mosley was a challenge to a Chicago ordinance banning 
picketing within close proximity to any public school building while 
school was in session. The one exception to. this restriction was for 
peaceful labor picketing of a school involved in a labor dispute.244 
The Supreme Court held the ordinance to be unconstitutional be­
cause of the distinction it drew between labor and other kinds of 
picketing. The Court was outspoken in its hostility to content con­
trol: "But, above all else, the First Amendment means that govern­
ment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its 
ideas, its subject matter, or its content."24S This and other similar 
sentiments expressed by the Mosley Court turned Mosley into a bat­
tle cry for those opposing content censorship. 
While the result in Mosley was by a unanimous Court, later 
cases raising a similar problem split the Court sharply. Two cases 
especially highlight this conflict. In Young v. American Mini Thea­
tres, Inc. 246 and FCC v. Pac!ftca Foundation 247 battle lines were 
drawn on the question of content discrimination. American Mini 
Theatres raised the issue in the context of a Detroit zoning ordinance 
which differentiated between motion picture theatres exhibiting 
adult films and other movie theatres. In the first paragraph of his 
opinion, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, posed the question of 
the ordinance's constitutionality in terms of whether the statutory 
scheme was improperly based on the content of protected speech.248 
In a part of his opinion joined only by Chief Justice Burger and 
Because ofits Content: The Peculiar Case ofSubject-Maller Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 81 (1978); The Supreme Court, 197.5 Term, 90 HARV. L. REv. 58, 196-205 (1976); 
Note, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.: Creating Levels ofProtected Speech, 4 
HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 321 (1977). 
243. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
244. 	 The ordinance challenged in Mosley provided as follows: 

A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly: 

(i) Pickets or demonstrates on a public way within ISO feet of any primary 
or secondary school building while the school is in session and one-half hour 
before the school is in session and one-half hour after the school session has 
been concluded, provided that this subsection does not prohibit the peaceful 
picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute. . . . Municipal Code, c. 
193-1 (i). 
408 U.S. at 92-93. 
245. Id at 95. 
246. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
247. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
248. 427 U.S. at 52. 
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Justices White and Rehnquist, Justice Stevens cautioned against 
overstating the impact of the Mosley equality principle.249 Mosley 
had to be analyzed in light of its facts and contrasted to other cases 
in which the Court approved of basing constitutional distinctions on 
the content of speech. With Mosley cut down to its proper size, Jus­
tice Stevens was free to conclude that society's interest in protecting 
the kind of expression contained in erotic materials was "of a wholly 
different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled 
political debate."2so This lesser interest justified subjecting sexually 
explicit motion pictures to a different regulatory system than other 
films. 
Justice Stewart, in a dissent joined by Justices Brennan, Mar­
shall, and Blackmun, expressed his outrage at the Court's "drastic 
departure from established principles of First Amendment law":251 
By refusing to invalidate Detroit's ordinance the Court rides 
roughshod over cardinal principles of First Amendment law, 
which require that time, place, and manner regulations that affect 
protected expression be content neutral except in the limited con­
text of a captive or juvenile audience. In place of these principles 
the Court invokes a concept wholly alien to the First Amendment. 
Since "few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to 
preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' ex­
hibited in the theaters of our choice," the Court implies that these 
films are not entitled to the full protection of the Constitution. 
This stands "Voltaire's immortal comment" on its head. For if the 
guarantees of the First Amendment were reserved for expression 
that more than a "few of us" would take up arms to defend, then 
the right of free expression would be defined and circumscribed 
by current popular opinion. The guarantees of the Bill of Rights 
were designed to protect against p:ecisely such majoritarian limi­
tations on individualliberty.2s2 
249. Id at 65-70. While only four Justices ascribed to the view that sexually ex­
plicit expression was entitled to less protection than political speech, a majority of the 
Court voted to uphold the Detroit ordinance. The fifth vote was provided by Justice 
Powell, concurring in the result. Justice Powell reasoned that because the ordinance did 
not suppress the production of adult films and also did not significantly restrict the pub­
lic's access to such films, the ordinance should be treated as a regulation of the place 
where such films could be shown and not as a complete ban on sexually explicit films. 
Id at 77-79. As a place regulation, the ordinance was justified because it was an exercise 
of the city's traditional and essential zoning power, it furthered the important govern­
ment interest of preventing the deterioration of urban neighborhoods, and the city's in­
terest was unrelated to the suppression of speech. Id at 80-82. 
250. Id at 70. 
251. Id at 84. 
252. Id at 85-86. (citations and footnotes omitted). The reference to "Voltaire's 
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The dissenting Justices' unrelenting displeasure with the Court's 
willingness to differentiate between "important" and "unimportant" 
speech could hardly be plainer. 
This same angry disagreement reappeared several terms later in 
FCC v. Pac!fica Foundation .253 This time the differentiated speech 
was a radio broadcast of a George Carlin monologue entitled 
"Filthy Words." The case raised a challenge to the FCC's power to 
regulate indecent language. While a majority of the Court upheld 
FCC authority, as in Young, no majority of Justices was willing to 
condone content discrimination. The Court's opinion, again au­
thored by Justice Stevens as it had been in Young, was joined only 
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist on the question of 
content-based regulation of speech.254 These three members of the 
Court characterized the speech in question as of "slight social value" 
and "offensive," therefore justifying its regulation.255 The other two 
members of the majority, Justices Powell and Blackmun, refused to 
join in these sentiments. While these two Justices found the FCC's 
action to be justified based on the presence of young children in the 
listening audience, the unique character of the broadcast media, and 
the need to protect unwilling adult listeners, they specifically dis­
agreed with Justice Stevens' remarks recognizing a hierarchy of 
speech values under the first amendment. 256 This same viewpoint is 
echoed in an elegantly scripted dissent by Justice Brennan in which 
he was careful to emphasize that a majority of the Court was unwill­
ing to subscribe to a theory of "a sliding scale of First Amendment 
protection calibrated to this Court's perception of the worth of a 
communication's content."257 
This ongoing debate between the Justices on the issue of content 
discrimination has been criticized in a variety of quarters on a vari­
ety of grounds.258 One point of criticism, however, needs to be 
immortal comment" is to an exchange attributed to Voltaire in which, in response to a 
suggestion that violence is a justifiable method of overthrowing a tyrannical government, 
he remarked: "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to 
say it." This statement was quoted in Justice Stevens' opinion. Id. at 63. 
253. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
254. Part IV -B of Justice Stevens' opinion concerned itself with the permissibility 
of regulating speech based on its content. It was this section· of the opinion which drew 
the support of only three members of the Court. Id. at 744-48. 
255. Id. at 746-47. 
256. Id. at 761-62. 
257. Id. at 763. 
258. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 242, at 99-100 (Supreme Court's decisions in cases 
wherein a particular speech subject matter was singled out for different treatment are 
"contradictory and imprecise," may well be incorrectly decided, and have failed to accu­
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stressed here. One factor greatly contributing to the confusion sur­
roundingMos/ey, Young, andPactfica is the Court's intermingling of 
what really are two separate questions. The Court treated almost 
synonymously the issues of content-based censorship and a mul­
tilevel theory of speech protection. While the two questions are re­
lated and both have relevance in the book removal area,259 they are 
not one question and do not require a single response. It would be 
possible for a court to conclude that while all protected speech has 
rately pinpoint the critical factors that led to the decisions); The Supreme Court, 197.5 
Term, supra note 242, at 200-02 (characterizing the attempt to distinguish political speech 
from sexually explicit speech as ''unworkable'' and inconsistent with first amendment 
values); Note, 28 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 456, 490-92 (1978) (describing Young v. Ameri­
can Mini Theatres, Inc. as "a jurisprudential mess" because of its disregard for basic first 
amendment precepts). But see Farber, supra note 242, at 729-31 (actual methodology 
used by the Supreme Coun in cases involving content-based regulations provides a 
workable method of analyzing such regulations-the problem of content regulation is 
"largely illusory"). 
259. While this anicle concentrates on the issue of the permissibility of content­
based regulation and only discusses in passing the possibility of a sliding scale of speech 
values, this latter inquiry is also very relevant to the book removal cases. In these cases, 
two of the frequently aniculated reasons for the removal of a book are the book's use of 
offensive language and its description of sexually explicit scenes. E.g., Bicknell v. 
Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615, 618 (D. Vt. 1969), tifld, 
638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. 
Supp. 703, 707 (D. Mass. 1978). Both of these speech types are among those suggested 
for a lesser degree of speech protection. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 746­
47 (1978) (opinion of Stevens, J.); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 
70-71 (1976) (opinion of Stevens, J.). If a coun were to decide that one or both of these 
speech categories, while protected by the first amendment, should receive some lesser 
measure of that protection, it could make a significant difference in the outcome of a 
book removal case. If the school board were required to justify its actions by some lesser 
standard of review in cases wherein it removed books because they contained such 
speech, the board would stand a much better chance of being able to show the necessary 
level ofjustification to withstand a constitutional attack on its actions. Thus far none of 
the cases in which a coun agreed to review the merits of a school board decision to 
remove a previously shelved book have adopted such a multileveled theory of speech 
protection. E.g., Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 715 
n.20 (D. Mass. 1978) (finding FCC v. Pacifica Foundation inapposite because of its reli­
ance on the fact "that broadcasts have the unique potential for invading the privacy of 
the home"). These same couns, however, have not uniformly rejected a second potential 
argument for applying a double standard of speech protection. This second argument 
would be based on the idea that the scope ofprotected speech is not the same for children 
as it is for adults. See, e.g., Erznomik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212-13 
(1975); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-43 (1968). Compare Right to Read 
Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 714 n.17 (D. Mass. 1978) (rejecting 
the argument that the youth of high school students justifies a school board's action in 
removing books containing vulgar language from the school library) witlt Bicknell v. 
Vergennes Union High School Bd. ofDirs., 638 F.2d 438,441 n.3 (2d Cir. 1980) (adopt­
ing a different standard of obscenity when considering whether sexually explicit material 
can be removed from a school library used by young children). 
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the same first amendment weight, distinctions based on the content 
of speech are constitutional if the government justification offered 
for the differing treatment rests on a compelling reason. If, oli. the 
other hand, a court were to conclude that some speech is more valua­
ble than other speech, the impact of this conclusion would be that a 
less than compelling level of government justification would be 
needed to uphold content-based regulations in cases in which the 
speech interfered with is given less than the full protection of the first 
amendment. 
This distinction can be seen more clearly by a further look at 
Mosley. It certainly is true that the Court in that case was emphatic 
in its support of the principle that there is "an equality of status in 
the field of ideas."260 Despite this equal protection aspect of the first 
amendment, however, the Court acknowledged that some content­
based distinctions could be constitutional: 
Similarly, under an equal protection analysis, there may be suffi­
cient regulatory interests justifying selective exclusions or distinc­
tions among pickets. Conflicting demands on the same place may 
compel the State to make choices among potential users and uses. 
And the State may have a legitimate interest in prohibiting some 
picketing to protect public order. But these justifications for selec­
tive exclusions from a public forum must be carefully scrutinized. 
Because picketing plainly involves expressive conduct within the 
protection of the First Amendment, discriminations among pick­
ets must be tailored to serve a substantial governmental 
interest.261 
The Court then went on to examine Chicago's justification for the 
antipicketing ordinance. That justification was identified as the le­
gitimate one of preventing the ~sruption of the public schools. De­
spite the substantiality of the city's goal, however, the Court 
concluded that the city's choice of a means to effectuate this legiti­
mate end was constitutionally defective.262 Nothing could be found 
260. Police Department, of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (quoting A. 
MEIKLEJOHN, POLmCAL FREEDOM: THE CoNSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 
(1948». 
261. 408 U.S. at 98-99 (citations omitted). 
262. Id at 99-102. This distinction between a permissible means and a permissible 
end was emphasized by the Court's decision in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 
104 (1972), decided on the same day as Mosley. In Grayned, the Court struck down an 
antipicketing ordinance virtually identical to the one in Mosley. A second Rockford or­
dinance, however, also was challenged in that case. That ordinance prohibited the will­
ful ''making of any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or 
good order of' a "school session or any class thereof' which is in session. Id at 108. 
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to legitimately distinguish peaceful labor from nonlabor picketing. 
Peaceful labor picketing was no less disruptive than other peaceful 
picketing. Further, the city could not use unfounded predictions 
about the potential violence that could be caused by other picketing 
as a constitutionally sufficient justification for the distinction con­
tained in the ordinance.263 Therefore, the Court reasoned, the city 
had not satisfied the constitutional requirement that it employ means 
that were tailored precisely to further substantial and legitimate gov­
ernment interests. 
This analysis suggests that if Chicago had been able to demon­
strate some significant distinction between labor and other picketing 
so that the regulation of only nonlabor picketing was important to 
the furtherance of its legitimate ends, its differential treatment might 
have been constitutionally permissible. Despite the suggestion in 
Mosley that the prohibition against content discrimination is not ab-
This antinoise ordinance was designed to prevent the disruption of school sessions, the 
same goal which supported the antipicketing ordinance. Unlike its treatment of the an­
tipicketing ordinance, however, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the antinoise 
ordinance. Id at 108-21. The ordinance was found to be narrowly tailored to further the 
city's compelling interest. Id at 117-21. 
A more recent case further highlights this point. In Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 
(1980), an Illinois statute that barred all picketing of residences or dwellings, but ex­
empted peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute was 
struck down. The Court found the situation identical to that in Mosley. Id at 460. 
While the state's interest in protecting privacy in the home was an important one, the 
state had chosen an impermissible means to protect that interest. As in Mosley, the state 
could not demonstrate any distinction between labor picketing and other kinds of picket­
ing that would make labor picketing less disruptive of residential privacy. Id at 465. 
Moreover, the Court rejected the state's attempt to justify the distinction as a means of 
giving special protection to labor picketing. The Court found no constitutional justifica­
tion for singling out labor picketing since it was no more valuable under the first amend­
ment than other types of picketing. Id at 466. Lastly, the Court found inadequate the 
state's final attempt to justify the statute by arguing that residences that are also places of 
employment dilute their right to privacy by "inviting" such disputes. The Court rejected 
this justification because it found it to be substantially underinclusive: ''Numerous types 
of peaceful picketing other than labor picketing would have but a negligible impact on 
privacy interests, and numerous other actions of a homeowner might constitute 'nonresi­
dential' uses of his property and would thus serve to vitiate the right to residential pri­
vacy." Id at 469 (footnote omitted). While none of the state's offered justifications were 
adequate to support the content-based distinction created in the Illinois statute, the Court 
made it clear that the statute was not being struck down simply because it was content­
based, but instead because the state had no compelling reason for utilizing a content­
based distinction. Id at 465. Accord, Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 274 (1981) ("In 
order to justity discriminatory exclusions from a public forum. . . the university must 
therefore satisty the standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions. It must 
show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is 
narrowly drawn to achieve that end."). 
263. 408 U.S. at 100-01. 
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solute, the case had nothing to do with the issue of whether some 
kinds of protected speech are more important under the first amend­
ment than others. No basis could be suggested for giving a greater 
first amendment value to labor picketing than to other kinds of pick­
eting. None of the possible classifications of less protected speech 
suggested by Justice Stevens in Young and Pac!ftca, such as erotic 
speech and offensive speech, were applicable to Mosley. This amply 
demonstrates that it is possible to justify some content-based distinc­
tions without at the same time creating a sliding scale for speech 
protection, 
Dividing the Court's debate about content control into two sep­
arate inquiries is a help in understanding the dilemma, but it still 
leaves one far from a resolution of the problem. At this point one 
additional content control case will be looked to for guidance. 
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd v. Conrad264 raised the issue of con­
tent-based distinctions in a context somewhat akin to the school li­
brary. In Southeastern Promotions, the board of directors of the 
Chattanooga Memorial Auditorium refused to approve the use of a 
municipally operated theater for a production of the musical "Hair." 
This denial of the use of a municipal facility occurred without any of 
the directors seeing the play or reading the script and was based on 
outside reports that the musical was obscene.265 Because the board's 
decision censored the production before it was performed, the Court 
labeled the board action a prior restraint on speech. As a prior re­
straint, it came before the Court "bearing a heavy presumption 
against its constitutional validity."266 Further, "rigorous procedural 
safeguards," such as a prompt system of judicial review, were a nec­
essary accompaniment to the use of such a prior restraint.267 The 
Court held that the necessary procedural safeguards were lacking in 
several respects.268 . 
264. 420 u.s. 546 (1975). Both Southeastern Promotions and Mosley are also im­
portant cases in the development of the public forum doctrine. See notes 69-82 supra 
and accompanying text. . 
265. 420 U.S. at 548. 
266. Id at 558 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963». 
267. 420 U.S. at 561. 
268. See note 80 supra for a description of the specific procedural requirements 
found to be lacking by the Court. Procedural infirmities also may be a way of disposing 
of some book removal cases. For example, in Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. 
Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979), copies of Ms. were removed from the school library after a 
resolution seeking to remove the magazine had been voted on affirmatively at a Board of 
Education meeting. Since the resolution had been presented to the Board of Education 
by one of its members, the Board acted on the proposal without following recently 
adopted interim "Guidelines for Selecting Instructional Materials." The district court 
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Having based its decision on this ground, the Court avoided any 
need to decide whether the board's reasons for barring "Hair" from 
its theater were constitutionally adequate.269 Certain statements 
made by the Court along the way to its ultimate decision, however, 
are relevant to that inquiry. For one thing, the Court expressed 
some concern over the role played by the board of directors: "An 
administrative board assigned to screening stage productions-and 
keeping off stage anything not deemed culturally uplifting or health­
ful-may well be less responsive than a court, an independent 
branch of government, to constitutionally protected interests in free 
expression."27o For another, it recognized ''that approval of an ap­
plication required some judgment as to the content and quality of 
the production."271 These same two points have equal application to 
the process of school library book censorship. The school board's 
interest is in an educationally uplifting library collection and the de­
cisions it makes must be based on the content and quality of various 
books. Unfortunately, after identifying that content evaluation is an 
inevitable part of the board's job, the majority refrained from ad­
dressing this crucial problem further.272 
ruled that having adopted the guidelines, the Board of Education was obligated to follow 
them. Id at 1273. The court invalidated the magazine's removal and ordered the Board 
to follow the guidelines in any future decisions to remove books from the library shelves. 
Id at 1276. 
Moreover, procedural irregularities may in1luence a court in favor of intervening in 
a book removal dispute. 
In circumstances of such irregularity and ambiguity, aprimafacie case is made 
out and intervention of a federal court is warranted because of the very infre­
quency with which it may be assumed such intervention will be necessary and 
because of the real threat that the school officials irregular and ambiguous han­
dling of the issue will, even despite the best intentions, create misunderstanding 
as to the scope of their activities which will serve to suppress freedom of 
expression. 
Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 409, 414-15 (2d 
Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981). 
269. 420 U.S. at 559. 
270. Id at 560-61. 
271. Id at 555 n.7. 
272. In addition to recognizing that content evaluation is an unavoidable aspect of 
the board of director's job, the Court in Southeastern Promotions also recognized that 
there may be occasions when content neutral reasons for excluding speech will come into 
play. The Court, for example, pointed out that "[t]here was no contention by the board 
that these facilities could not accommodate a production of this size." Id at 555. The 
implications of this comment are that content neutral reasons for refusing the play would 
not have been objectionable under the first amendment. This suggestion is especially 
relevant in the context of the book removal cases because of the close analogy between 
exclusions resulting because the theater is too small and the explanation in the book 
removal cases that a book may be excluded because of a limitation on shelf space. See 
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This issue received due consideration, however, in both the sep­
arate opinion of Justice Douglas, in part dissenting and in part con­
curring, and in the dissent of Justice Rehnquist. Justice Douglas' 
concern was with the Court's "application of a few procedural band­
aids"273 when the serious constitutional flaw in the case was the con­
tent screening engaged in by the board of directors: 
As s.oon as municipal officials are permitted to pick and choose, as 
they are in all existing socialist regimes, between those produc­
tions which are "clean and healthful and culturally uplifting" in 
content and those which are not, the path is cleared for a regime 
of censorship under which full voice can be given only to those 
views which meet with the approval of the powers that be.274 
Justice Rehnquist interpreted the Court's opinion differently 
from Justice Douglas, seeing it instead as a condemnation of content 
screening. It was the Court's apparent disapproval of board determi­
nations based on decisions relative to the content and quality of of­
fered productions that distressed Justice Rehnquist.275 While he 
conceded that the theater is a public forum subject to first amend­
ment constraints, Justice Rehnquist was unwilling to classify it along 
with public streets and parks. Unlike expression in those places, ex­
pression in a municipal theater must be on a scheduled basis and 
that scheduling will involve a process of inclusion and exclusion.276 
In Justice Rehnquist's view, the Court's unwillingness to recognize 
this reality and allow the theater to function as a theater produces 
some unsatisfactory consequences and leaves some important ques­
tions unresolved: 
Maya municipal theater devote an entire season to Shakespeare, 
or is it required to book any potential producer on a first come, 
first served basis? These questions are real ones in light of the 
Court's opinion, which by its terms seems to give no constitution­
ally permissible role in the way of selection to the municipal 
authorities. 
A municipal theater may not be run by municipal authorities 
note 236 supra and accompanying text. The Court's remarks on this point in Southeast­
ern Promotions lent validity to the noninterventionist courts' decision to uphold content 
neutral book removals under their three-part classification scheme. Accord, Heffron v. 
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 101 S. Ct. 2559, 2564-65 (1981). 
273. 420 U.S. at 563. 
274. Id 
275. Id at 571-72. 
276. Id at 570. 
1981] PUBLIC SCHOOL LIBRARY CENSORSHIP 73 

as if it were a private theater, free to judge on a content basis 
alone which plays it wishes to have performed and which it does 
not. But, just as surely, that element of it which is "theater" ought 
to be accorded some constitutional recognition along with that ele­
ment of it which is "municipal."277 
These same unresolved questions might just as easily be asked about 
the public school library. Unfortunately, the Court's analysis in 
Southeastern Promotions suggested no surefire way to determine the 
extent to which the first amendment recognizes that element which is 
"school library" along with that element which is "public." 
The conflict of roles crystallized in Southeastern Promotions is 
not unique to the municipal theater and the school library. It arises 
whenever government sponsorship is afforded an activity in which 
selectivity is ordinarily an important aspect. It is undoubtedly true, 
as Justice Rehnquist pointed out, that a private theater would select 
its productions based on a variety of content-based factors. The ex­
tent to which government must refrain from relying on these same 
factors when it is involved in mooiog a theater or other similar activ­
ity is indeed a troublesome point. Regrettably, the judicial responses 
to this troubling inquiry leave us far. from a complete resolution of 
the problem. For the most part courts, probably sensing this di­
lemma lying in wait for them once they determine some degree of 
scrutiny should be applied, avoid the dilemma entirely by the use of 
several evasive techniques.278 A screening of the case law for cases 
in which the issue of the permissible scope of editorial discretion was 
squarely addressed produces only a few solid nuggets of analysis. 
One example of a case in which the court examined the proper 
scope of government editorial discretion is Advocates for Arts v. 
Thomson.279 In that case Granite, a literary journal, had applied for 
a grant-in-aid under a program of public funding for the arts spon­
sored by the New Hampshire Commission on the Arts. Granite's 
grant application was turned down because of objection to a poem 
published in a past issue of the magazine. The poem was described 
277. Id at 573-74. 
278. Among the techniques used by courts to avoid tackling the difficult problem 
raised by government exercise of editorial discretion are a finding of insufficient state 
involvement in the challenged action to give rise to a first amendment claim, e.g. , Missis­
sippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976), cerl. denied, 430 U.S. 
982 (1977), and a decision that no public forum exists, thereby permitting the court to 
refuse all claims of access, e.g., Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 656 F.2d 
1012 (5th Cir. 1981); Avins v. Rutgers, State Univ., 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cerro 
denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968). 
279. 532 F.2d 792 (1st Cir.), cerro denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976). 
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as "an item of filth" by the New Hampshire Governor.280 Granite 
challenged the denial of its application as a violation of its first 
amendment rights. While the First Circuit noted a resemblance be­
tween the case before it and Southeastern Promotions, it found the 
differences between the two cases more compelling. The court found 
no tradition of neutrality in public support of the arts and could see 
no way that funding decisions could be made on aneutral basis.281 
While access to a municipal theater could be allocated neutrally on a 
first-come-first-served basis, no method of avoiding a judgment on 
the comparative worth of projects applying for grants could be 
discerned: 
The decision to withhold support is unavoidably based in some 
part on the "subject matter" or "content" of expression, for the 
very assumption of public funding of the arts is that decisions will 
be made according to the literary or artistic worth of competing 
applicants. Given this focus on the comparative merit of literary 
and artistic works equally entitled to first amendment protection 
as "speech", courts have no particular institutional competence 
warranting case-by-case participation in the allocation of 
funds.282 
The First Circuit's reaction to the fact that decisions based on artistic 
merit are necessarily both content-based and subjective was to leave 
those decisions entirely in the hands of the administrators of the pro­
gram. Thus the solution proposed by the court in Advocatesfor Arts 
is that in cases in which the government activity requires the exercise 
of editorial discretion and no neutral standards can be substituted 
for subjective ones, that discretion should be exercised unhampered 
by any constitutional restraints. This result is on all fours with the 
result and reasoning of noninterventionist courts in the book re­
moval cases.283 
280. Id at 793. 
281. Id at 796. 
282. Id at 795-96. 
283. Despite this similarity in reasoning between Advocatesfor Arts and the analy­
sis of noninterventionist courts, an attempt was made by one interventionist court to 
distinguish the case. In Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 
703 (D. Mass. 1978), the court found a difference between censoring speech, as in the 
book removal cases, and enlarging speech by making money available to fund expres­
sion, as in Advocatesfor Arts. Id at 712 n.15. This distinction, while facile, seems a 
semantic difference at best. One also could argue that creating a library, which the 
school had no obligation to do in the first instance, enlarges expression and, therefore, 
decisions about what to shelve or not to shelve are not different than decisions about 
whether to fund. 
75 1981) PUBLIC SCHOOL LIBRARY CENSORSHIP 
While cQntrary points of view are available in the case law, for 
the most part these sources provide little in the way of satisfactory 
analysis.284 The most complete analysis suggesting some constitu­
tional limitations on editorial discretion is found in the opinion of 
Circuit Judge Goldberg, dissenting in Mississippi Gay Alliance v. 
Goudelock.285 In that case, the Mississippi Gay Alliance submitted a 
paid advertisement to the student newspaper at Mississippi State 
University. The editor of the paper refused to publish the ad and the 
Gay Alliance sued. The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit denied plaintiffs' claim relying on evidence that no uni­
versity official had taken part in the decision not to publish the ad. 
The decision was made solely by the student editor of the paper in 
the proper exercise of his discretion, thus the Court found a lack of 
284. Typical of the cases finding exercises of editorial discretion to be reviewable 
are Radical Lawyers Caucus v. Pool, 324 F. Supp. 268 (W.O. Tex. 1970), Lee v. Board of 
Regents of State Colleges, 306 F. Supp. 1097 (W.O. Wis. 1969), aJf'd, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th 
Cir. 1971), and Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). In Pool, a political 
advertisement was found to be wrongfully excluded from a state funded bar journal de­
spite a journal policy prohibiting the acceptance of political ads. See note 100 supra. 
The court in Pool applied a compelling state interest test in evaluating the justifications 
offered by the journal in support of its policy and found those justifications wanting. 324 
F. Supp. at 270. The court rejected defendants' explanation that its policy was designed 
to protect the State Bar's public image for disinterestedness and integrity. Id That rejec­
tion was based on the fact that speech that invites dispute is equally protected by the first 
amendment. The court did not even consider whether the need to exercise editorial dis­
cretion in any way tempered the application of this first amendment principle. The court 
also found that defendants could not rely on the argument that the State Bar desired to 
maintain a position of political neutrality in the face of the journal's practice of re­
printing highly political editorials from various news sources. Id In Lee, plaintiffs suc­
cessfully challenged a university newspaper policy against accepting editorial 
advertisements. After finding the paper to be a public forum, the court based its decision 
that the ads could not be refused on the paper's acceptance of commercial and political 
ads. 304 F. Supp. at 1101. Contra, Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 
(1974). Additionally, the defendants failed to demonstrate that the printing of editorial 
ads would "materially and substantially interfere" with the operation of the university. 
Id Finally, in Zucker, the issue of a publication's policy against the acceptance of polit­
ical ads was again before a court. As in Pool and Lee, the court struck down the refusal 
to accept such ads. The facts in Zucker, however, did differ significantly from the situa­
tions in Pool and Lee. In Zucker, the student editor of a school paper wanted to publish 
an ad submitted by a student group opposing the Vietnam War. The school principal, 
however, refused to allow the ad to be printed. 209 F. Supp. at 103. The court found 
that the paper served as an important educational public forum for students in the school 
and that Tinker supported a right of access to the paper for the expression of student 
ideas. Id at 104-05. Thus, in Zucker, no issue of the degree of editorial discretion that 
should be allowed the editors of a state-supported publication was raised. Unlike the 
events in Pool and Lee, in Zucker the paper's editor wanted to publish the ad and the 
refusal came at the hands of the school principal. 
285. 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977). 
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state action.286 In the absence of state action, a necessary prerequi­
site to any claim of constitutional invasion, no review of the propri­
ety of the editor's action was required. 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Goldberg first took issue with 
the majority's analysis of the state action question. After finding 
sufficient state involvement to justify a remand of the case to the 
district court,287 Judge Goldberg considered the delicate interplay 
between equal access principles and the right of the student editors 
to control the content of the newspaper they edit. Early on in his 
analysis, Judge Goldberg rejected both extremes of a feast or famine 
analysis. He refused to find either that a student newspaper is un­
hampered by constitutional constraints in its exercise of discretion or 
that student editors may never exclude material from the student pa­
per for content-based reasons. In compromising on a happy medium 
between these two extremes, Judge Goldberg divided the campus 
newspaper into two parts: The "editorial product" of the newspaper 
and the paper's "unedited space." Student editors are permitted 
"unfettered discretion" over the "editorial product," which includes 
materials written by the student staff of the paper, guest columns, 
and letters to the editor.288 On the other hand, "unedited space," 
such as space available for "unedited advertisements or announce­
ments from individuals outside the newspaper staff," must be made 
available on a content neutral basis.289 Despite the requirement of 
content neutral access to these spaces, Judge Goldberg recognized 
the need to allow some regulation of these parts of the student news­
paper. For instance, he suggested that certain limits placed on the 
sources of the announcements might be permissible.290 This would 
include restricting access to members of the university community. 
Judge Goldberg also was aware of the problem of limitations on the 
space available in unedited portions of the paper.291 Space limita­
tions ~ght cause the publication to restrict each announcement to a 
maximum number of words, require the payment of a reasonable fee 
for the placement of an announcement, or select from the submitted 
. announcements at random until all the space allotted for this pur­
. 286. Id at 1075. For additional comments on the state action question as it affects 
school newspapers, see Newell, A Rigltt ofAccess to Student Newspapers at Public Univer­
sities, 4 J. COLL. & U.L. 209, 210-15 (1977); Note, The State College Press and tlte Public 
Forum Doctrine, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv. 227, 232-35 (1977). 
287. 536 F.2d at 1085. 
288. Id at 1087. 
289. Id 
290. Id at 1088. 
291. Id 
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pose is filled. These solutions to the problem of limited space are 
approved because they are content neutral and not content selective. 
The analysis suggested by Judge Goldberg appears to work well 
in the context of a school newspaper composed of both edited and 
unedited space. The nature of the forum involved makes feasible the 
exercise of Solomonic wisdom as a solution to the editorial discretion 
quandary. Not all forums, however, provide such convenient dual­
ity. Neither the municipal theater nor the school library seem easy 
targets for this half-and-half solution. Neither of these facilities has 
the equivalent of unedited space. If some access is to be made avail­
able on a content neutral basis it will have to be at the expense of 
editorial discretion in space akin to the edited portion of the 
newspaper. 
A more broad based solution than is found in Judge Goldberg's 
opinion in Mississippi Gay Alliance is offered by Professor Karst.292 
Professor Karst proposes a standard of review that would tolerate 
government exercise of editorial discretion in the operation of a pub­
lic forum only to the extent necessary to further a compelling gov­
ernment interest in maintaining the integrity of the forum.293 
To see how this solution would work in actual operation, a good 
initial example is found in the campus newspaper. Like the division 
employed by Judge Goldberg, this standard sometimes will treat dis­
similarly the different parts of the paper. With regard to the uned­
ited space of the paper, no compelling need exists to exercise content 
control over such space. No essential characteristic of the newspaper 
will be threatened by requiring neutral distribution of such space. 
On the other hand, a different result is required when considering 
the treatment of articles written by members of the paper's staff. If 
student editors are not permitted to make judgments about the quali­
ty and content of these submissions, the essence of what a newspaper 
is all about would be sacrificed in the name of content neutrality. At 
this stage, as well, Professor Karst's compelling interest analysis 
292. Karst, supra note 112. 
293. Id at 253-59. A similar approach is suggested by Professor Canby: 
The court must. . . determine whether the medium is one in which the state 
necessarily exercises an editorial function. . . . [N]othing in the nature of an 
auditorium or school plant requires the exercise of editorial judgment over the 
entire facility .... As long as alternative methods of expression are available, 
a right of access should be denied where the government enterprise cannot truly 
exist without the exercise of editorial discretion. 
Canby, The First Amendment and the Stale as Editor: Implications for Public Broadcast­
ing, 52 TEX. L. REv. 1123, 1133-34 (1974) (emphasis in the original) (footnote omitted). 
See also Comment, supra note 209, at 1451-60. 
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reaches an identical result to Judge Goldberg's "editorial product" 
theory. The two theories, however, diverge with respect to guest col­
umns and letters to the editor. While Judge Goldberg treated these 
paper parts as marginal examples of editorial product, Professor 
Karst's compelling interest analysis standard dictates no clear-cut re­
sult in all cases based solely on the label attached to the section of 
the paper to which access is sought: 
Can any constitutional doctrine be devised to permit the editor 
to exercise the discretion that is necessary to the operation of a 
"real" newspaper and at the same time prevent the exclusion of 
views from a government newspaper merely because the editor 
does not share those views? One solution might be found in a 
constitutional principle that tolerated editorial discretion so long 
as it were lodged in someone who could be counted on to use pro­
fessional (rather than personal) standards in exercising it. In a 
given case, where it could be shown that an editor had abused this 
discretion by excluding opposing views. . . a court should feel no 
hesitation in intervening to guarantee access to the opponents, in 
the name of the first amendment's equality principle. But the re­
fusal of the school newspaper editor to print a cartoon because of 
its bad taste . . . or to print an article that is badly written . . . 
should not raise a first amendment problem. That these two areas 
blur together at their edges should not disqualify a court from de­
ciding where a particular editorial action falls.294 
While Professor Karst concedes that courts may have to struggle 
with cases on the borderline of compelling, he also is correct in as­
suming that this failing should not serve as a deterrent to the use of 
his standard, as it is a failing held in common by all evaluative for­
mulas employed in constitutional analysis. 
The next step in testing the durability of the Karst formulation 
of course will be to apply it to the school library book removal pro­
cess. In deciding when the government's interest in removal is com­
pelling, it will be necessary to determine what varieties of removal 
are essential to the task of proper library management. It should be 
pointed out initially that making this determination is complicated 
by the human dimensions of the average book removal case. Ordi­
narily, those initially promoting removal of a book are not members 
of the professional staff of the library. The impetus for removal 
likely will come from a parent or an individual member of the school 
board.295 While an administrative review process usually will come 
294. Karst, supra note 112, at 257-59 (footnotes omitted). 
295. E.g., Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 
79 1981) PUBLIC SCHOOL LIBRARY CENSORSHIP 
into play before such a request results in the removal of a book,296 
this process may be influenced by the political heat generated by a 
vocal group of parents. Therefore, the cooler heads of library per­
sonnel may be overruled on the issue of the book's suitability.297 
This private intervention in the professional operation of the 
school library adds an interesting complication to any effort to apply 
a compelling government interest analysis to the book removal pro­
cess. Professor Karst lists as one of his reasons for allowing some 
degree of content control to government officials the idea that profes­
sional judgment ought to be given some weight.298 If editorial dis­
cretion is to be vested only with professionals, this creates somewhat 
of a conundrum in the typical library book removal case. In truth, 
the book removal decision usually will be the product of collective 
deliberations by both professionals and nonprofessionals. While the 
instigation for the investigation of a book will be from a concerned 
parent, professionals at least will have been called in to participate in 
the final decisionmaking process.299 Whether this should influence a 
court in its resolution of a book removal case is open to debate. In 
part, the answer will be a function of whether the concern is more 
404,409 (2d Cir. 1980), cerl.. granled, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981) (removal directed by members 
of the (Board of Education); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 
(D.N.H. 1979) (removal proposed by a member of the Board of Education); Right to 
Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 705 (D. Mass. 1978) (removal 
instigated by a parent). 
296. E.g., Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615, 
617-18 (0. Vt. 1979), qffd, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980). Book removal 
procedures provide that a parent or local citizen objecting to a book in the li­
brary may initiate a review of the work by completing a form entitled "Citizen's 
Request for Professional Reconsideration of a Work," and submitting it to the 
High School Principal. The Principal must provide copies of the request to the 
librarian and Superintendent of Schools and must inform the Board of the re­
quest. The librarian must then review the request and submit a written report 
of "action taken" to the Board. Finally, the procedures provide that ''un­
resolved issues shall be settled by a majority vote of the Board or its designees." 
Id (citations omitted). 
297. E.g., Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 708 
(0. Mass. 1978) (school librarian's opinion that the poem ''was not obscene" and ''that 
both students and faculty should have access to it" was rejected by School Committee 
and librarian was threatened with loss of her job for decision to initially place poem on 
the library shelves). 
298. Karst, supra note 112, at 257. 
299. E.g., Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (D.N.H. 1978) 
(complaints about library books were handled by ''the appointment of an Instructional 
Materials Reconsideration Committee composed of professional library-media person. 
nel. the principal or his representative, the appropriate assistant superintendent, the per­
son or persons involved in the original selection of the material. and the person or 
persons using the materials in the individual school."). 
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with process or result. If this effort is solely to decide if a particular 
decision is justified, one ought to examine the prof erred justification 
for removal to see if it satisfies constitutional standards. If the con­
cern is with process, this flaw ought perhaps to be dealt with sepa­
rately, and not intermixed with an appraisal C?f the importance of the 
justification offered for the removal. 300 
Despite this added difficulty in the analysis, there still is no rea­
son to assume that the Karst standard will not prove workable in the 
context of the book removal cases. To test this assumption, it will be 
necessary to consider several different fact patterns. Suppose, for ex­
ample, a book is removed because its contents are determined to be 
obsolete-a science textbook now out of date because of more recent 
scientific advances-it is essential to the nlDning of the library that 
the librarian have the ability to make such decisions. Although a 
judgment is being made about the contents of the book in question, 
it is a judgment a court would not want to second-guess. Even if 
some degree of parental involvement in raising the question of obso­
lescence came to light, it is hard to see why this would make any 
difference in the outcome of the case. 
As a second example, suppose a book were removed from the 
library because the school disagreed with the position it took on a 
controversial issue. Nothing necessary to the maintenance of a top­
flight library requires allowing such a decision to stand un­
checked.301 Once a decision is made to include a book on a 
300. See note 268 supra. 
301. Some evidence of this is found in the "Guidelines For Selecting Instructional 
Materials" adopted by the Nashua Board of Education: 
It was required by the guidelines that the materials be consistent with the gen­
eral educational goals of the school district, meet high standards of quality in 
factual content and presentation, be appropriate for the subject area and for the 
age, maturation, ability level, and social development of the students, have aes­
thetic, literary, or social value, be designed to help the students gain an aware­
ness and understanding of the contributions made by both sexes, and by 
religious, ethnic and cultural groups to American heritage; and tltat a selection 
. ofmaterials on controversial irsues be directed toward maintaining a balanced 
collection representing various views. 
Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (D.N.H. 1979) (emphasis ad­
ded). 
Further support for this position is contained in the Library Bill of Rights adopted 
by the American Library Association Council: 
The American Library Association affirms that all libraries are forums for in­
formation and ideas, and that the following basic policies should guide their 
services: 
1. Books and other library resources should be provided for the interest, infor­
mation, and enlightment of all people of the community the library serves. 
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particular topic in the library, expulsion solely because of disagree­
ment with the point of view taken by the author should be viewed as 
an unjustified instance ofcontent discrimination. This would be true 
no matter what the identity of the participants in the removal 
process. 
Finally, suppose a book was removed from the library because 
the language used by the author was considered offensive or because 
the book included nonobscene, yet sexually explicit scenes; what 
then? This last example is by far the hardest. In part, a solution to it 
depends on one's definition of the essential function of the school 
library. If a school library is viewed as a limitless marketplace of 
ideas, no editorial discretion needs to exist based on dislike for the 
language or themes chosen by an author.302 We are dealing here 
with a particular species of library, however, a school library. The 
question to be posed is whether there is something essential in the 
operation of a school library that requires allowing the school to at­
tempt to foster certain ideas of morality by restricting its book collec­
tion. This question has been given varying answers by the courts 
deciding book removal cases.303 There also are constitutional con-
Materials should not be excluded because of the origin, background, or views of 
those contributing to their creation. 
2. Libraries should provide materials and information presenting all points of 
view on current and historical issues. Materials should not be proscribed or 
removed because of partisan or doctrinal disapproval 
3. Libraries should challenge censorship in the fulfillment of their responsibil­
ity to provide information and enlightenment. 
4. Libraries should cooperate with all persons and groups concerned with re­
sisting abridgment of free expression and free access to ideas. 
5. A person's right to use a library should not be denied or abridged because 
of origin, age, background, or views. 
6. Libraries which make exhibit spaces and meeting rooms available to the 
public they serve should make such facilities available on an equitable basis, 
regardless of the beliefs or affiliations of individuals or groups requesting their 
use. 
AMERICAN LmRARY Assoc. COUNCIL, LIBRARY BILL OF &OHTS (1980); reprinted in 2 
CURRENTS 3, at 10 (1980). 
302. An exclusion based on objection to the language or themes chosen by the 
author should not be confused with exclusion because a book is badly written or con­
structed. While an exclusion based on the literary quality of a book is content-based, it 
should be categorized with exclusions based on obsolescence. One of the characteristics 
of a school library is that it serves as a repository for high quality writings. Therefore, to 
maintain this aspect of the library collection, it is essential that removals based on judg­
ments about literary merit be permitted. 
303. Compare Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 
714 (D. Mass. 1978) ("The prospect of successive school committees 'sanitizing' the 
school library of views divergent from their own is alarming ....") witll Zykan v. War­
saw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir. 1980) ("[T)he importance of 
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siderations associated with the question.304 
One bright note is that this judgment is not further complicated 
by whether the removal was effected by parents, librarians, or the 
school board. If one were to accept the idea that the school may 
properly transmit community values to its students, there is no need 
to draw a line between professional judgments about morality and 
parental opinions on this same issue. Since the professionals only 
serve as surrogates for members of the community, it hardly should 
invalidate the decisions reached when the community expresses itself 
directly. On the other hand, if one were to deny the validity of the 
school as moral censor, moral justifications would not be compelling 
reasons for book removals, whether those removals were caused by 
parents or professionals. Because these questions are very much 
judgment calls, no final answers will be attempted here. Whichever 
way one chooses to define the contours of the role of the school li­
brary, once supplied with a definition a result can be reached easily 
in cases of removals for offensive language or sexual explicitness. 
Despite some "blurring at the edges," Professor Karst's analysis 
provides a very workable standard of review' for the typical book 
removal case. What is especially interesting about how this standard 
operates in practice is that it comes very close to what is done by 
courts following the judicial review model in the book removal 
cases. These courts have seen the need not to treat all content-based 
removals identically. The cases uniformly recognize the inappropri­
ateness of removals based on the political content of a book.305 They 
reach divergent results, however, when books are removed because 
they contain foul language or explicit sexual descriptions, and their 
disagreement stems from a differing view of the goals of public 
education.306 
If the cases have an obvious flaw, it is the way in which they 
secondary schools in the development of intellectual faculties is only one part of a broad 
formative role encompassing the encouragement and nurturing of those fundamental s0­
cial, political, and moral values that will permit a student to take his place in the 
community."). 
304. See earlier discussion of whether the first amendment permits the government 
to disseminate a favored ideology in the schools in text accompanying notes liS-59 
supra. 
305. E.g., Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (D. N.H. 1979). 
306. Compare Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 
714 (D. Mass. 1978) wi/It Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 
638 F.2d 404, 436-37 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J., concurring), cerJ. gran/ed, 102 S. Ct. 
385 (1981). 
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distinguish between content-based and content neutral removals.307 
One example given in the case law of content neutral removal is a 
removal based on a lack of shelf space.308 If the library shelves were 
to overflow, removing the excess books by a random drawing of titles 
from the card catalogue would be content neutral. Removal based 
on a review of the collection to decide which books are least neces­
sary to the overall balance of the collection, however, is not content 
neutral. While such a removal need not be viewed as an improper 
exercise of content discrimination, it is not neutral. For a second 
example, tum to the example of the outdated science book used ear­
lier in discussing the Karst formulation. The book removal cases 
define removals resulting from the obsolescence of a book as content 
neutral.309 Because the process of deciding if something is obsolete 
requires an evaluation of its contents, such a removal cannot accu­
rately be described as content neutral. While the removal of an ob­
solete book should not be found invalid, its proper classification is 
with other cases of justifiable content-based selection. This flaw 
aside, the cases do come to grips with the need to distinguish be­
tween valid and invalid content-based decisions. While the analysis 
relied on may overlook the controversial history of content control in 
first amendment analysis, the judgments reached, while in some 
cases debatable, are all eminently justifiable. 
Thus, in attempting to summarize the results of this in-depth 
view of the book removal cases, there is both good news and bad 
news. The good news is that when dealing with the actual review of 
such decisions on the merits, the courts that reach the merits have 
applied standards and achieved results with which it is easy to feel 
comfortable. While these courts have not articulated the nature of 
the task required of them in as accurate a fashion as one might hope 
for, their ability to apply standards developed outside the book re­
moval cases to this new context rates generally high marks. As for 
the bad news, it is found in the inability of both interventionist and 
noninterventionist courts to satisfactorily analyze those matters lead­
ing up to a decision whether to review on the merits. In this sphere, 
307. This comment is not meant to suggest that the distinction between content­
based and content neutral removals is not a legitimate one. The legitimacy of this dis­
tinction seems well established. See note 272 supra. The point made here is only that the 
line drawn by the interventionist courts between content-based and content neutral justi­
fications is not an accurate dividing line. 
308. Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 711 (D. 
Mass. 1978). 
309. Id 
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the major question to be asked is whether the plaintiff has suffered 
the invasion of a constitutionally protected interest. Ifno such inva­
sion has occurred, no further review of government action is justi­
fied. The efforts to find such an invasion have involved two central 
first amendment doctrines. In dealing with the possibility that the 
school library is a public forum, the courts seemingly lack awareness 
of the complexities raised by this inquiry. Similarly, in deciding 
whether students have a constitutionally protected right to know, the 
courts' resolution of this issue fails to take into account many of the 
difficult aspects of applying right to know principles in the library 
book removal context. With respect to both of these doctrines, the 
courts' analysis leaves something to be desired. 
III. SUITS TO FORCE REMOVAL OF A BOOK FROM 

THE SCHOOL LIBRARY 

Having explored the ins and outs of the first of the situations in 
which school library book censorship occurs, the removal of a 
shelved book, it is now time to turn to the other two library censor­
ship fact patterns for a brief comparison of the problems raised. The 
first of these alternative factual settings arises when a lawsuit is 
brought to force the removal of a book from the school library. 
In such a setting, it is easy to imagine the chain of events lead­
ing the complainant to seek judicial intervention beginning with a 
parent being informed that the school library has a copy of a certain 
book. The parent then would initiate a complaint through whatever 
administrative channel is provided for such purposes to object to the 
book being available to students.31o Dissatisfied by the school's deci­
sion to allow the book to remain in the library collection, the parent 
would petition for judicial revlew of the school's decision. 
The case law involving this fact pattern is sparse.311 No case 
310. An example of such an administrative review procedure is found in Salvail v. 
Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (D.N.H. 1979). In that case, the Nashua 
Board of Education had adopted guidelines to be followed when a member of the public 
raised a complaint about a library book or other instructional material. After the filing 
of a complaint, an Instructional Materials Reconsideration Committee would be ap­
pointed. See note 299 supra. The committee was given the task of reexamining the ma­
terial and issuing a report which would be given to the School Superintendent and then 
forwarded to the complainant. If the complainant was dissatisfied with the results of the 
reexamination, an appeal could be taken to the School Superintendent. If the complain­
ant still was not satisfied, there was provision for a further appeal to the Board of 
Education. 
311. The only cases that can be found involving this fact pattern are Evans v. 
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directly discusses the free speech aspect of such a lawsuit.312 This 
paucity of case law might be viewed as a reason for paying little 
attention to this category of censorship dispute but for one factual 
reality. In truth, there is no bright line separating cases in which the 
school's removal of a book is challenged and cases in which suit is 
brought to force removal. In many cases, as was pointed out previ­
ously,313 a book is removed because of prompting by concerned par­
ents. Some of these parental efforts meet with success in their initial 
encounter with the school administration. When this occurs, one po­
tential result is that another group of parents and students with op­
posing views on whether the book should be left in the library will 
seek legal recourse to bring about the return of the book to the li­
brary shelf. In other cases, the early efforts of parents seeking re­
moval will meet with failure. Thereafter, these parents may decide 
to take their fight to the courts. Viewed in this light, the two kinds of 
lawsuits begin to look more of a piece and simply reflect two sides of 
the same coin. Whether the judicial response to these two varieties 
of censorship dispute ought to be similar, of course, is not clear just 
from the disclosure that all that separates the cases is which group of 
Selma Union High School Dist., 193 Cal. 54, 222 P. 801 (1924), and Rosenberg v. Board 
of Educ., 196 Misc. 542, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 1944). 
312. In Evans v. Selma Union High School Dist., 193 Cal. 54, 222 P. 801 (1924), 
plaintifl'sought to enjoin the purchase of 12 copies of the King James version of the Bible 
for the high school library. Plainillrs claim was that the purchase of the Bible violated 
several provisions of the California Constitution and a number of state statutes that for­
bade the use of sectarian or denominational books in public schools and school libraries. 
The court denied plainillrs request for relief on the ground that "[t)he mere act of 
purchasing a book to be added to the school library does not carry with it any implica­
tion of the adoption of the theory or dogma contained therein, or any approval of the 
book itself except as a work of literature fit to be included in a reference library." Id at 
60,222 P. at 803. Since the lawsuit involved a religious book, the case raised a claim in 
the nature ofan establishment clause violation and did not involve any free speech issue. 
In Rosenberg v. Board of Educ., 196 Misc. 542, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 1949), 
petitioners challenged the shelving of Oliller Twist by Charles Dickens and TIre Mercluutt 
of Venice by William Shakespeare in the school library. Petitioners argued that the 
Board of Education of the City of New York had abused its discretion, under the New 
York Education Law, to select appropriate books for placement in the school library and 
for use as instructional material. They based this claim on the fact ''that the two books 
are objectionable because they tend to engender hatred of the Jew as a person and as a 
race." Id at 543, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 345. The court rejected petitioners' claim because it 
found the Board's action consistent with the educational objective of developing inquir­
ing minds. In the absence of proof the Board had selected the books in order to en­
courage anti-religious feelings, the court upheld the Board's actions. While petitioners in 
Rosenberg could have argued their case based on first amendment principles. they did 
not do so. Instead, the case was argued and decided solely on the basis of the New York 
Education Law. 
313. See note 295 supra and accompanying text. 
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parents the school sides with in the first round of the censorship con­
test. Still, this aspect of the situation justifies a more than cursory 
examination of suits that seek the removal of a book from the school 
library. 
As a starting point in that examination, it will be useful to con­
sider what this change in the fact pattern augurs in terms of the two 
judicial attitudes reflected in the book removal cases. From the per­
spective of a noninterventionist court there is no greater justification 
for intervention in a challenge to nonremoval than in the removal 
situation. The decisions of school administrators are no less trust­
worthy when they decide to turn back parental efforts to remove 
books than when they accede to such demands. Thus, courts wishing 
to defer to the greater expertise of the school board in such matters 
will feel comfortable with their noninterventionist stance in both 
kinds of cases. 
As for interventionist courts willing to act where necessary in 
book removal cases, for several reasons they will not feel equally at 
ease second-guessing school authorities where the book has been 
kept on the library shelf. In the first place, as these courts view the 
library as a public forum, the issue arises whether there is a first 
amendment right to keep certain ideas out of a forum in addition to 
the acknowledged right to include ideas in a forum. Similarly, with 
the right to know, a version of this doctrine that would recognize a 
right not to know and to keep others from knowing would have to be 
adopted. Because in many ways both of these ideas are antithetical 
to the basic values furthered by the first amendment, they seem un­
likely judgments to be made by interventionist courts. This is espe­
cially true in light of the fact that much of the philosophy behind the 
activist position is premised on the need to ferret out acts of censor­
ship, even those committed by school authorities. To have these 
same courts turn around and force the school to censor its book col­
lection seems an unlikely result. Thus, when dealing with suits to 
force the removal of a book, it appears that noninterventionist courts 
-and interventionist courts will reach the same conclusion, though for 
very different reasons, and will refuse to remove a shelved book. 
The only remaining question is whether this result is justified by 
analytic differences between the two kinds of censorship cases. To 
make this judgment will require a brief rethinking of some of the 
issues addressed in the analysis of cases challenging the removal of a 
book. Whether public forum and right to know principles demand a 
similar treatment of cases challenging book removals and cases seek­
ing such removals or whether proper analysis requires dissimilar re­
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suIts in these two categories of censorship dispute needs to be 
determined. 
In the cases challenging the removal of books, two public forum 
arguments were identified as being the most suited to characterizing 
the library collection as a public forum. Both of these arguments 
required reliance on the concept of an involuntary forum. Under the 
first of these arguments, the government's attempt to create a forum 
for a certain kind of expression and to reserve that forum exclusively 
for its own use will fail. Having opened a forum for government 
expression, the first amendment imposes an obligation on the gov­
ernment to make that forum available to nongovernment partici­
pants as well. Under this theory, if the school library is to be 
considered a public forum for purposes of challenges to book remov­
als, that characterization will apply whether the plaintiffs seek to re­
store a book or remove one. Despite its continuing identity as a 
public forum, however, the critical question revolves around the na­
ture of the rights granted to participants in the forum. The basic 
right involved in most public forum cases is the right to have one's 
voice heard in the forum along with the voices of others who seek to 
exercise their forum rights. In the book removal context, students 
seek to "speak" in the forum by having a book retained in the collec­
tion because it represents an idea they want included in the forum. 
Nothing about public forum principles suggests a parallel forum 
right to silence disfavored ideas. A speaker may not be forced to 
speak;314 nor does a speaker have a right to silence others. Because 
the theory upon which the forum comes into being is premised on 
the idea that the government may not create a forum exclusively for 
the exposition of its own ideas, it would be ironic if that same censor­
ing of ideas could be accomplished by a nongovernment participant 
in the forum. The idea behind this forum theory rebels at such a 
notion. Its thought is to open up forum use to a wider circle of ideas, 
not to constrict its use even further. Therefore, it is clear that under 
a theory that precludes the government from. maintaining the school 
library exclusively for its own use, that same theory would not pro­
tect the right of someone to successfully request the removal of a 
library book. 
A more interesting analysis results by looking at the involuntary 
forum theory that is rooted in limitations on the right of government 
advocacy. If it is determined that some constitutional limitations ex­
ist on the right of the government to advocate a preferred ideology, 
314. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). 
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query what mechanism would exist to correct instances where the 
government oversteps the bounds of its discretion in this area. One 
obvious mechanism is that an affected parent or student, harmed by 
being the victim of this one-sided message, would be able to sue to 
correct the situation. The most likely form of relief to be sought in 
this event would be one that requires the government to deem­
phasize its favored ideology or to broaden the spectrum of messages 
being delivered by including other views in the delivery system as 
well. One alternative to this remedy, however, may exist. That al­
ternative remedy would seek to silence the government's one-sided 
message by eliminating government speech in an area altogether. 
For instance, inAnderson v. CityofBoston,3lS Citizens to Protect Pub­
lic Funds v. Board of Education of Parsippany-Troy Hil/s,316 and 
Stem v. Kramarsky,317 plaintiffs prevented the government from us­
ing public funds for the endorsement of political issues.3ls The rem­
edy in these cases involved silencing the government's voice in 
certain areas. While the government was permitted to relate neutral 
information revealing the pros and cons of particular issues, it could 
not speak as an advocate for a position. The choices available were 
to say nothing at all on a particular issue or to reform its speech so as 
to make it neutral. These two alternatives would seem to exist in the 
book censorship cases as well. One of those options would result in 
the removal of certain books from the library. For mstance, suppose 
the school included books on the subject of capital punishment in its 
library, but all of the included books argued in favor of the death 
penalty. If a suit were brought to protest this practice, two remedies 
would be available. One would entail the school removing all the 
books it had on the subject of capital punishment, thus amounting to 
a judicially supervised example of book removal. Alternatively, the 
school could add books taking a position opposed to the death pen­
alty. This remedy would render an equally satisfactory result in 
such a case.319 Ultimately, the choice of remedies would be the li­
315. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2297, 80 N.E.2d 628, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 1060 
(1979). 
316. 13 N.J. 172,98 A.2d 673 (1953). 
317. 84 Misc. 2d 447, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1975). 
318. For a discussion of these three cases, see text accompanying notes 142-50 
supra. 
319. Indeed, it might be more accurate to describe this second remedy, the addition 
of books, as more satisfactory. From an educational point of view, the library should 
choose to enhance its book collection rather than to restrict it still further and to screen 
out valuable subject areas. Despite the superiority of a decision to add books, from the 
perspective of improving the library as a tool for learning, it is difficult to find any consti­
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brary's own to make. Because either option would cure the uncon­
stitutional aspects of the school's behavior, and the removal option 
itself is not supported by any constitutionally based right to silence 
speech on controversial issues, the choice is the school's to make. 
While the above situation sets out a scenario in which a suit to 
remove a book or books from the school library would be successful, 
this theory will be of limited utility in a practical setting. Realisti­
cally, most parental complaints about books in the library do not 
stem from a desire to expand the universe of ideas found in the li­
brary collection, but instead seek to contract that universe. Most 
suits will be intended to produce a library that fosters the complain­
ant's one-sided view and not to allow the library to display alterna­
tive perspectives on its bookshelves. For instance, a suit might be 
brought because a parent objected to the collection including a book 
advocating premarital sex. The parent would wish to have this book 
removed from the library; a solution that involved the addition of a 
book taking the opposite outlook would not be an equally satisfac­
tory result from the parent's point of view. Additionally, if the li­
brary collection already included books discouraging teenagers from 
engaging in sexual relations, no parental complaint could be raised 
to the presence of the offensive book. In such a case the school 
would not be guilty of having a book collection that preached too 
narrow a message, and therefore a book removal suit would have no 
legal basis. 
Turning to the right to know issue, there is even less likelihood 
that this doctrine would support a lawsuit to remove a book from the 
school library. The idea behind a suit to remove a book is that there 
is a constitutionally guaranteed right not to know and to keep others 
from knowing. This notion is the antithesis of the right to know doc­
trine, thus it is difficult to imagine any twist of perspective that could 
tutional basis for forcing this choice upon the library. Decisions about what subject areas 
to include in the library collection are among those compelling content-based decisions 
the school should be entitled to make. See earlier discussion of this suggested standard 
of review in text accompanying notes 292-304 supra. Of course, one might argue that 
once the government has established a forum that includes books on a certain topic, it is 
not free to disestablish that forum or any part thereof for an improper reason. Since the 
reason for now excluding books on a controversial topic is that otherwise the government 
would be forced to include books advocating a disfavored point of view, this reason 
arguably is constitutionally impermissible. Cf Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (School Board's failure to rehire untenured 
teacher is Unconstitutional if the teacher's engaging in conduct protected by the first 
amendment was a motivating factor in the Board's decision, and the Board fails to show 
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even in 
the absence of the exercise of first amendment rights). 
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result in restructuring the theory so as to make it exploitable by a 
person seeking to achieve the removal of a shelved library book. To 
be more specific, under one' view of the right to know, the listener is 
the student and the speaker is the publisher or author. Here, instead 
of seeking to enforce a right to hear what the speaker has to say, the 
student (or the student's parent) would seek to stop the speaker from 
speaking. Similarly, if the speaker is the government and the listener 
is the student, the effort would be to stop the government as speaker 
from conveying its message. No right to know principles would sup­
port either of these positions. 
In looking to other first amendment theories that involve silenc­
ing speech, there is little in the first amendment galaxy that could be 
called upon as an aid in this enterprise. One theory of forced silence 
is rooted in notions of privacy where the rights of others must be 
balanced against the plaintiffs right to privacy.320 Because the infor­
mation being revealed by the presence of a book on the library shelf 
does not involve anything private to the plaintiff, this theory is of no 
assistance. 
Another privacy related concept is that of the need to protect a 
captive audience that may deserve some protection from unwanted 
ideas.321 It can be argued that the captive audience rationale is still 
more persuasive when the captives are juveniles. 322 While the school 
library patrons are juveniles, they do not qualify as captives. A stu­
dent is free to ignore an offensive book in the library where there is 
no requirement that certain books be read, therefore no captive audi­
ence claim can be raised. 
One additional theory of forced silence finds its origins in the 
320. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610 (1969) 
(injunction granted to prevent the showing of a film, ''Titicut Follies," to anyone other 
than professionals with a special interest in the subject matter of the film because the 
film's portrayal of conditions at state correctional institution for the criminally insane, 
including numerous episodes ofnaked inmates exhibiting obvious signs of mental illness, 
violated the privacy rights of the inmates); Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 
668 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (permanent injunction granted to prevent further circulation of a 
book by a psychiatrist containing verbatim transcripts of sessions between psychiatrist 
and patient which detailed intimate facts of patient's life). 
321. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 759 (1978) (powell, J., concur­
ring); Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970); Black, He Cannot Choose But 
Hear: The Plight ofthe Captive Auditor, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 960 (1953); Haiman, Speech 
v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to he Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 153 (1972). 
322. Cj Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concur­
ring) ("I think a State may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely deline­
ated areas, a child-like someone in a captive audience---is not possessed of that full 
capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guaran­
tees.") (footnote omitted). 
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parent/child relationship. The argument here would be that the pri­
mary responsibility for instilling values in a child is with the child's 
parents and that this parental role is entitled to constitutional protec­
tion as part of the concept of liberty within the due process clause.323 
Therefore, the school would not be free to interfere with the constitu­
tionally protected parent/child relationship by making available to 
children ideas that differ from the ideas of their parents. While this 
notion may have some credibility in the situation where the child is 
the captive of certain ideas in the classroom setting,324 whatever the 
scope of parental rights, those rights do not extend to the point of 
permitting a parent to "cleanse" the library shelves by removing all 
offensive books. One solution occasionally relied on by school 
boards in dealing with controversial books is an offshoot of this pa­
rental control model. In some cases, instead of being removed en­
tirely, books are placed on a limited access shelf.32s In order to 
check a book on this shelf out of the library, the student must have a 
parent's approval for the loan of the book. Some schools claim this 
is a fair accommodation of the rights of the parties. Whether it is 
must be determined by delineating the extent to which minors have 
first amendment rights independent of the rights of their parents.326 
This was not an issue in Tinker because the Tinker parents shared 
the same point of view as their· children and actively encouraged 
their children to participate in protests against the Vietnam War. No 
clear answer to this difficult constitutional question has ever been 
provided. The answer may in part tum on the age of the students 
involved.327 The "mature minor" may have more constitutionally 
protected rights than the "immature minor."328 Whatever the an­
swer to this problem, it is difficult to see that it makes a difference in 
323. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 758 (1978) (Powell, J., 
concurring); Wisconsin v. Yoder,406 U.S. 205,232-34 (1972); Ginsberg v. New York, 
390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923). 
324. See Comment, supra note II, at 492-503. 
325. E.g., Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 
404,423 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981) (while nine books were en­
tirely removed from school libraries, one book, Black Boy by Richard Wright, was re­
turned to the libraries with student access conditioned on parental approval); Presidents 
Council Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289, 290 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972) (Down These Mean Streets, while removed from schoolli ­
braries, was made available on a direct loan basis to the parents of children attending 
district schools). 
326. See Garvey, supra note 12, at 328-37. 
327. See Tushnet, Free Expression and tire Young Adult: A Constitutional Frame­
work, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 746, 749-52. 
328. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
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the context of a suit to remove a book from the school library. In 
such a case, students are not being forced to read any particular book 
and it is hard to imagine that one parent would be granted rights that 
could be used to preclude other parents and their children from hav­
ing access to books that they consider educationally beneficial. Giv­
ing one parent monopolistic control over the content of the school 
library and what it may not contain is no more satisfactory than giv­
ing the school itself this exclusive right. 
The fourth possibility for a right of enforced silence stems from 
the idea that some speech is socially harmful. Arguments occasion­
ally have been advanced that 3peech tending to promote socially 
harmful ideas is not protected speech and ought to be silenced.329 In 
the main, these arguments have been unsuccessful because one of the 
central purposes of the first amendment is to protect the expression 
of unpopular views.33o If the first amendment only protected views 
acceptable to a majority of the population, it would have little point 
since such views are in small danger of being suppressed. It is a 
cornerstone of first amendment theory that all ideas, good and bad, 
should have a chance to compete in the marketplace of ideas and 
that only the best ideas will emerge victorious as a result of this con­
test.33i This notion runs counter to the idea of forced censorship. 
Moreover, even if in some cases the government may be able to de­
termine that it needs to silence certain speech for the protection of 
the public interest, this is still a far cry from one individual being 
able to force the government to suppress speech against the govern­
ment's better judgment.332 Therefore, even this potential idea for 
329. See, e.g., Note, Group Vil!fication Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.1. 308 (1979). 
330. E.g., Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. lli.), aJl'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th 
Cir.), cerl. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of 
America, 51 Ill. App. 3d 279, 366 N.E.2d 347 (1977), aJl'd in part and rev'd in part, 69 Ill. 
2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978). 
331. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, 1., dissenting). 
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may 
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own 
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in 
ideas,-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself ac­
cepted in the competition of the market; and that truth is the only ground upon 
which their wishes safely can be carried out. 
Id 
332. Ifspeech is shown to be unprotected, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 
U.S. 49 (1973), or if the government has a sufficiently compelling justification for the 
suppression of speech, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), government 
restraints on speech are constitutionally permissible. That the government may be enti­
tled to silence speech, however, does not mean that an individual would be able to force 
the silencing of speech the government chooses to leave alone. See Organization for a 
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imposed silence has no real application to cases attempting to force 
the school to remove books from its library. 
It seems fairly clear that there is little support in first amend­
ment theory for an argument that would result in a court ordering 
the removal of a book from the library shelves. With the limited 
exception that restraints on the right of government advocacy could 
produce such a result in the form of a remedy for the government 
overstepping the constitutionally prescribed bounds of its right to 
speak, no real claim can be grounded in any doctrine consistent with 
first amendment theory. Thus, the position that such suits are 
doomed to failure, shared by interventionist and noninterventionist 
courts alike, seems easily supported by first amendment principles. 
While intervention may be justified under several different theories 
in cases in which a school board's decision to remove a book is being 
challenged, this is not the case wherein a plaintiff is seeking to force 
the removal of a book. 




The third and final censorship scenario arises in a situation 
wherein a parent or a student sues to force a school to purchase cer­
tain books for the school library. As a last point of examination into 
the school library censorship arena, this situation will be compared 
to its other two censorship counterparts: suits to challenge removal 
and suits to bring about removal. 
The genesis ofa suit to require the purchase of certain books for 
the school library will be rooted in parental or student dissatisfaction 
with the quality of the school library collection. Mter meeting with 
no success in efforts to suggest additional titles for the collection, a 
lawsuit will be commenced to force the school to correct deficiencies 
in its library collection. 
While this situation is almost nonexistent among reported 
cases,333 it has not escaped the attention of courts handling book re-
Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); cf. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 
292-94 (1979) (while Freedom of Information Act permits federal agencies to withhold 
information under certain circumstances, nondisclosure cannot be forced upon agency by 
submitter of information who wishes to keep that information confidential). 
333. In re Appeal of Daniel Kornblum, 70 N.Y.S. Educ. Dep't Rep. 19 (1949) is 
the only decision this author has been able to identify that came close to the situation of a 
suit seeking to require the purchase of a book. In that case, The Nalion was removed 
from the list of periodicals approved for purchase by high school libraries in the City of 
New York. While previously on the approved list, the New York City Board of Educa­
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moval controversies. All of the courts deciding cases raising a chal­
lenge to a book removal have parenthetically remarked on the likely 
fate of attempts to challenge a school library decision not to select a 
particular book for the school library as contrasted with a decision to 
remove an already shelved book.334 In most of the cases, the court, 
whether interventionist or noninterventionist, has concluded that ju­
dicial intervention rarely is merited in the initial book selection pro­
cesS.335 This result is easily reached and explained in the case of 
noninterventionist courts. Such a result is in keeping with their gen­
eral philosophy of school autonomy in such matters. As for in­
terventionist courts, while most such courts take time in their 
opinions to state that no intervention would be justified in the book 
selection process,336 none of the courts expressing such an attitude 
bother to supply an explanation for the distinction it draws. This 
willingness to leave selection decisions in the hands of the school 
board is pounced upon by noninterventi~nist courts as a basis for 
criticizing the judicial review approach. The noninterventionist 
tion removed The Nation for the 1948-49 school year because of several anti-Catholic 
articles that had appeared in the magazine during 1948. Suit was brought by Daniel 
Kornblum, a taxpayer, and The Nation Associates, Inc., The Nation's publisher, chal­
lenging the Board of Education's action on a variety of statutory and constitutional 
grounds. The Commissioner of Education, in ruling on appellants' claim of a violation 
of the freedom of the press, held that free press principles did not require the Board to 
purchase any particular publications. After rejecting the remainder of appellants' argu­
ments, the Commissioner ruled in favor of the Board of Education. The Nation was not 
returned to the approved list until 1963. Since that time, the Board of Education has 
changed its practices and the Magazine List is now merely a suggested list, no longer 
restricting what magazines schools may purchase. Letter from Helen Scattley, Director 
of the New York City School Library Service to David Beminghausen (Apr. 6, 1972), 
reprinted in D. BERNINGHAUSEN, THE FLIGHT FROM REASON 55 (1975). 
The only other case seemingly involving such a fact pattern is Minarcini v. Strongs­
ville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976). In Minarcini, the court initially 
described the case as raising issues of what books should be chosen as textbooks, 
purchased for the library, and removed from the library. Id. at 578. Moreover, the facts, 
as recounted by the court, indicated that one book at issue in the case, God Bless You, Mr. 
Rosewater by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., had not yet been purchased by the library. Despite 
these facts, this aspect of the case was ignored throughout the decision. While the court 
stated that the school has no obligation to purchase any particular books for the school 
library, this remark appears to be dictum and was not made in relation to any facts in the 
record. Id. at 582. 
334. See, e.g., Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 
F.2d 404, 435-36 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J., concurring), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 
(1981); Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976). 
335. See, e.g., Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 
615,620 n.3 (D. Vt. 1979), ajJ'd, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of 
Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (D.N.H. 1979). 
336. See, e.g., Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 
711 (D. Mass. 1978). 
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courts claim that this distinction is justified only by the theory that a 
book acquires tenure by being shelved in the library,337 a theory 
these courts find indefensible. 
While there is agreement by almost all of the courts concerned 
that attempts to gain access to the book selection process should be 
rebuked, the question arises whether this easy dismissal is justified 
by the legal principles involved. Because no explanation is offered in 
defense of this distinction, an attempt will be made here to deter­
mine if a challenger seeking to force the purchase of a book ought to 
be perceived as in a different legal posture than one seeking to chal­
lenge the removal of a book. 
The place to initiate a search for legally justifiable distinctions, 
as in the case of suits to restore removed books, is with public forum 
principles.. The question to be asked is whether a finding that the 
school library is a public forum for purposes of the book removal 
situation requires this same characterization to be carried over to the 
book selection context as well. To resolve this inquiry it will be nec­
essary to reexamine the several public forum theories that proved 
most workable when applied to book removal disputes. 
The first theory successfully employed in the book removal set­
ting was an involuntary public forum theory that required the gov­
ernment to give students access to a forum it had created exclusively 
for its own use. Despite a government intention to monopolize the 
primary forum it had established, public forum theory precluded it 
from doing so. Having opened a forum for its own use, the school 
was required to admit nongovernment users based on something 
akin to the Mosley equal access principle. In light of this theory, it 
must be asked why the access of nongovernment participants to the 
forum must be limited to contesting the removal of selected books. 
One obvious explanation comes to mind. Suppose the forum is con­
sidered to be the library collection itself, those books the library has 
purchased and placed on the library shelves. In that event access 
rights will rightfully exist only within the contours of the forum as 
defined. If a shelved book is removed, the exclusion of that book can 
be objected to by students who have the right to participate in the 
forum. If a book is not yet part of the collection, however, it is 
outside the forum and no student forum related rights come into 
play. 
This interpretation of the situation does explain why book selec­
337. Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289, 
293 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972). 
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tion is not subject to the same constitutional limitations as book re­
moval. This interpretation, however, is not the only possible view of 
the situation. An alternative position is that the government con­
trolled forum is not comprised only of the books already purchased 
by the school but, instead, consists of the libr~ry bookshelves and all 
books that potentially could fill those shelves. If this is an accurate 
description of what it means to label the school library a public fo­
rum, students having rights in the forum can challenge both deci­
sions about what goes on the library bookshelves as well as what 
comes off those shelves. 
This alternative explanation raises the question of why there are 
two equally plausible ways of defining the school library as a forum 
in the context of this first public forum theory. The one answer that 
can be suggested for this anomaly is the flexibility of the public fo­
rum concept. Under this involuntary public forum theory, the gov­
ernment's promise of a forum is one implied in law and not in fact. 
The government's actual intent is to create a forum exclusively for 
the expression of government views and the first amendment simply 
says that such an intent cannot be effectuated. Instead, the govern­
ment is required to allow nongovernment users access to the forum. 
Since the government never had the intent to open its forum to 
outside users, it is not possible to examine the government's intent in 
order to determine the scope of the primary forum it has created. As 
a forum implied in law, the forum can be either the protection of 
already shelved materials or the library bookshelves and all materi­
als that potentially could be suited to filling those shelves.338 
Another description of a situation in which this same problem 
occurs may be helpful in clarifying this difficulty. In Roherts v. 
DiMauro,339 the City of Springfield agreed to provide space and 
funding for a system of 180 medical information tapes (Tel-Med) 
338. In most public forum contexts the distinction between initial exclusion and 
exclusion after access has been granted is irrelevant. In the case of a traditional volun­
tary public forum that is available to outside speakers, the speaker who has not yet been 
granted access to the forum is the very person who has the right to complain about his 
exclusion from the forum. Even in the case of voluntary forums where the government 
desires to be the only voice heard in the forum but has the intention of speaking on 
behalf of all who wish their views aired, e.g., Alaska Gay Coalition v. Sullivan, 578 P.2d 
951 (Alas. 1978), the difference between views once included and views never included is 
irrelevant. If the government's forum "offer" involves the expression of all points of 
view, then a violation of first amendment rights occurs both when the government 
removes a previously included viewpoint, and when it fails at any time to include a 
viewpoint. 
339. No. 78-1634 (Super. Ct. Mass., Dec. 26, 1978) (order granting preliminary 
injunction). 
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compiled by Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Massachusetts. The tapes 
were played for members of the public who called the Tel-Med Tape 
Library phone number and requested particular tapes by number. 
After the tape system had been installed, the mayor became aware 
that the Tape Library contained tapes on the subjects of birth control 
and abortion. He then took it upon himself to remove a total of six 
tapes on these subjects. A suit was brought by several local residents 
claiming that the city's decision to fund the tape system created a 
public forum and that the removal of the six tapes violated their first 
amendment right to know. 
The claim made by plaintiffs in Roberts is analogous to a suit 
challenging the removal of a book from the school library. The 
city's sponsorship of the collection of 180 tapes can be viewed as the 
creation of. a primary forum exclusively for government controlled 
speech. As in the school library book removal cases, one can argue 
that the first amendment requires that the government's attempt at 
exclusivity fail and that members of the public acquire a vested in­
terest in the availability of the information system. That being so, 
decisions by the government to remove previously included tapes are 
subject to challenge by those who are the intended beneficiaries of 
the information. 340 
That easy issue aside, the litigation developed a more interesting 
component. After the suit was brought to have the six tapes returned 
and a temporary restraining order was issued requiring the mayor to 
restore the missing tapes,341 another group ofcitizens moved to inter­
vene in the lawsuit claiming that they had a right to include a prolife 
tape in the Tel-Med Tape Library. They argued that having created 
340. Characterization of the Tape Library as a primary forum has avoided the 
question of whether the forum (with respect to the original 180 tapes) was a voluntary or 
an involuntary forum. Two differing views o~ this question are possible. One view 
would characterize the Tape Library as a voluntary forum much like the Anchorage Blue 
Book in Alaska Gay Coalition v. Sullivan, 578 P.2d 951 (Alas. 1978). See text accompa­
nying notes 86-88 mpra. Under this view, the argument would be made that it was the 
city's intention to create a medical information system of 180 tapes for the benefit of local 
residents. Having such an intent and thereby creating a public forum, the city was not 
free to renege on its intention by selectively removing some of the 180 tapes. An alterna­
tive view of the facts would perceive the situation as involving an involuntary forum. 
Here the claim would be that the city was providing a service to the community that it 
felt free to alter or discontinue at any time and that the city never intended, by the provi­
sion of this service, to vest city residents with a constitutional interest in the continued 
existence of the Tape Library. 
341. Roberts v. DiMauro, No. 78-1634 (Super. Ct. Mass., Dec. 18, 1978) (tempo-, 
rary restraining order issued as follows: ''The Court orders that as long as the 180 tapes 
are on city property, the Mayor, agents or servants, cannot interfere or act as a censor 
over the playing of any of the tapes."). 
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a forum, the city was not free to use that forum to advocate a posi­
tion on a controversial issue like abortion without giving opposing 
views a chance to be heard through the same medium. Unfortu­
nately, this issue was never resolved by the court.342 The case be­
came moot when Blue Cross-Blue Shield rC?moved the tapes from 
city property and began running them as a privately sponsored 
service.343 
Had the court been forced to deal with this issue, however, the 
resolution of the issue, as in a book selection case, would focus on 
the exact nature of the forum that the city had created. Was the 
forum the closed collection of 180 medical information tapes or an 
open ended forum for all medical information tapes in areas related 
to the original 180? No easy answer to this dilemma presents it­
self.344 Either result is possible. The choice between the two ap­
proaches, however, has great significance in the context of a book 
selection challenge. One approach would make possible such chal­
lenges and the other would not. 
Without resolving the issue of how the forum should be defined 
in such cases, it should be remembered that one other involuntary 
forum theory was suggested for use in the book removal cases. That 
version of the doctrine instead involves constitutional restrictions on 
what the government may say in its exclusive forum. If this forum 
theory is relied on, it seems fairly certain that book selection and 
removal cannot be analytically separated. Since the problem is that 
342. Id (Dec. 26, 1978) (application for intervention denied without prejudice on 
the ground that a further request for the inclusion of the proposed additional tape should 
be directed to the city before such an application for intervention could properly be 
considered). 
343. Blue Cross-Blue Shield removed the Tape Library from city property on De­
cember 28, 1978. The city thereafter filed a motion to dismiss on the ground ofmootness. 
The city's motion was never acted upon and thus the preliminary injunction issued on 
December 26, 1978 remains in effect. 
344. In the interest of complete accuracy, one easy solution did seem in the offing 
had the Tel-Med controversy continued. While the court dismissed the intervenors' com­
plaint, it did so without prejudice. The suggestion made to the intervenors by the court 
was that they should write to the city reiterating their request for including an additional 
tape. The city had turned down the initial request on the ground that it was prevented by 
the temporary restraining order issued against the city from tampering with the Tape 
Library. The superior court, however, stated that the city was in error in its interpreta­
tion of the court order. Under that order, the city was precluded only from removing any 
of the 180 tapes. The order did not prevent adding tapes to the collection. With this 
clarification of the court order presented to the city, it is entirely possible, had the tapes 
not been removed from city control, that the city would have granted the intervenors' 
request, thereby voluntarily opening up the forum to medical information tapes beyond 
the original collection. Aside from this development, however, the case would have had 
to be resolved based on involuntary forum grounds. 
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the government is using the forum it created and it monopolizes for 
the expression of one-sided viewpoints, behavior that is contrary to 
constitutional requirements, the proper remedy for this constitu­
tional violation is for the government to correct the imbalance in its 
collection. This can be accomplished in several ways. If the imbal­
ance arose only because shelved books were removed, reshelving is 
an appropriate remedy. If the collection was unbalanced from its 
inception, a cure will be achieved through either of two solutions. 
The first solution is the removal of those books that create the imbal­
ance;345 all shelved books on abortion if all such books advocate a 
prochoice position. The second possible remedy is the addition of 
books to offer a wider selection of viewpoints: the addition of prolife 
books if all the shelved books advocate a prochoice position. This 
version of the involuntary forum theory necessarily would create a 
right on the part of a student to complain about the nonselection of 
books. Thus, in applying the public forum doctrine to book selection 
cases, one finds that under some applications of that doctrine, book 
selection and book removal cases can be dealt with differently and, 
under others, the results in both kinds of cases are identical. 
The next point of comparison between book selection and book 
removal cases involves the right to know. In making this compari­
son, it must be recalled that originally in discussing right to know 
principles it was decided that two alternative analyses were avail­
able: One viewing the speaker as the publisher or author and the 
other viewing the speaker as the government.346 In a complaint 
about the book selection process, if the speaker were to be consid­
ered the author of a book that the government failed to include in 
the school library, there is a relationship between a willing speaker 
and a willing listener. As in the book removal cases, for this analysis 
to be tenable, it will be necessary to show that the speaker/listener 
relationship has been assisted by the government through the gov­
ernment's creation of a public forum. Thus, one must demonstrate 
that public forum theory includes a right to force the government to 
buy unpurchased books. If public forum principles attach only to 
purchased books, the right to know argument will fail. It will be 
only in the event that the forum consists of the bookshelves and 
books that could fill those shelves that a student will obtain relief by 
asserting the right to know. Ultimately, under this right to know 
345. See text accompanying notes 315-19 supra. 
346. See text accompanying notes 197-203 supra. 
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theory, removal and selection are not analytically separate because 
they both depend on the existence of a public forum. 
As was pointed out, however, an alternative way of lookffig at 
the right to know question exists. It also is possible to utilize that 
doctrine by viewing the government as the speaker. Under this ap­
proach, the right to know is a self-sufficient basis for finding the in­
vasion of a right protected by the first amendment and has no 
dependence on public forum theory. Unfortunately, under this view 
the speaker is no longer a willing speaker. As an unwilling speaker, 
however, there are significant differences between the book removal 
situation and the initial book selection process. In the removal con­
text, smce the book is owned by the school and has only been taken 
off the shelf; the student is seeking access to information (a book) in 
the control of the government. While one may quarrel over whether 
the information being sought is governmental in character or relates 
to the operation of government, at least it is government property. 
By contrast, in a suit to force the purchase of a book, the information 
being sought (the requested book) has never been in government 
hands and thus seeking such information from an unwilling govern­
ment finds little or no justification in right to know theory. 
The only other right to know argument with a potential for cov­
ering the selection situation is Professor Emerson's idea of the right 
to know acting as a restraint on government monopolization of an 
important channel of communication.347 As was pointed out in ini­
tially discussing that theory,348 as students are not a captive audience 
in the library and because library books do not so obviously bear a 
government seal of approval, Professor Emerson's theory is not as 
easily applied in the school library setting as it is in the context of the 
classroom. 
Despite the significant difficulties standing in the way ofjudicial 
review of a claim of improper book selection, the greatest difficulty 
of all may be encountered in the process of a review of the merits of 
such a claim. Initially, it must be remembered that the job of filling 
the library's shelves involves continuous choices between numerous 
book titles, many of which are rejected for every one that is chosen. 
One's visceral reaction to this may be to conclude that the realities of 
the process ought to prevent holding each of these decisions up to 
scrutiny by a court. Once one begins to look carefully at the possible 
347. See note 226 supra and accompanying text. 
348. See text accompanying notes 227-30 supra. 
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reasons for selection, however, this nearly impossible task begins to 
look quite possible. 
To begin with, the plaintiff in such a case will have the burden 
of showing the existence of a constitutionally improper reason for 
nonselection. Many reasons, as can be seen from the analysis of con­
stitutionally adequate versus constitutionally inadequate justifica­
tions in the context of allegedly improper book removals,349 are 
entirely appropriate reasons for library action. Explanations such as 
a book's excessive cost, that its author or publisher is unknown to the 
selector, an author's reputation for poor quality work, the library 
collection being already adequately supplied with books iq a certain 
subject area, a certain topic being unsuited to the needs of the school 
library, and many others of the same ilk, are easily identified as deci­
sions it is essential that the school be able to make.350 The plaintiff 
must therefore demonstrate some other basis for the school's action. 
Among the improper reasons would be that the selector disagrees 
with the position the author of a book takes on a controversial mat­
ter, that the selector is antipathetic to the background or views of the 
author of a book, and possibly that the book contains offensive lan­
guage or sexually explicit scenes. These reasons would be consid­
ered improper bases for book removal,35 1 thus they are equally 
improper in the case of nonselection of a book. 
The major obstacle for the plaintiff in a book selection case will 
be in obtaining evidence of improper selection. In cases in which the 
nonselection is essentially inadvertent-for example, where the li­
brarian had no special knowledge about a nonselected book; instead, 
a positive choice was made to include a different book-no such evi­
dence will be available. Such cases, however, are not bothersome. 
As the reasons for nonselection in these cases are not unconstitu­
tional, there is no cause for feeling troubled by the unavailability of 
evidence of the specific reason· for nonselection. In other cases, evi­
dence may be more easily available. If a book were actively consid­
ered and then rejected for an improper reason, evidence of this may 
be available in the form of statements made by the selector.352 In 
349. See text accompanying notes 295-309 supra. 
350. See notes 292-94 supra and accompanying text for a more detailed description 
of the standard of review suggested for use in cases raising a challenge to a book re­
moval. This article assumes this same standard of review is appropriate for use in the 
book selection situation. 
351. See text accompanying notes 301-04 supra. 
352. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
268 (1977). 
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still other cases, the nonselection decision may be made neither in an 
obviously improper manner nor in an obviously innocent one. In 
such cases, the plaintiff must show that at least one of the factors' that 
motivated the decisionmaker was an unconstitutional factor.353 The 
burden then will shift to the defendant school board to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the same decision would have 
been made in the absence of an improper motive.354 Thus, if the 
plaintiff shows that the book was initially slated for purchase and 
that decision later was reconsidered and changed, this departure 
from ordinary book selection procedures would be prima facie evi­
dence of an improper motive for nonselection.355 The burden of 
proof then would shift to the school to show that the reconsideration 
was unrelated to the book's content: For example, where all book 
purchases were reconsidered during that period because of cutbacks 
in the library budget; or that the reconsideration, while initiated by a 
member of the library staff because of concern over offensive lan­
guage in the book, was made because the book in question had re­
ceived bad reviews in several influential book review magazines due 
to its poor literary quality. These examples demonstrate that while 
the availability of evidence sometimes may present a problem to the 
plaintiff in a book selection case, that problem is no more acute than 
the difficulty usually faced in an attempt to demonstrate that govern­
ment action is improperly motivated.356 Thus, despite surface differ­
ences between book removal and book selection controversies, in 
,attempting to review the merits of such controversies the same stan­
dard of review that proved workable in the book removal cases is 
equally functional when applied to book selection cases. 
In the end, despite the knee jerk reaction of interventionist 
courts, it appears that the distinction drawn between the initial selec­
tion situation and later removal of a book is not an inevitable one. 
While the selection situation encounters some additional difficulties, 
both in showing that a constitutional violation has occurred and in 
353. Mt. Healthy City School Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 
(1977). 
354. Id 
355. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
267 (1977). 
356. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55,65-74 (1980); Brest, The Supreme 
Court, 1975 Term-Foreword' In Defense ofthe Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. 
REv. I (1976); Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem ofLegislative 
Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REv. 95; Ely, Legislative andAdministrative Motivation in Constitu­
tional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Symposium. Legislative Motivation, 15 SAN DIEGO 
L. REv. 925 (1978). 
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proving that the government has no compelling reason to justify that 
violation, these difficulties are not insurmountable. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As was suggested at the outset of this article, the resolution of 
school library censorship disputes requires an exacting application of 
a number of intricate and interwoven first amendment doctrines. In 
much of that analysis, it is necessary to cross uncharted first amend­
ment territory, determining the proper boundaries of doctrine and 
exploring new aspects of recognized first amendment concepts. 
Courts faced with such controversies usually have chosen instead to 
rely on established doctrine, avoiding an attempt to examine new 
analytic possibilities. Unfortunately, this path is not really available 
without the sacrifice of accuracy and doctrinal integrity. In the 
Supreme Court's pending decision of a school library censorship 
case, the Court must be willing to deal with these complexities, no 
longer sweeping aside analytic weaknesses. Even if the result of this 
new probing is to reveal a number of first amendment dilemmas, this 
consequence should not be feared. In the end, the result of exposing 
these dilemmas and attempting to resolve them will be to strengthen 
the doctrinal foundation of free speech analysis and to add to the 
overall understanding of first amendment principles. 
